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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the projection and valuation of the Egyptian social 
security pension system which represents the first and main pillar in pension provision 
in Egypt. The system is officially a funded defined benefit one and is managed by two 
public Funds on behalf of the state. As a result of the pre-funding strategy, the two 
Funds have been accumulating a large amount of assets, which makes them important 
institutional investors with certain characteristics. Larger contributions from 
employees and/or employers or cutting back some benefits cannot be recommended 
by the system's actuary in the event of an actuarial deficit for many political, 
economic and social reasons. Actuarial deficits can be dealt with by two methods, the 
first is higher interest rates on the invested funds from the National Investment Bank 
(NIB). The second is a transfer from the Treasury to shoulder the actuarial deficit 
alongside the annual subsidy given to improve the level of benefits. 
This strategy raises four very important questions. The first is whether the system's 
expected annual cash flow is sustainable under different demographic and economic 
scenarios, particularly whether the system will face any cash flow liquidity shortage 
in the near future. The second is how much the expected annual subsidy will be. The 
third is what is the required rate of interest on the invested funds to achieve the 
funding objective of covering 100% of the liabilities. The fourth is whether the 
current contribution rates are fair and adequate for new entrants at certain ages. In 
answering these questions a pension projection and valuation model is developed. 
This involves analysing and modelling the relevant demographic and economic 
factors in order to project them. 
It is found that the system will face cash flow deficits unless it liquidates some of its 
assets over the projection period. It is also found that the current contribution rates are 
more than enough to cover the cost of new entrants, even with delays in starting work 
as a result of the high unemployment. It is also found that a moderate rate of interest 
of around 6-7% per annum with salary growth of around 8-9% per annum can keep 
the funding level at 100% of the liabilities. Finally, a set of recommendations are 
made for reforming the system to enable it to survive the changes it faces in an 
uncertain economic and demographic environment. Some suggestions for further 
work are also discussed. 
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Key to Symbols and Definitions 
No. Variable Definitions 
1. Population Variables 
1. Base Date 30 of June 1997 is the base date of the projection (i. e. t= 
of projection 0) and the projection will be carried out until 306 of June 
2025. This means that t takes values of t=0,1, 
...., 
28. 
This allows a comparison between the model's results and 
the actual results over 1997-2000 in order to validate the 
model's projections over 2000-25; 
2. Coverage The ESSPS covers 105% of the employed work force ; 
3. S Denotes sex and s= in for males and s=f for females; 
4. X, 
,z 
Age last birthday of male, female and orphan, respectively; 
5. POP(x, t, s) Number of population of sex s and age x last birthday in 
year t; 
6. LF(x, t, s) Number of labour force of age x last birthday and sex s in 
year tfort? 1 and 18<_x<_64; 
7. LFPR(x, t, s) Labour force participation rate for sex s and age x last 
birthday in year t for t >_ 1 and 18: 5 x: 5 64; 
8. TLF(t, s) Total labour force of sex s in year t fort >_ 1; 
9. TLF(t) Total labour force of both sexes in year t for t >_ 1; 
10. UEMR(x, t, s) Unemployment rate of sex s and age x last birthday in year 
tfort 
_1 and 185x564; 11. UEM(x, t, s) Number of unemployed of sex s and age x last birthday in 
Bartfort>_ 1 and 18<_x<_64; 
12. EM(x, t, s) Number of employed of sex s and age x last birthday in 
Bartfort>_ 1 and 18SxS64; 
13. TEM(t, S) Total number of employed of sex s in year t for t >_ 1; 
14. TEM(t) Total number of employed in year t fort >_ 1 
15. M Denotes particular scheme of the system where, M=H for 
the casual workers scheme, M=E for the self-employed 
scheme, M=W for the Egyptian working abroad scheme, 
M=C for the civil servants scheme, M=P for the public 
and private sector employees, M=GSF for the Government 
Sector Fund, M= PPSF for the Public and Private Sector 
Fund and M= ESSPS for the Egyptian Social Security 
Pension System; 
16. b, r Denote entry age and Normal Retirement Age (NRA) 
respectively in scheme M where b= 18 for M=C, P, W 
1 Any one who has joined any kind of jobs must join the ESSPS (except for the majority of the 
informal sector). Even if the individual changes the job he/she may stay in the same scheme or move to 
another scheme within the system. The only case, which might happen when the member moves to one 
of the jobs that have been contracted out in the 1970s, and this is a rare event. The coverage ratio of 
105% was worked out from the experience of the ESSPS over 1990-1999. It is more than 100% 
because some of the unemployed workforce continuous to receive coverage in the year t because they 
were employed and contributed to system in previous years and potentially able to contribute to the 
system again in the following years. 
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andb=21 forM=E, H, theNRA=60 forM=C, P, W 
and NRA = 65 for M=E, H; 
17. PC(M, x, t, s) Proportion covered by scheme M of EM(t, x, s) in year t 
fort>_ 1 andb<_x<_r; 
18. Act(M, x, t, s) Number of active members covered by scheme M of sex s 
and aged x last birthday in year t for t >_ 1 and b5 x5 r; 
19. Act(M, t) Total active members covered by scheme M in year t for t 
20. Act(t) Total active members covered by the ESSPS in year t for t 
>_ 1; 
21. g(M, s) The constant assumed rate of increase (or decrease) in 
membership of scheme M of sex s over the projection 
period; 
22. Z(M, x, t, s) Rate of increase (or decrease) in the membership of 
scheme M of sex s and age x last birthday in year t for t >_ 1 
and xl <x< X2 where xl = the youngest age at entry and x2 
= the assumed oldest age for en ; 
23. G Denotes the cause of retirement where, G=N for normal 
old-age retirement benefit, R= remuneration benefit, G= 
E for early retirement benefit, G=I for invalidity 
retirement benefit, G=W for work or illness injuries 
retirement benefit, G=U for unemployment benefits and 
G=D for the death benefit; 
24. G(M, x, t, s) Number of G beneficiaries of scheme M of sex s and aged 
x last birthday in year t for t >_ 1; 
25. WI(M, s, t, s) Number of widows/widowers of scheme M aged y (or x) 
last birthday in year t for t >_ 1; 
26. Or(M, z, t, s) Number of orphans of the scheme M aged z last birthday 
in year tfort>_ 1; 
27. TNF(M, x, t, s) Number of beneficiaries of scheme M of sex s and aged x 
last birthday in year t for t >_ 1; 
2. Cash-flow Variables 
2.1. Income 
28. P(M) Rate of compliance in scheme M which represents the 
overall proportion of active members who pay contribution 
to the scheme; 
29. dc(M, x, t) The contribution density', which is the average fraction of 
the year during which contributions are effectively payable 
by an active member aged x last birthday of scheme M 
between time t and t+1 for t >_ 1 and b:: 5 x<_ r; 
30. dc(M, t) The average contribution density for an active member of 
scheme M between time zero and t for t >_ 1 and b: 5 x: 5 r; 
31. C (M, B/V Contribution rate of scheme M for basic or variable salar ; 
32. SALM, x, B) The age-dependent salary scale of the basic salary of an 
` Although this should be a function of x, it is assumed in this thesis that it is independent of x as there 
is no available data to work out the relationship between contribution density and age. 
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active member of scheme M aged x last birthday for b: 5 x 
S r; 
33. S(M, x, t, B/I9 The basic/variable pensionable salary of active members 
aged x last birthdaatt=0 for b<_x_5r; 
34. AS(M, X) Average pensionable salary of active members aged x last 
birthday att=0 for b_x<_r; 
35. AS(M, x+t) Average pensionable salary of active members aged x+t 
last birthday at time t for t >_ 1; 
36. TS(M, t) Total insured salaries under scheme M in year t for t >_ 1; 
37. PS(M, x+ t, s) Total past service for an active member of scheme M and 
aged x+t last birthday in year t for t >_ 1; 
38. NI(M, t) Projected net income of scheme M in year t fort >_ 1; 
39. FI(M, t) Projected increase in funds of the two Funds (M = GSF 
and PPSF) in year t for t? 1; 
40. F(M, t) Projected fund of the two Funds (M = GSF and PPSF) at 
the end of year t for t >_ 1; 
41. TIM, t) Projected total income to scheme M in year t for tz1; 
42. TE(M, t) Projected total expenditure of scheme M in year t for t >_ 1; 
43. TS(M, t, B/V) Projected total basic/variable pensionable salaries for 
scheme M in year t for t >_ 1; 
44. TC(M, t) Projected total contribution income for scheme M in year t 
fort>_ 1; 
45. TTS(M, t) Projected total Treasury subsidy income to scheme M in 
year 1; 
46. TIR(ESSPS, t) Projected total investment return to the two Funds (M = 
GSF and PPSF) on the invested funds in year t for t >_ 1; 
2.2. Benefits 
47. db(M, x, t) Denotes the benefit density', which is the proportion of the 
potential period of service for an active member aged x last 
birthday of scheme M in year t which is effectively 
reckoned for pension purposes for t >_ 1 and b: 5 x<_ r; 
48. L Denotes particular type of the pension amount where, L= 
B for the basic pension amount, L=V for the variable 
ension amount and L=I for the total pension increments; 
49. GP(M, x, t, s, L) Average monthly pension amount of type L of a new G 
beneficiary of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday 
in year t for tz1; 
50. GL(M, x, t, s, L) Average lump sum amount of type L of a new G 
beneficiary of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday 
in year t for t >_ 1; 
51. DKB(M, x, t, L) Death benefit amount for deceased beneficiary of K status 
at death where K= Act for death in service and K =G, for 
death after retirement (where G=N, E, I& W), of pension 
amount of te L of scheme M of sex s and aged x last 
3 The actual benefit density may exceed dc(M, x, t) due to crediting of non-contributory periods, 
however, it is assumed in this model that db(M, x, t) = dc(M, x, t). 
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birthday in year t for t >_ 1; 
52. DKP(M, x, t, L) Average monthly death pension amount of type L for a 
new deceased beneficiary of K status at death where K= 
Act for death in service and K =G, for death after 
retirement (where G=N, E, I& W), of pension amount of 
type L of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in 
year tfor tz1; 
53. NDP(M, x, t, L) Total death pension amount of a new deceased member of 
type L of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in 
Bartfort 
_ 
1; 
54. DKLS(M, x, t, L) Death lump sum amount for new deceased beneficiary of 
K status at death where K= Act for death in service and K 
=G for death after retirement (where G=N, E, I& W), of 
scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in year t for t >_ 
1; 
55. DLST(M, x, t, L) Total death lump sum amount for new deceased 
beneficiary of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday 
in year tfor t_1; 
56. Pro(x) Lump sum proportion paid in the case of the death or 
invalidity of the insured person of sex s and aged x last 
birthday in year t >_ 1 which is a function of the age at 
death or invalidit ; 
57. AS(M, x, t, s, BIV) Average pensionable salary for a member aged x last 
birthday of scheme M in year t fort >_ 1 and r: 5 x: 5 b; 
58. FS(M, x, t, s, B) Final salary, based on the basic wage for a member aged x 
last birthday of scheme Min year t for t; 
-> 
1 and r: 5 x: 5 b; 
59. CAS(M, x, t, s, Career average salary, based on the basic or variable wage 
B/i'9 for a member aged x last birthday of scheme M in year t 
fort>_I and r<_x<_b; 
60. RF(M, x, s, B/I'9 Reduction factor for early retirement pension 
(basic/variable) of scheme M of sex s and aged x last 
birthday for b: 5 x: 5 r; 
61. SurP(M, x, s) Survivors' benefits function used in the projection of the 
death benefits which gives the share in the deceased's 
pension for every category of survivor and the probability 
of getting this share in scheme M; 
62. f3! The rate of pension increase (increments) of scheme M in 
eartfortý! 1; 
63. O(M, B) The constant rate of the promotional basic/variable salary 
scale for scheme M; 
64. AF(H, t) The monthly flat pension amount for the members of the 
casual workers scheme (CSIS) in year t. It is assumed to be 
as follow: L. E. 57over 1997-98, L. E. 70 over 1998-99, 
L. E. 80 over 1999-2000, and an assumed annual increase of 
19 
= 8% over 2000-20254 1 ; 
65. zx Average age (in years) of the youngest child of the 
4 It has to be taken into account that ß is replaced by zero when t=1,2 &3 as the actual values of the 
pension amounts are available. 
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deceased member (assumed to be female) with the 
assumption of an average of two children for every 
deceased member (the second is assumed to be male and 
older than the youngest by an average of 2 years) ageti z 
and z+2 respectively; 
66. z* The age limit for orphans' pensions (as 0 <_ z 
_< 
*z) is 
assumed to be 315 for sons (unlimited for disabled son) 
and unlimited for unmarried daughter; 
67. YS Average age of the widow of a male dying at age x; 
68. dr The average age difference (in years) between husband and 
wife as y,, =x 
-d,, ); 
69. h.,, by The proportion of married persons among those dying at 
ages x (male) and y (female) respectively; 
70. FC(M, x, t, s) The total cost of funeral grants for the number of deaths 
cases of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in year 
t fort 
_ 
1; 
71. DC(M, x, t, s) The total cost of death grants for the number of deaths 
cases of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in year 
tfort> 
_ 
1; 
72. TAC(M, t) Total projected administration cost in the two Funds (M = 
GSF and PPSF in year t fort >_ 1; 
73. TGP(M, x, t, s, L) Total amount of pension of type L of G beneficiaries of 
scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in year t for t 
1; 
74. TGP(M, x, t, s) Total amount of pension (sum of the three pension 
amounts, basic, variable and increments) of G beneficiaries 
of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in year t for 
t>_ 
75. TGLS(M, x, t, s) Total lump sum benefits paid to G retiring members of 
scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in year t for t 
1 and x=r; 
76. TGB(M, x, t, s) Total amount of benefits (sum of the three benefit 
amounts, basic, variable and increments) of G beneficiaries 
of scheme M of sex s and aged x last birthday in year t for 
t>_ 1; 
77. TGB(M, t) Total benefit expenditure on G retirement of scheme M in 
year tfor tz 1; 
78. TB (M, t, L) Total benefit expenditure of scheme M of type L in year t 
fort>_ 1; 
79. TB(M, t) Total benefit expenditure of scheme M in year t for t >_ 1; 
2.3. Service Table 
80. qX, q1 q 
,q q 
The independent rate of decrements of mortality, X x x invalidity, early retirement, invalidity as a result of work 
injuries and unemployment rates respectively of a member 
s It is currently 26 years, however, the Government has decided to increase it to 31 if the orphan has 
not found a job as a result of the high unemployment. It is also extended for daughters until they get 
married and sons and brothers if they are disabled. 
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aged x last birthda ; 
81. qid The independent rate of decrements of mortality of an 
invalid person aged x last birthda ; 
82. (ad)d, (ad)' and rx Number of exits due to death, invalidity and early 
retirement respectively between ages x and x+1; 
83. "qz 'q 
,*qs 
The associated dependent rate of decrements of mortality, 
x invalidity and invalidity resulting from work injury 
respectively of a person aged x last birthda ; 
84. (d), st) 
, 
(e) Forces of death, invalidity, early retirement, death after 
(w (id) invalidity and work injury decrements respectively at age x µ 
related to the ESSPS service table; 
85. A(M, x, t, s) The proportion of insured persons who are effectively in 
contributory service of scheme M of an active member of 
sex s aged x last birthday in year t; 
86. t(ap)x Probability that an active member aged x last birthday will 
remain active at age x+t with respect to the modes of 
decrement; 
87. (a1)x Number of survivors aged x last birthday in the double 
decrement table of the ESSPS; 
88. 'q 
f, 
*q f The associated dependent rate of decrements of mortality 
and marriage respectively of a female aged zf last birthda ; 
89. *q 
yPm , 
*q rd The associated dependent rate of decrements of mortality 
and remarriage respectively of a female aged y last 
birthda ; 
3. Valuation Variables 
90. i Valuation interest rate; 
91. V The reciprocal of (1+ 1); 
92. 8 The uniform force of earned interest on invested assets; 
93. The assumed inflation rate; 
94. Y, The force of salary escalation in year t; 
95. 8eq The uniform force of earned interest on invested assets 
which can achieve a funding ratio (FR) of 100%; 
96. Bt The force of inflation in year t; 
97. leq(t) The rate of interest rate equivalent to Seq, which keeps the 
FR M, t% at 100% constant over the projection period; 
98. C(M) The contribution rate of scheme M which is a flat fraction 
of the pensionable income level per active member6; 
99. U' and Zip 7 Expected present value of income of one unit per annum, x paid continuously to a life aged x on invalidity and on 
retirement respectively until death; 
100. Erz dip °, ýZ +2 Expected present value of income of one unit per annum, xx paid continuously to widow, daughter and son aged x-di, 
z,, and z, t +2 respectively on the death of a member of the ESIPS; 
6 This is taken as a total paid by the employee and the employer together. 
The continuous annuity value is used as a convenient means of approximating the actual form of 
pension payment that is monthly. ii is calculated using qX 
. 
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101. PVC(M, t) Present value of future contributions of active members of 
scheme M at time t; 
102. PVC(M, t, L) Present value of future contributions of active members of 
teL (B V) of scheme M at time t; 
103. P VS(M, t, L) Present value of future insured salaries of active members 
of te L (B & V) of scheme M at time t; 
104. PVB(M, t) Total present value of liabilities (based on past + future 
service) of the members (active members and pensioners) 
of scheme M at time t; 
105. PVB(M, t, L) Total present value of the liabilities (based on past + future 
service) of the members (active and pensioners) of type L 
& V) of scheme M at time t; 
106. PVGB(M, t, L) Total present value of the liabilities (based on past + future 
service) of the members (active and pensioners) of G 
benefits of te L (B & V) of scheme M at time t; 
107. PVGA(M, t, L) Total present value of the liabilities (based on past + future 
service) of the active members of G benefits of type L (B 
& V) of scheme M at time t; 
108. PVGP(M, t, L) Present value of the liabilities of the pensioners of G 
benefits of te L (B & V) of scheme M at time t; 
109. PVGAP(M, t) Present value of the pension liabilities of G benefits of the 
active members of te L (B & V) of scheme M at time t; 
110. PVGAL(M, t) Present value of the lump sum liabilities of G benefits of 
the active members of type L (B & V) of scheme M at time 
t; 
111. GR (M, t) End of service remuneration of G beneficiaries of scheme 
M at time t: 
112. GL(M, t) Lump sum benefits of G beneficiaries of scheme M at time 
t; 
113. DSL(M, t, L) Death in service lump sum benefits of scheme M of type L 
at time t; 
114. DGL(M, t, L) Death after retirement lump sum benefits of G 
beneficiaries of scheme M of te L at time t; 
115. PVBP(M, t, L) Total present value of the liabilities of pensioners and 
survivors of te L (B & V) of the scheme M at time t; 
116. PVDPG(M, t, L) Present value of the death benefits of the pensioners of G 
beneficiaries G#D, U) of te L of scheme M at time t; 
117. PVGA(M, t, L) Present value of the liabilities of G benefits of active 
members of te L (B & V) of scheme M at time t; 
118. PVGAP(M, t, L) Present value of the pension liabilities of G benefits of 
active members of te L (B & V) of scheme M at time t; 
119. PVWA(M, t, L) Present value of the liabilities of work injuries benefits of 
active members of te L (B & V) of scheme M at time t; 
120. PVGAL(M, t, L) Present value of the lump sum liabilities of G benefits of 
active members of te L (B & V) of scheme M at time t; 
121. PVDAS(M, t, L) Present value of death in service benefits of active 
members of scheme M of te L (B & V) at time t; 
122. PVDASP(M, t, L) Present value of death in service pension benefits of active 
members of scheme M of te L (B & V) at time t; 
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123. PVDASL(M, t, L) Present value of death in service lump sum benefits of 
active members of scheme M of te L (B & V) at time t; 
124. PVDAG(M, t, L) Present value of death after retirement benefits of active 
member G beneficiaries of scheme M of type L (B & V) at 
time t; 
125. PVDAGP(M, t, L) Present value of death after retirement pension benefits of 
active member G beneficiaries of scheme M of type L (B 
&V at time t; 
126. PVDAGL(M, t, L) Present value of death after retirement lump sum benefits 
of active member G beneficiaries of scheme M of type L 
(B & V) at time t; 
127. PVAC(M, t, L) Present value of the administration cost of the Fund M for 
M= GSF & PPSF of te L (B & V) at time t; 
128. SurV(M, x, s) Survivors' benefits function used in the valuation of the 
death benefits which gives the share in the deceased's 
pension for every category of survivor and the 
corresponding annuity of this share in scheme M; 
129. PVDLS(M, t, L) Present value of death lump sum liabilities of type L (B & 
V) of scheme M at time t; 
130. PVDS(M, t, L) Present value of survivors (widows & orphans) benefits 
of scheme M of te L (B & V) at time t; 
131. PVDW(M, t, L) Present value of widows benefits of scheme M of type L 
B&V at time t; 
132. PVDO(M, t, L) Present value of orphans benefits of scheme M of type L 
(B & V) at time t; 
133. SRP(M, t) Total survivors pension of scheme M in year t; 
134. SRLS(M, t) Total survivors lump sum benefits (such as marriage, death 
and funeral grants) of scheme M in year t; 
135. PVF(M, t) The present value of the fund at time t (to represent the 
assets in the fund at time tfor M= GSF & PPSF 
136. Surplus(M, i, t) the value of surplus/deficit of the fund M for M= GSF & 
PPSF at time t using i valuation interest rate in the 
valuation; 
137. FR(M, i, t) The funding ratio of the Fund M fund for M= GSF & 
PPSF at the end of year t using i valuation interest rate in 
the valuation; 
138. ACR(M, t) Administrative cost ratio of the Fund M (for M= GSF & 
PPSF) at time t. 
The Following Relationships Apply to the Above Variables: 
LF(x, t, s) = POP(x, t, s) x LFPR(x, t, s) for all tzI and b Sx S(r 
-1); (1) 
TLF(t) 
=EE LF(x, t, s) for all tz1 and b Sx S(r 
-1); (2) sx 
EM(x, t, s) = POP(x, t, s) xLFPR(x, t, s) x (1- UEMR(x, t, s)) (3) 
for all t? 1 and b Sx S(r 
-1); 
TEM(t) 
=EE EM(x, t, s) for all tz1 and b Sx 
-<(r -1); (4) sx 
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PC(M, x, t, s) = Act(M, x, t, s)/ EM(t, x, s) 
TGP(M, x+1, t+1, s, I) = 
(5) 
[TGP(M, x, t, s, I) + TGP(M, x, t, s, B) x ßr Jx (1 
- 
qz) J (6) 
TGP(M, x, t, s) = TGP(M, x, t, s, B) + TGP(M, x, t, s, V) + TGP(M,, x, t, s, 1)8 (7) 
TB(M, t) =TRB(M, t)+TEB(M, t)+TIB(M, t)+TDB(M, t) (8) 
In the projection and for the death of a male member, the death benefits is assumed to 
be distributed between survivors according to the following general survivor function: 
4 
[1- qZ f _*W. ý If J+4qa9 (9) -- 1- SurP(M, x, t)= 
1 [1-'qd 
-'wyx J+1d 2 
In the projection and for the death of a female member, the death benefits is assumed 
to be distributed between survivors according to the following general survivor 
function: 
1d 10 SurP(M, y, t)= 3 [1-'q yf -'w', fJ+3 [1 - gZym j (10) 
In the valuation and for the death of a male member, the present value of the death 
benefits is assumed to be calculated according to the following general survivor 
function: 
SurV(M, x, t) _2 äwJ_di +4 a°+j +4a x+j+i) (11) 
In the valuation and for the death of a female member, the present value of the death 
benefits is assumed to be calculated according to the following survivor function: 
Sur V(MY, t)3a0+J +3ay+, +2) (12) 
' qX = qz (l - 0.5 qx) (13) 
qx = qx(1 - 0.5gX) (14) 
qx = qx (1 - 0.5q X) (15) 
(ap)x+1= ([1- 'q'x d 
-*qx)](1 - qx+, )) (16) 
8 The amount of pension increments for every individual pensioner is increased every year at the rate of 
V, of the basic pension amount, which takes place at the beginning of each financial year. 
This function assumes that pension of the deceased insured male is fully inherited by a widow and 
two orphans. The widow gets 50% of the pension and the two orphans (son and daughter), each gets 
25% of the pension value. 
10 This function assumes that two-thirds of the pension of the deceased insured female is inherited by 
two orphans. The two orphans (son and daughter) each gets one-third of the pension value. 
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(al)X+l 
_ 
(al)x ([i 
- 
*q 
_*q'')1(1 - qX+, )} (17) 
(ad)x 
= 
(al).,, x *4x (18) 
(ad)., ' 
= 
(al)., x *9x (19) 
1 
-$ (20) 
Special Commutation Functions 
There are series of sex-specific special commutation functions are needed for carrying 
out the valuation of the two Funds. These commutation functions are based on the 
ESSPS service table. 
Functions Based on the Active Service Table (b: 5 x< r-1) 
Das +D as 
D° al vx D°s =s D° as =x x+' x- 
ýx 
'xx xx 2 
Nns 
_ýDas ýr _ 
Nx 
xzxD zs 
Functions based on the Life Table for the Invalids (b <_ xS 
(0) 
D` 
_ 
(a1)'vx D! 
= 
Di + DX+1 Nt 
=D xxx2xz z=x 
! 
Nx 
ax=Dr 
x 
Functions based on the Double Decrement Table for Widows 
(Y*<_ x <(O) 
Dw 
= 
/al'vy Dw 
= 
Dy Dy+l 
Nw 
=Z 
Dw 
Y` 
ýY 
Y2Y 
z-y Y 
Nw iw=Y 
y Dw 
y 
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Functions based on the Double Decrement Table for Orphan 
Females (Daughters) (0<_ zf <w) 
DD 
D° 
= al) ° vZf D°= 
DZJ + DZI 
+I ND_DD Zj Zf Zj -2 Zf 
z- ZI 
Zf 
D 
-D 
Nz1 
zf 
Annuity Functions based on One Decrement Table for 
Orphan Males (Sons) (2<_ zm <_ z*) 
D3 
m_ 
(al); vZm 
ND 
-D 
_ 
Zf 
zf DD 
zf 
Ds + D9 DS 
- 
Z, 
" 
Zm+l NS 
=E 
D8 
Zm 2 Zm Zm Zm-2 
For sons with z,,, > z* the annuity employed will be the W. 
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i. Introduction 
In the early 1990s, economic and pension reforms were undertaken in many places in 
the world leading to substantial changes in the organising and financing of pension 
systems. Pension reform objectives should be the improvement of retirement income 
security, providing a satisfactory income to people in retirement and making sure that 
the retirement income of workers can be predictable (Daykin, 1999). The challenge in 
delivering a stable and predictable retirement income is that the world is changing and 
inherently unpredictable, which makes pension schemes subject to a variety of risks. 
As the economic, demographic and political situation in a country alters, some 
changes in retirement income schemes may also be required because of the interaction 
between pension schemes and these changes. 
Delivering a satisfactory income in retirement can be achieved in a variety of ways, in 
arrangements established by the state (referred to as social security schemes), 
employers (occupational pension schemes), and individuals (personal savings and 
private insurance). Most countries aim for a mix of different types of retirement 
provisions. This depends on philosophies toward individual and private sector 
responsibilities versus the role of the state, and views as to the relative capabilities of 
the private and public sectors. Cultural, historical, political, social and economic 
factors have played a major role in shaping the different combinations of pillars of 
pension provisions in terms of their relative importance for the financial welfare of 
the elderly. Arguments regarding equity, redistribution, efficiency of delivery and 
security of retirement income have also played a major part. 
Social security pension systems are regarded as one of the great social developments 
of the last hundred years and most countries have some form of state or public 
provision to provide the first pillar of pension provision. Although the importance of 
the state pension schemes vary from one country to another", such schemes play an 
important role in many economies as they are national in scope, mandatory and 
financed, in general, by contributions related to participants' earnings. Such schemes 
aim to provide income security in respect of a range of contingencies to the majority 
of the population through a comprehensive social insurance system. They can provide 
" In some industrialised countries the state scheme has been the main source of retirement income for 
pensioners, whereas less developed countries may have no state pension scheme at all. 
26 
a relatively high level of replacement of pre-retirement income, together with a basic 
level of income to all those who are not in remunerative employment 12. 
With a state scheme, which is supposed to be compulsory in coverage for the whole 
country, the risks are shared across the nation and the system will eventually reach an 
advanced state of maturity. They have, traditionally, been unfunded13 defined benefit 
schemes. However, methods of financing public retirement provisions vary between 
different countries, with schemes in developing countries often adopting various 
levels of pre-funding to finance benefits (Iyer, S., 1999). The state schemes are 
supposed to avoid the risk of insolvency in employer-sponsored schemes. 
The first and perhaps foremost consideration is what constitutes "retirement 
provision" in the state schemes. Our interest concerns actuarial involvement in the 
state retirement systems and the objectives of actuarial projection and valuation in 
such systems. The purpose of managing a pension scheme is to control the scheme 
through applying actuarial techniques and other means in order to achieve its 
objectives. The problems of achieving a satisfactory balance between income and 
expenditure over a specific period of time are very different in PAYG schemes and 
funded schemes. 
In the field of funded defined benefit pension schemes, the need for actuarial 
involvement arises from the requirement for information on the benefits promised 
before they are actually paid 14, so that the cost remains stable as a percentage of 
salary. It is also important to make sure that the assets are sufficient to cover the 
accrued liabilities. A funded scheme's financial status is adequate if projections 
and/or valuations indicate that the revenues plus assets are sufficient to meet 
liabilities. This will depend on many assumptions, such as the interest earned on the 
fund, the mortality of members, and the salary growth rate. Therefore, the valuation 
and projections of such schemes is central to actuarial applications. 
12 The U. K has a low flat-rate retirement pension which is about 18% of national average earnings for a 
single person and 28% for a married couple, supplemented by an additional earnings-related pension. 
13 From the financing point of view, there are two types of schemes. A funded scheme, where the cost 
of providing a member's pension is met by accumulating a fund over the member's period of service 
before retirement. An unfunded scheme (referred to as pay as you go PAYG), where the cost of 
pensions is met directly by the contributions paid at the same time. This involves a transfer of money 
between different generations of members and there is no pool of assets in such schemes. 
14 Projecting when benefit payments are to be made (demographic projection) and projecting the level 
of benefits to be paid (economic projection). 
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II. Significance of the Research 
The methods of financing income for retirement vary between different countries and 
the role of the state in financing social security from general taxation revenue is under 
debate everywhere. Many PAYG State pension schemes have been moving towards 
pre-funded schemes or privatisation. Theoretical concepts of a pension scheme can be 
illustrated by examining the essential elements of the state pension scheme in Egypt. 
This contributes to the development of the theory in the field of public pension 
schemes, as it gives insight into a different type of practice in the area of social 
security. It is important for future developments to examine different methods for the 
financing of social security and the respective roles of the state, employers and 
workers. 
Why should we investigate the Egyptian Social Security Pension 
System (ESSPS)'5? 
The ESSPS is one of the most comprehensive social security pension systems in the 
developing world. It can contribute to the global experience in social insurance and to 
the current debate on reforming such systems around the world. The system arose 
from a special, if not unique, set of circumstances and is quite different from many 
other public pension systems. The circumstances that lead us to say that this scheme 
will continue and its design and experience are worthy of study are a product of the 
economic, political, and legal environments in which this system operates. There is 
also a general agreement in Egypt that the system has become a permanent feature of 
Egypt's financial structure and an essential element of economic stability so that the 
system would be maintained whenever governmental intervention should become 
necessary. However, there are some indications of a financing problem, both in the 
short and long term, unless particular issues are addressed in a reform programme. 
The ESSPS is officially a funded defined benefit scheme and it is required that the 
assets held are sufficient to meet the promised liabilities. The system is currently 
facing some financial difficulties simply because of an inability to collect all the 
revenues due to it, to invest its assets wisely, and because of a changing economic and 
social environments and an accumulated deficit. It is recognised that such problems 
15 The system consists of two Funds, the Government Sector Fund (GSF) and the Public and Private 
Sector Fund (PPSF). 
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need to be addressed to avoid severe stress on the pension system and their effects on 
the future actuarial soundness of the system. 
The system needs to be investigated because of its growing cost, so the extent to 
which different factors contribute to this cost can be identified. This thesis deals with 
various aspects of cash flow projections, which is the first time that the cash flows of 
the system have been modelled using actuarial techniques. The model is also extended 
to valuations and other relevant issues. This involves investigating the economic and 
demographic experience of the system and making assumptions about the future trend 
of such factors. The method and assumptions used depend upon the purposes for 
which the calculations are being made and must be considered in the light of the 
environment for the provision of advice. 
This thesis also explores the effect of changes in some of the important demographic 
and economic factors such as the increase in life expectancy, decrease in fertility 
rates, salary escalation, soaring level of unemployment and the rate of return on the 
assets. It investigates mortality trends within the national population and constructs an 
Egyptian life table, which is used in projecting the future population within the social 
security system. 
To exercise control over defined benefit pension schemes, projection and valuation 
techniques have an important role through the choice of the valuation basis. Valuation 
results can be controlled by taking different views on assumptions such as the 
expected rate of return on the assets. The control of the valuation results of the ESSPS 
is mainly achieved by varying the rate of interest on the assets invested by the NIB16, 
as the interest rate from this Bank controls the investment experience of the system. 
There is also a requirement that the cost remains stable, as a percentage of salary, not 
only for the active members but also for new entrants. Therefore, the contribution 
rates have to be tested to determine whether they are sufficient for new entrants. 
iii. Research Objectives 
This thesis aims to achieve the following objectives: 
1- Outline and examine the basic structure and the overall objectives of the 
retirement provision in Egypt (concentrating on the state arrangements and very 
16 As well as a commitment from the government to shoulder the burden of any actuarial deficit which 
cannot be amortised. 
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briefly covering the available private arrangements) according to current 
legislation. Explore the range of benefits which are provided by the ESSPS and 
the methods of financing. 
2- Investigate the cash flow statement experiences of the two Funds and the 
management experiences of the system. 
3- Investigate the current investment strategy (including the roles of the NIB and the 
Treasury) and how it can be developed. 
4- Analyse the demographic and economic experience of the system. This analysis is 
used for setting the best estimate of the demographic and economic assumptions 
for the valuation and projection. This includes the structure of active members, 
pensioners and dependants, salary and pension increases, the rate of return on the 
assets, mortality, normal and early retirement, invalidity, and other demographic 
and economic factors. 
5- Examine the objectives of the actuarial valuation and past assumptions used; 
6- Develop an actuarial model for the projection and valuation of the ESSPS 
consistent with the structure of the system and its method of funding by adopting 
realistic and practical methods of measuring cash-flows of the system. 
7- Construct a mortality life table for the Egyptian population to be employed in the 
calculations in the rest of the thesis. 
8- Project the future population of Egypt to be used in the projection of the 
population within the social security system. 
9- Analyse and project labour force participation and unemployment rates. 
10-Employ the model to project the expected annual cash-flows and assess the 
financial viability of the system over the projection period, based on the status quo 
of the system. 
11- Investigate whether the system would have any cash-flow shortage (excess of 
expenditure over contributions) over the projection period. 
12- Determine the valuation interest rate required for achieving the funding 
objectives'7 under the assumption of the sufficiency of the current contribution 
rates. 
13- Test the implications of changing future interest rates and salary growth on the 
funding level of the system 18. 
17 The assumed rate of investment return on the scheme's assets used in valuing the liabilities. 
18 (The assets + present value of contributions) / (Total projected liabilities) 
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14- Test the sufficiency of contribution rates for new entrants under a range of 
assumed interest rates and salary escalation. 
15- Explores and assesses the strengths and weaknesses in the current structure of the 
system. Identify and discuss the problems facing the scheme and the degree of its 
success in meeting objectives. Put forward a set of recommendations to deal with 
its structural, managerial and operational problems. 
iv. Research Methodology 
This research will devise three main methodologies to accomplish its objectives. 
Firstly: analyse the underlying conceptual framework of the pension system in Egypt 
explaining how the State pension Funds are managed under the current strategy 
(including financial structure and the investment strategy). 
Secondly: an empirical methodology will be employed to collect, analyse and 
interpret data to refine and substantiate the analyses made and set the demographic 
and economic assumptions. Develop the actuarial projection and valuation model to 
be employed. This includes the construction of an Egyptian life table, the population 
projection model, the labour force and unemployment projections. 
Thirdly: an analytical methodology for interpreting the results by means of a 
sensitivity analysis and find their effect on the economy. The main findings of the 
analysis are: 
1. The expected future distribution of insurable earnings and number of contributors 
and beneficiaries. 
2. The variation in future cash-flows according to the sensitivity analysis. 
3. The valuation results, including the funding ratio and the level of contribution 
rates for new entrants under different rates of interest and salary growth. 
4. Conclusions, summary and recommendations that are conducive to better theory 
and practice of the scheme's future management. 
v. Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 1 
This chapter provides the historical background and the main conceptual framework 
of the current retirement provisions in Egypt. It also provides discussions about the 
structure of the different schemes within the ESSPS and their administration, together 
with the important related issues and problems facing the system. 
31 
Chapter 2 
This chapter is concerned with the overall economic and demographic indicators of 
Egypt. The experience of the ESSPS, such as its investment performance, increases to 
pensions in payment, salary increases and Treasury subsidies to the system is 
discussed. It also discusses the structure of the membership of every individual 
scheme within the system and projection of future growth. It also provides the basis 
for setting the assumptions for different decrement rates and other economic and 
demographic assumptions employed in the projection and valuation of the ESSPS. 
Chapter 3 
A mathematical model for cash-flow projection and valuation of the system is 
developed and various aspects of actuarial funding are analysed in this chapter. The 
aims are to explore the future financial stability of the system and how to control the 
system's experience through varying future rates of interest and salary growth. 
Chapter 4 
This chapter deals with the mortality investigation and the construction of an Egyptian 
life table 1994-96 and the other relevant mortality indicators needed for modelling the 
ESSPS. It also discusses the experience of the English life tables employed in the 
valuations of the ESSPS compared with the 1994-96 investigation. 
Chapter 5 
This chapter deals with the projections of the national population of Egypt over 1997- 
2025. 
Chapter 6 
This chapter deals with the analysis and the projection of labour force participation, 
employment and unemployment rates in each age-sex category over the projection 
period. The population that will be within the ESSPS based on the levels of future 
fertility, mortality and unemployment (by sex and age) is estimated. 
Chapter 7 
This chapter presents and analyses the results of applying the model and carrying out 
a sensitivity analysis. This includes medium term financial estimates of future cash- 
flows and Treasury subsidy of the system. In the valuation, the accrued liabilities of 
32 
the system and the surplus/deficit of the two Funds are calculated. The suitability of 
the current contribution rates for new entrants is assessed and a sensitivity analysis 
under different interest and salary growth rates is presented. The medium-term 
equilibrium of the system is investigated. 
Chapter 8 
Summary, findings, comments and conclusions are presented. Recommendations for 
solving some of the problems facing the system are suggested. 
vi. Data and Program 
Enormous amounts of statistical demographic and economic data were employed in 
achieving the objectives of this thesis. These data were taken from different sources 
which are mentioned in the statistics part of the references. A computer-based pension 
valuation and projection model was designed using S-Plus software package. 
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Chapter 1 
The Conceptual Framework of the Egyptian 
Social Security Pension System (ESSPS) 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter gives the framework of retirement income provision in Egypt. It 
describes the current provisions of social insurance protection entitlement and 
discuses the relevant aspects of the financing, managing and efficiency of the current 
system which provides the basis for the subsequent modelling of the system. 
1.2. The Egyptian Social Security Pension System (ESSPS) 
1.2.1. Historical Development of the System 
The ESSPS began in 18541 when laws governing pensions for civil servants were 
introduced on the 26`h of December by a `Khedwial decree'2. These laws established 
an old age, death and invalidity insurance system for a few selected groups of 
permanent civil servants and also for a few categories of higher governmental 
employees. The more recent origins of the ESSPS have been traced back to the 
influence of the French and German schemes (with their reliance on the Bismarck 
system) in the last quarter of the 19`" century. 
In 1935, the pension scheme was extended to become a general scheme covering 
more risks and providing more benefits, but it was only available to a few categories 
of the Government employees. The first social security law for workers (as with many 
countries) was related to industrial accident insurance and was provided under Law 64 
of 1936. Initially, insurance companies provided such insurance and casual and home 
workers were excluded from coverage under this Law. 
Law No. 86, introduced in 1942, provided compulsory and non-contributory 
insurance against industrial injuries and the cost was entirely borne by employers. 
'The history of the Egyptian social protection system can be described from a much earlier starting 
point. It says that "the ancient Egyptians had a well developed system of charity which exempted 
endowed properties and funds from taxation; schemes existed for protection of workers; and a range of 
free services, such as education, shelter for the homeless, hospitals for the sick and cemeteries for the 
poor were established. Those who required to serve in the various temples were compensated for lost 
income. Emphasis was placed on support of the elderly and those in need" (ILO, 1997). 
2 The "Khedewi" was the name of the ruler of Egypt at this time. 
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Employers were required to insure their liabilities with an insurance carrier, with the 
employer and carrier being jointly liable for the payments of compensation to 
workers. The Minister of Social Affairs held primary responsibility for the 
supervision of the scheme and for fixing maximum premiums. Law No. 117, 
introduced in 1950, extended the scheme to cover contingencies due to occupational 
diseases. 
In July 1950, a non-contributory social security scheme based on public social 
assistance rather than social insurance principles was established. Benefits were 
means-tested, made available to all those in need and not eligible for benefits from 
any other state pension scheme and were financed from the Government's general 
revenues. Benefits were made available not only to Egyptian nationals, but also to 
foreigners with at least 10 years of continuous residency in the country. Employers of 
a number of firms operating in Egypt established and supported provident funds to 
give protection to their employees. Benefits generally were in the form of lump-sum 
payments in the case of sickness, invalidity, death, or retirement. 
The system changed substantially following the July 1952 revolution and expanded 
schemes of social security were established. It became widely stratified and extended 
to cover more citizens and more contingencies. An insurance fund was established in 
1955 (the Provident and Insurance Fund) under the Organisation for Insurance and 
Saving3, which took over the responsibility for supervising the beginnings of the 
modem social security system in Egypt. 
Law No. 202, introduced in 1958, improved industrial injury benefits and made such 
insurance compulsory within the Social Insurance Organisation (SIO). At the 
beginning of the 1960s, a contributory old age pension scheme for civil servants was 
established. Law No. 79 of 1975 replaced the civil pension legislation for civil 
servants and also provided social insurance for public and private sector workers. Law 
No. 54 of 1975 allows the establishment of private pension funds (the vast majority 
are occupational pension schemes). Law No. 50 of 1978 provides benefits for 
Egyptians working abroad in the case of old age, death and invalidity. 
3 It became the Organisation for Social Insurance in 1958, the General Organisation for Social Security 
in 1962 and the Public and Private Sector Fund from 1997. 
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The system also contains a pension scheme that represents a "safety net" of social 
security financed mainly by general taxes as well as some indirect resources (Law No. 
112 of 1980). This Law provides coverage for casual workers who are not covered 
under any of the other social security laws. The system extends to non- Egyptian 
nationals working in Egypt for at least one year, provided that their governments offer 
reciprocal arrangements for the Egyptians. 
1.2.2. The Characteristics and Structure of the ESSPS 
The ESSPS reflects an underlying philosophy of the state that aims to achieve specific 
social, political and macroeconomic objectives. The Egyptian Constitution states that 
the state has "To guarantee social protection in the form of income security to all 
citizens in respect of the contingencies of old age, invalidity, death, sickness, injury 
and unemployment". On the other hand, the Government relies heavily on the system 
to support the national development plan by financing various national projects at low 
interest rates and so achieves some of its social and economic development aims. 
The system is regulated and supervised by the state through the Ministry of Insurance 
and Social Affairs (MISAs) and managed by the National Organisation for Social 
Insurance (NOSI). The state is guaranteeing the benefits as well as providing funds in 
the event of a financial crisis and financing any additional benefits, such as pension 
increases, granted by political decisions. The NOSI operates two funds, the 
Government Sector Fund (GSF) and the Public and Private Sector Fund (PPSF). 
The two main current sources for providing retirement benefits to members of the 
Egyptian population, who are no longer actively working, are the state pension system 
and private pension funds, which are mainly occupational pension funds. Although 
there are many supplementary schemes operated by employers, neither of these 
schemes nor commercial insurance, or private savings have yet played any significant 
role in the retirement income field. Opportunities for commercial insurance in 
pensions and savings are still very limited but occupational pension schemes are 
growing fast in Egypt. These are consistent with the state ideology, which advocates 
control of the retirement income system for the country and with the economic and 
labour market environment which the public sector still dominates. Labour mobility is 
limited and the vast majority of private sector enterprises are small. 
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1.2.3. Coverage 
Coverage is defined as the extent to which the scheme is available to the entire 
working population. The State policy is based on extending social security protection 
to all its citizens, which extend in scope to virtually all the labour force (including 
self-employed, casual workers and domestic servants)4. The system is comprehensive 
in terms of coverage of workers and contingencies. The majority of the retired work 
force relies on the system to replace the major part of their income. This is clearly 
intended by the state and it is also intended to be in accordance with social insurance 
principles. The ESSPS is compulsory5 for all workers between ages 186 and 60 (the 
normal retirement age (NRA), for both men and women). Job changing allows 
individual to stay in the same scheme or move to another scheme within the system. 
In 1998-99, more than 24.3m persons were covered by the system (17.5m contributors 
and 6.8 beneficiaries), representing 38.5% of the total Egyptian population in that 
year (only 12% over 1970-75 and between 35-38.5% over 1980-99). The proportion 
of employees depending on the system for their retirement income was more than 
98% in 1999. The total number of pensioners has increased from 0.3m in 1977 to 
1.8m in 1998-99, which implies an annual growth of 8.8% over this period (3.7%7 
over 1984-99). The proportion of pensioners to the population aged 60+ has increased 
from 13.4% in 1977 to 45.5% in 1998-99, with an average annual growth of 7% (3% 
over 1984-99). The proportion of pensioners to contributors increased from 9.6% in 
1975 to 12.1% in 1998-99, with an average annual growth of 0.97% over 1975-99. 
1.2.4. Benefits 
The system is a defined benefit arrangements which offers salary-related benefits in 
return for salary-related contributions (which have also been stable over the last three 
decades). It comprises programmes for old age, death, invalidity, sickness, work 
injuries, and unemployment. Benefits are offered to the working population provided 
4 These groups have been excluded by most developing countries and many middle income countries 
on account of administrative difficulties (ILO, 1999). 
s The only two exceptions are when the member moves to one of the jobs that have been contracted out 
in the 1970s (and this is a rare event) or moves to informal sector, which has a very low coverage rate. 
6 This age is for regular employment in the private sector but there is no minimum age for workers in 
public institutions, public sector enterprises and civil servants. 
The number of pensioners have increased significantly in the 1990s (around 7% yearly) as a result of 
the significant increase in the early retirement (the rate is 3.2% without early retirement pensioners). 
8 Defined benefit indicates that all the benefits are defined in the rules. There are many types of defined 
benefit schemes depending on how earnings are treated in determination of benefits, namely: final 
salary schemes, career average schemes, revalued career average schemes, flat rate schemes. 
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that they satisfy the eligibility requirements. There has been continuous improvement 
in the scope and scale of benefits over the last two decades. New benefits have been 
added and the existing benefits have been improved. Benefits are not merely meant to 
prevent poverty: they are intended to provide a relatively high replacement rate for 
lost earnings. The system aims to provide a standard of living similar to that enjoyed 
during working life, but individuals have to take what is offered by the scheme. 
1.2.5. Financing 
The ESSPS has two different schemes from the financing point of view. The first is 
funded, according to insurance principles (the Egyptian Social Insurance Pension 
System, ESIPS). The second is financed from three sources: very small flat rate 
contributions paid by the contributors, some indirect resources and the balance from 
the general revenues. The second one provides pensions on the basis of means-tested 
rather than social insurance principles for the casual workers. 
The ESIPS has been mainly operating on the basis that every generation is responsible 
for funding its own liabilities. Benefits are primarily financed by contributions from 
employers, employees and returns on the invested funds, although there has been a 
substantial subsidy from the Treasury. Members must contribute to the system to 
obtain a pension paid irrespective of means. Employers' and employees' monthly 
contributions represent the basic sources for financing the system. Contributions are 
fixed percentages of the pensionable salary for each year of service. The government 
contributes 1% of the payroll out of its general revenues, which goes towards old age, 
death and invalidity pensions, financing the annual increases in pension and being a 
back-up source to cover any deficit. 
The ESIS aims to maintain an actuarial equilibrium for its two Funds which have had 
deficits over the last three decades as a result, mainly, of the investment strategy. The 
government is responsible for investing most of the funds through the National 
Investment Bank (NIB). The NIB finances national and local projects and the interest 
rates provided on deposits held in the bank were below market rates. 
1.2.6. Categories Covered by the ESSPS 
In order to achieve and ensure a guaranteed and adequate pension for each inactive 
member of the population, which is the fundamental principle for any social security 
system, the Government enacted some laws to organise and regulate the ESSPS. The 
38 
provisions of the system are laid down in legislation in a group of primary laws, 
which cover the rights and obligations of individuals and establishments affected by 
the scheme, including the contributions to be paid and the benefits to be received. 
These Laws provide the information required for the analysis of the ESSPS and the 
classification of its beneficiaries (as insured members of the ESSPS constitute several 
distinct sub-populations), which are as follow: 
1. Law No. 79 of 1975 for civil servants and workers in public and private sectors; 
2. Law No. 108 of 1976 for employers and self-employed persons; 
3. Law No. 50 of 1978 for Egyptians working abroad; 
4. Law No. 112 of 1980 for casual workers; 
5. Law No. 64 of 1980 for contracted-out schemes; and 
6. Law No. 54 of 1975 for private pension funds. 
In the following sections, the system is analysed according to categories of members, 
contingencies covered, contributions, benefits and conditions for eligibility of benefits 
and the place of every scheme within the overall system of retirement provisions. 
1.3. Law No. 79 of 1975 (the Employees Scheme) 
Law No. 79, introduced in 1975, is the primary Law affecting the social security 
pension system as a whole, as it represents the core and the most significant part of 
the ESSPS. It provides coverage for civil servants, workers in public sector 
enterprises and workers with regular employment in the private sector enterprises. 
Members of this scheme are provided with the following benefits: 
(i) Normal old age, early retirement, invalidity and death benefits; 
(ii) Work injuries and occupational diseases benefits; 
(iii) Unemployment benefits; and 
(iv) Sickness and maternity benefits. 
Benefits take the form of pensions and lump sum payments provided to pensioners 
and their dependants. The ESIS has a specific definition for pensionable salary, which 
needs to be clarified before examining these provisions. (In what follows, the word 
salary is used interchangeably with earnings and wages). 
1.3.1. Pensionable Salary 
It is necessary to define whether the earnings concerned are basic pay, full taxable pay 
or pay on some other definition. From April 1984, the ESIS started to distinguish 
between two different parts of insurable salaries, basic and variable salaries, and each 
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is subject to a separate ceiling9. This happened when massive increases in employees' 
wages took place in the 1970s and 1980s to deal with the sharp rise in inflation. These 
salary increases were created under the name of variable wages and were not 
pensionable according to the rules, which introduced a new type of contribution 
evasion. The problem was badly affecting pensioners as pensions were severely 
eroded by inflation as they are not yet properly indexed to inflation but adjusted at the 
discretion of policy makers. In July 1992, the definition of pensionable salary was 
extended to include the special annual salary increments, which came into effect from 
1 July 1987 for the salary of civil servants and public enterprise workers. 
Contributions are now calculated on both basic and variable salaries and benefits are 
also paid in respect of both. 
1.3.1.1. Basic Salary 
The basic salary is directly derived from the remuneration due according to the labour 
legislation and it has to be in compliance with the regulations, particularly in relation 
to minimum salary. All employees have a basic salary defined by tables applicable to 
the relevant employment scheme for each category of government and public sector 
employment. A salary table prescribed by Law 53 of 1984 (see Tables 1.1 Appendix 
1) determines the basic salaries for civil servants and public enterprise workers 
(without the special annual increments). In private sector, the salary is specified in the 
employment contract and must not be below the minimum basic salary set by the law. 
1.3.1.2. Variable Salary 
The variable salary is the additional payments received by the insured person, which 
is composed of some or all of the following elements: 
(i) Bonuses, incentives, remunerations and shares of the firm's profit, 
(ii) Commissions, gratuities, and other similar allowances and compensations, 
(iii) Overtime wages or compensations for extra-ordinary efforts, 
(iv) Social increases such as high cost of living increases, 
(v) Amount in excess of the maximum of basic wage. 
Variable salaries differ widely between the government, public and private sectors, 
but they are more significant in the public sector. Maximum earnings for contribution 
and benefit purposes consist of limits on combined basic and variable salaries. The 
establishment of benefit (and contribution) ceilings limits the state's responsibilities to 
9 This inclusion contributed to increasing the system's contribution income significantly. 
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high-income earners, as the retirement pensions are restricted to the first tranche of 
earnings as explained in the following sections. 
1.3.1.3. Salary Increments 
A special annual increment came into effect from 1 July 1987 for the salary of civil 
servants and public enterprise workers. Each year the special increment is determined 
as a certain percentagel° of the basic salary and is added to the variable salary. Since 1 
July 1992, the increment introduced 5 years earlier is deducted from the variable 
salary and added to the basic salary every year. Therefore, the special increment of the 
next year applies to the increased basic salary. Yearly increments to the basic pension 
are also provided directly by the Government and are financed by the Treasury. 
1.3.2. Contribution Rates 
Contributions are paid by the employer, employees and the Government, and are fixed 
as a percentage of insurable earnings of both the basic and variable wages up to the 
specified ceiling. Table 1.1 shows the standard contribution rates for the three parties. 
Table 1.1. Contribution rates as a percentage of salary for members covered by Law 79/1975 
Contingency Employer Employee Government Total 
Old-age, invalidity, death 15 10 1 26 
Work injury" 3 
- - 
3 
Sickness 4 1 
- 
5 
Unemployment 12 2 
- - 
2 
Sub-total 24 11 1 36 
End of service remuneration 2 3 
- 
5 
Total 26 14 1 41 
Source: Law 79/1975 
However, under Law 79, the contribution rates actually paid to the scheme are 
different from those stipulated in the legislation. There are several deductions from 
the total standard contribution rate of 41% and the effective total contribution rate is 
actually around 35-40% for basic salary and 30-35% for variable salary, depending on 
the sector and contingencies covered. For example: More specifically: 
- 
Contract workers (not permanent) and workers younger than 18 and older than 60 
are not covered by the unemployment benefits; 
10 It is announced every year on the budget day and it has been 10% for many years. 
11 Lower rates of contributions apply in the case of employment injury in Government (1%) and public 
enterprises (2%), and for sickness (3%) in both sectors. 
12 The government does not contribute to unemployment insurance for its employees. 
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- 
The employers' contribution rate for sickness and maternity benefits is reduced to 
3% for civil servants and public enterprise workers. 
- 
Employers can elect not to contribute towards the sickness and employment injury 
benefits if they pay these benefits directly to their workers 13. 
The actual contribution rates on basic and variable salaries are shown in Tables 1.2 
and 1.3 as follows: 
Table 1.2. Contribution rates as percentage of the basic salary 
Government Public Sector Privat e Secto r 
14 
Employer Worker Total Employer Worker Total Employer Worker Total 
Pension 15 10 25 15 10 25 15 10 25 
Remuneration 2 3 5 2 3 5 2 3 5 
Work injury" 1 
- 
1 2 
- 
2 3 
- 
3 
Sickness 3 1 4 3 1 4 4 1 5 
Unemployment 
- - - 
2 
- 
2 2 
- 
2 
Total 21 14 35 24 14 38 26 14 40 
Transfer to POHI 4.5 5 5 
Source: Law 79/1975 
Table 1.3. Contribution rates as a percentage of the variable salary 
Governmen t Public Sector Private Sector 
Employer Worker Total Employer Worker Total Employer Worker Total 
Pension 15 10 25 15 10 25 15 10 25 
Work injury I 
- 
1 2 
- 
2 3 
- 
3 
Sickness 3 1 4 3 1 4 4 1 5 
Unemployment 
- - - 
2 
- 
2 2 
- 
2 
Total 19 11 30 22 11 33 24 11 35 
Transfer to POHI 4.5 5 5 
Source: Law 79/1975 
In general, employees, employers and the government contribute 10%, 15%, and 1% 
respectively of the basic and variable pensionable salaries toward old age, death and 
invalidity, so in total 26% of salaries are allocated to the old age, death and disability 
pension benefits. This also indicates that the employer contribution constitutes the 
major part of the social insurance contributions. Contributions are calculated on the 
" This is the case with the Government, public sector, and private sector enterprises with 500 workers. 
14 For non-regular contributors in the private sector (contractor workers who are non permanent), 
remuneration, sickness and unemployment benefits are not payable; therefore, the contribution rate is 
reduced by 12% (5%: remuneration, 5%: sickness, 2%: unemployment). 
15 These rates are reduced to 0.5%, 1% and 2% for the Government, public sector enterprises and 
private sector enterprises respectively if the medical care is provided by the employer. 
6 The Government, as an employer, pays 3% and provides cash benefits directly to insured employees 
and private sector employers can pay 3% if they pay cash sickness benefits directly to their employees. 
"The Public Organisation for Health Insurance (POHI) 
'a Workers employed in private enterprises with 500 workers or more and insured by another system 
for health insurance do not pay the sickness contribution of 5%. 
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basis of monthly wages for workers in Government and public enterprises, and on the 
basis of the January wage each year for workers in the private sector19. 
1.3.3. Old Age and Early Retirement Benefits 
1.3.3.1. Qualifying Conditions and Calculations for the Basic Salary 
Pension 
1. Normal retirement age (NRA) of 60 for both men and women20; 
2. A qualified contribution period of more than 9 years21; 
3. For early retirement, there is no specified minimum retirement age, but there is a 
qualifying contributory period of 20 years22; and 
4. If a pensioner returns to insurable employment before age 6023, the pension is 
suspended during the period of work. But if earnings from the job are less than 
those paid before the pension award, the difference is paid as pension entitlement. 
The pension is calculated according to the followings: 
1. The basic old age pension is determined as follows: 
1 
Average monthly earnings during The number of 
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X the last two years of service with X contributory years up to 14(1.1) 
a maximum of LE 550 per month a maximum of 36 years 
This gives a maximum replacement rate of 80%25 of the average earnings over the last 
two years of service with a minimum of 50% if the qualifying period is more than 19 
years or a pension value of LE 5526 a month in 1997, whichever is greater27; 
19 The collection mechanism for the contributions integrates social security contributions with general 
tax collection, which seems to have reduced evasion considerably in the past. 
20 It is 65 for some other categories which are exempt from retirement at age 60, such as judges. 
21 In the case of normal retirement only, a proportion of a year is rounded up to an integer year if this 
gives eligibility to the pension. 
Z Scheme statistics suggest that there are approximately 19,000 pensioners younger than age 50 (16% 
of the total early retirement pensioners) in the PPSF. At present pensions claimed before pensionable 
age are only subject to a reduction of 1% per year and the reduction is imposed only in bands of five 
years which has the effect of encouraging people to exercise their retirement option at certain ages such 
as 45,50, or 55. 
23 There are considerable opportunities for informal employment outside the scope of insurable 
employment covered by the ESSPS. 
24 The accrued rate is up to 1/40 for the hard jobs and 1/36 for the dangerous jobs, often in mining 
sector and the law determines such jobs. The LE 550 per month was the ceiling over 1999/2000 and 
this means that the maximum basic pension in 1999/2000 was LE 440. 
23 This represents full replacement of net earnings because about 20% of the earnings is deducted as 
taxes and social insurance contributions. 
26 LE denotes the Egyptian Pound and £1.00 Sterling was LE5.5 until the end of 2001 and LE9 
thereafter as a result of the devaluation of the Egyptian currency at the end of 2002. 
27 LE70 per month for workers in Government and public enterprises and if the average monthly 
earnings over the last two years are less than LE70 per month the ratio is increased to 100%. 
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2. Additional contributory years can also be purchased if the contributor wants to 
satisfy the required number of contributory years in order to qualify for the old 
age retirement pension; and 
3. For an early retirement, the pension at age 60 is reduced by a reduction factor 
varying between 5-15%, depending on the number of years left to reach age 60 
following the suspension of employment. The reduction factor is 15% if the 
retirement age is less than 45,10% if it is less than 50,5% if it is less than 55 and 
there is no reduction for retirement at age 55 and over. 28 
1.3.3.2. Qualifying Conditions and Calculations for the Variable 
Salary Pension 
(1) Pension age of 60 for men and women and no entitlement to this pension before 
the age of 50 if early retirement has taken place before this age; 
(2) A contributory period starting from 1st April 1984 until retirement age; and 
(3) No minimum contribution period is required, however a minimum period of 22.5 
years and a maximum period of 36 years is taken in the calculation of the pension. 
The pension is calculated according to the following: 
1. The monthly old age pension of the variable salary is determined as: 
No. of contributory 11+ (0.02 x No. of Career average 
years with a Min. L contributory years) 
x 
. 
'earnings 
with a (1 2) 
of 22.5 years and a 45 maximum of LE 
Max. of 36 years 500 per month. 
2. This gives a replacement rate of 50-80% of the career average earnings with a 
maximum pension value of LE 400 a month in 1997; 
3. The monthly average wage is increased by 2% simple for each contributory year; 
4. For early retirement, the same rules are applied with a reduction in the pension of 
5% for each year left until NRA. 
The total pension is the sum of the basic and variable salary pensions. The maximum 
pension can not exceed 80% of the average monthly earnings with a maximum of LE 
840 per month as from July 1997 (i. e. 80% of the maximum total pensionable salary 
of 12,600 in 1999/2000). 
28 For example, if an insured person is to retire at age 54 instead of age 60, his/her pension will be less 
than the accrued pension value if he/she had worked until age 60 by a percentage = [(6/45) + 0.10] _ 
23.33%. 
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1.3.3.3. Lump Sum 
1- If the insured does not qualify for a pension, two lump sums of 15% of the 
average annual earnings for every contributory year are payable and calculated as 
follow for basic and variable salaries respectively; 
Average yearly earnings during I 
of 
= 
0.15 x the last two years of service with x number (1.3) 
a maximum of LE 550 per month 
contributto ry years 
=0 
. 
15 x1 
+(0.02 x number 
x 
Yearly career 
x 
number of (1.4) Lof contributory years) average earnings contributory years 
2- Over 36 years of contributions entitles a lump sum compensation calculated only 
for the basic salary according to the following formula; 
Average yearly earnings during 
= 
0.15 x the last two years of service with x 
Max [(contributory 
years 
- 
36), 0] (1 5) 
a maximum of LE 550 per month 
1.3.3.4. End of Service Remuneration 
The insured person receives "remuneration" before retirement if he/she qualifies for a 
pension or a lump sum benefit. This benefit was introduced in April 1984 and is 
financed by contributions on the basic salary only as explained before. The pensioner 
can replace this benefit with a monthly pension added to his/her variable salary 
pension. The remuneration is a lump sum calculated using the following formula: 
Average monthly basic earnings 
= 
during the last two years of service x 
Max (No. of contributory (1.6) 
with a maximum of LE 550 per month 
years, 10) 
1.3.4. Invalidity Benefits 
Invalidity is the loss of capacity to carry out any remunerative activity and in the case 
of total and permanent invalidity of an insured member, an invalidity pension is 
payable. The qualifying conditions for invalidity pension are as follow: 
1. Losing capacity to carry out any gainful activity permanently which arises during 
insurable employment or within one year of termination; 
2. The insured had not received lump-sum compensation or reached retirement age; 
3. A minimum contribution period of 3 consecutive months, or a total of 6 months29. 
29 This may be seen as a relatively short and generous qualifying period of membership for a long-term 
benefit, particularly when it is recognised that the medical test of invalidity is difficult to apply. 
However, a social security system sometimes subsidies vulnerable groups although it generally 
operates according to insurance principles. 
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The pension is determined as follows: 
1. An invalidity pension of basic salary is calculated as 30: 
1 
Average monthly The number of contributory years 
45 x earnings 
during the x+ Min( 3extra years, the remaining (1.7) 
last year of service period to age 60) 
An invalidity pension of variable salary is calculated according to the formula 1.2. 
2. The pension from the above formula is compared with 65% of the average 
monthly earnings, and whichever is greater is payable; 
3. The maximum total pension is 80% of the average monthly earnings, or LE 840 
(from 1998) whichever is less. The minimum monthly pension amount is LE 40; 
4. In the case of "partial" invalidity (less than 35% of "full" invalidity) a lump sum 
of four years' pension proportionate to the degree of invalidity is payable. 
1.3.5. Survivor's Benefits 
Survivors benefits entitlement is derived from the insured record of the deceased 
person and the satisfaction of the conditions for invalidity pension or having been a 
pensioner at the time of death. The death benefit (or the pension) is inherited by 
dependants and divided among them according to the rules specified by the Law 
given in Table 1.2 of Appendix 1. The system provides income protection to a broad 
range of surviving dependants, which include the following31: 
1. Widow of any age, ex-wife32 and disabled dependent widower; 
2. Orphans and dependent brothers until age 21 (26 if they are in higher education33) 
and without any age limit if they are disabled; 
3. Unmarried daughters34 and dependent unmarried sisters until they marry; 
4. Parents35, sisters and brothers if they do not have any other source of income. 
30 The extra period is added only in the case of the basic salary pension. 
'' Most of the actuaries in Egypt suggest that it is prudent to assume that in the case of the death of the 
insured person or the pensioner 100% of the pension will be divided between the survivors as a result 
of this long chain of eligible individuals (Abd-Alhamid M., 1997). 
32 She has this right under some very restrictive conditions such being forced to be divorced, living 
with her ex-husband for at least 20 years, having an income of less than the pension entitlement. 
39 Around 20% of the total survivors pensions goes to orphans aged over 20 years old. It is now 
proposed to extend the age of eligibility to 31 if they are unemployed. 
4 If after marriage, the husband dies (or divorce occurs) she may be able to regain eligibility for part of 
her father's pension. This happens under the condition that the total pension from both her husband and 
her father does not exceed the maximum amount she would have received from her father's pension 
only if that were higher. Pension from her husband takes primacy and her father's pension is just a 
supplement to her husband's pension. 
35 The mother of the insured member has the right to keep her share in the pension once awarded to her 
without cessation under any circumstances. 
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Survivors' benefits are provided subject to meeting some required conditions: 
1. Either the deceased insured person would have qualified for an invalidity pension 
had he/she claimed such a pension on the date of death or was already in receipt of 
a retirement or invalidity pension at death; 
2. The beneficiaries may be required to satisfy further conditions according to the 
rules applied to dependants, such as having attained a specified age, being 
disabled, not being remarried, or having the care of children, is not working or 
earning at least as much as the pension entitlement; 
3. A survivor's pension is determined exactly as the invalidity pension and then 
divided among the dependants according to specified proportions as explained in 
Chapter 2; 
1.3.6. Additional Rights 
There are some other additional benefits, which include the following: 
1. Marriage grants can be claimed by daughters and dependent sisters of the 
deceased member, equal to the maximum of one-year's pension and LE 200; 
2. Lump sum payments are made to sons and daughters on reaching age 21 years 36 
3. Funeral grant of two months' basic salary or pension with a minimum of LE 200; 
4. A death grant of three months' total salary or pension; 
5. Lump sum payments are payable in the following cases37: 
i. Death and total and partial invalidity of an active member which results in 
the cessation of the occupation of the active member; 
ii. The death of a pensioner with no survivors eligible for a pension, paid to 
his/her ineligible relatives or carers38. 
This lump sum payment is calculated as: 
The average yearly Percentage determined 
= earnings during the x according to the age (1.8) 
last contributory year at death or disability 
36 It is 26 if he/she is a student. 
37 Calculated for both basic and variable salaries according to the proportions given in Table 1.3 of 
Appendix 1. It is reduced by 50% in the case of partial disability, increased by 50% if the death or 
invalidity resulted from a work injury or occupational disease and increased by 100% for the (ii) case. 
38 This is ignored in our model on the grounds that there is no available data to investigate it and it is 
assumed that 100% of the pension is paid on the death of the insured member. 
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1.3.7. Work Injuries and Occupational Diseases Insurance 
Employees in Government, public and regular private sectors aged 18 and over are 
insured against the consequences of work injuries and occupational diseases. 
1.3.7.1. Qualifying Conditions 
There is no minimum contributory period. Eligibility for benefit following an accident 
deemed to be a work injury would be granted in any of the following cases: 
1. Suffering one of the schedule occupational diseases as defined by law; 
2. An injury due to an accident at work which happens during work time or because 
of work even if the accident happens in a different place and time39; 
3. Special rules apply in the cases of injury due to "hard work or tiredness in work". 
Injuries such as heart attacks or strokes that happen to the insured person before 
age 60 as a result of additional workload are covered as work injuries. 
1.3.7.2. Monetary Benefits During Treatment 
Employment injury insurance covers temporary invalidity benefits and the insured 
person is entitled to the following rights over the period of treatment: 
1. Compensation of monthly earnings is payable from the Ist day of injury until 
recovery or permanent invalidity or the death of the insured person; 
2. Medical benefits, including general and specialist care, surgery, hospitalisation, 
medicines, appliances, rehabilitation and compensation for transport expenses. 
1.3.7.3. Permanent Invalidity or Survivors Benefits 
If the period of treatment ends with death, or total or partial invalidity, then the 
insured person or his/her dependants is entitled to the following benefits: 
1. In the case of death or total invalidity, a pension equivalent to a minimum of 
80%40 of average monthly earnings (basic and variable); 
2. Pensions are increased by 5% every 5 years until age 60; 
3. In the case of partial invalidity (35% or more), the insured is entitled to a partial 
invalidity pension (basic salary only) proportionate to the percentage of invalidity; 
4. If the degree of permanent invalidity is less than 35%, then the insured person is 
entitled to a lump sum compensation calculated using the following formula: 
= 
Degree of total invalidity x the monthly pension for total invalidity x 48 (1.9) 
39 This is also includes an injury sustained during the journey to work or returning from work. 
40 It can reach but not exceed 100% when coupled with old age, survivors or invalidity pension. 
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1.3.8. Unemployment Insurance 
The system has been complemented by unemployment benefits, but they are only 
available for permanently employed persons in the public sector (not government 
workers) and regular private sector employees for ages 18-60. The qualifying 
conditions for unemployment benefits are as follow: 
1. Contribution period of 6 months, including the 3 months prior to unemployment; 
2. Unemployment is not due to voluntary leaving (resigning), discharge for 
misconduct or dishonesty, refusal of a suitable job offer, or refusal of training; and 
3. The insured person is able and willing to work, has a registration document and 
reports weekly to the Manpower Office of the Ministry of Labour. 
Unemployment benefits are as follow: 
(1) Compensation of 60% of the last monthly salary is payable for up to 16 weeks41. 
(2) Benefits are not payable in the following circumstance: 
- 
After attaining age 60; 
- 
Refusal of a suitable job offer 42or vocational training; 
- 
Receipt of a pension, which exceeds unemployment benefit (apart from industrial 
injury benefit). 
Th protection against the consequences of unemployment in Egypt is not significant 
as the duration and levels of benefits are very limited and little is available in terms of 
retraining and job protection for workers in the case of forced or unfair redundancy. 
Unemployment benefits do not also have any significant role because the vast 
majority of unemployed persons are new entrants to the labour force43 who do not 
qualify for such benefits, as explained in Chapter 6. 
1.3.9. Sickness and Maternity Insurance 
Health and medical care is provided by the POHI, which operates independently from 
the NOSI. The collected health insurance contributions are transferred to the POHI 
which in return provides health insurance benefits until the insured person recovers, 
41 It may be extended to 28 weeks if the contributions were paid for the last 24 months. A waiting 
period of one-week is required before any benefit is payable. 
2A suitable job offers include one where: the salary is at least 75% of the salary used for the 
unemployment benefits, the work is consistent with the qualifications, experience and physical and 
professional capacities of the individual and the work is within the area where the insured person used 
to work when he/she became unemployed. 
43 It was found that 94% of the unemployed in 1998 were in the age group 15-29. 
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becomes permanently disabled or dies. Only employees in Government, public and 
regular private sectors are covered by this insurance. It provides entitlement to cash 
benefits as a replacement for earnings lost through incapacity as a result of maternity 
or sickness and medical care. It also covers pensioners who want to be covered by the 
provisions of health insurance. The widow/widower of the insured person or 
pensioner has the right to health insurance provided that he/she is entitled to a pension 
and has no other pensions of his/her own. Widows/widowers have to contribute 2% of 
their pension and other pensioners contribute 1 %. 
The qualifying conditions for benefits are: 
1. A contribution period of the last three months or 6 months including the last 2; 
2. In the case of maternity benefits, the contributory period must include the last 10 
months. 
Cash benefits44 in compensation for wages lost while the insured person is absent 
from work include the following: 
1.75% of the daily wage is paid during the first 90 days of sickness (without any 
waiting period), increased to 85% for a further 90 days in a calendar year45; 
2. Maternity benefit is a compensation of 75% of the average monthly earnings, paid 
for 90 days before and after confinement for Government employees, and for 50 
days for public and regular private sector employees. 
1.4. Law 108 of 1976 (Self-employed Persons Scheme) 
From 197346, social insurance protection has been extended to employers and self- 
employed persons engaged in certain types of work in Egypt. This scheme established 
a contributory and obligatory social insurance pension scheme to cover persons 
working on their own account (employers who are working for themselves and have 
employees helping them) in commercial, industrial or agricultural activities. It also 
includes self-employed persons (working for themselves with no employees) and 
owners of property. 
1.4.1. Characteristics of the Scheme 
1. It was established as a fully funded scheme, however the Treasury funds its annual 
pension increments; 
44 Benefits also include medical services offered by the general practitioner and specialists. 
as 100% of earnings without any limit in duration is payable in the case of a specified chronic disease 
46 The first Law was No. 61 of 1973, which was amended to the current Law. 
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2. Contribution is a flat rate of 15% of the monthly pensionable income level and 
paid by the insured person only; 
3. The scheme insures against old age, death, and invalidity contingencies; 
4. The scheme is compulsory with an entry age of 21 and NRA of 65; 
5. The coverage is based on one of 19 levels of insured income that range from47 LE 
100 to LE 1000 per month. The insured person can choose to contribute to any of 
these pensionable income levels48 and to increase or decrease the level from 
January following the request of change until age 55. 
6. The insured member can backdate an increase in pensionable income level to the 
date he/she entered the scheme at any time and pays the difference in 
contributions accumulated at 6% per annum over the whole period. 
1.4.2. Qualifying Conditions 
1. NRA of 6549 with at least 120 months of contributions, the insured person can pay 
additional contributions at retirement to satisfy this condition; 
2. Early retirement at any age with a required contributory period of 240 months for 
entitlement to a pension, otherwise a lump sum is payable; 
3. In the case of death in service or permanent and total invalidity of the insured 
person before age 65, a contribution period of at least 6 months or the last 3 
consecutive months is required5° for entitlement to benefits. 51. 
1.4.3. Old-Age Pension 
1. An old-age pension is determined as: 
1x The monthly career average 
Number of contributory 
x years up to a maximum (1.10) 45 pensionable income level 
of 36 years 
2. The minimum pension is LE3552 and the maximum is 80% of the monthly average 
income. Over 36 years of contributions gives entitlement to a lump sum as: 
47 This range came to force from 1/7/2001 as it was between LE50 and LE 900 before that date. 
48 A self-employed person who previously worked for others is required to choose an income level not 
less than 60% of their last pensionable salary. If the self-employed person has employees then he/she is 
required to choose an income level not less than the average of the wages of his/her employees. 
49 This NRA is higher than the NRA under Law 79, which might be in recognition of their capacity for 
a longer working life in their private business. 
so It is assumed in this thesis that all death in service and total disability cases will be eligible for the 
pension. This is more prudent and consistent with the reality in the ESSPS for the majority of cases. 
1 Entitlement to invalidity and survivor's pension extends for one year from business termination. 
52 The Treasury transfers to the Fund the difference between the minimum required by the Law and the 
calculated pension if the later is less, except for early retirement when this minimum does not apply. 
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36), 0] 
3. In the case of early retirement, the pension is reduced from the pension amount at 
age 65 by 5% 
- 
20%, according to the age at retirement. 
4. If the insured person does not qualify for a pension, a lump sum is calculated as: 
The monthly career Number of 
= 
1.44 x (1 + 0.06 x n) x average pensionable x contributory (1.12) 
income level years 
where n is the difference between the last contributory year and the year of attaining 
the NRA or death or invalidity in the case the insured member stops paying 
contribution before retirement. 
1.4.4. Death and Invalidity Pension 
1. The formula used for the old age pension applies for the invalidity and death in 
service pension except that the contribution service period is increased by 3 years 
(or the remaining period to NRA if less) and thus the pension is calculated as: 
1x The monthly career average 
x 
The number of contributory years (1.13) 
45 pensionable income level + Min. [3, (65 
- 
retirement age)] 
2. The pension has to be at least 65%53 of the career average pensionable income or 
LE 35, whichever is greater; 
3. In the case of death benefits, the pension is divided among the dependants, which 
is discussed later. 
1.4.5. Additional Rights 
They are the same as in Section 1.3.6. 
1.5. Law 50 of 1973 (Egyptians Working Abroad Scheme) 
This scheme offers Egyptians working abroad a contributory and voluntary54 social 
insurance scheme, based on 17 different levels of insurable income. The coverage 
characteristics of the scheme are as follow: 
1. Those persons who are aged between 18 and 60, working abroad under personal 
contracts and subject to the compulsory social insurance system inside Egypt; 
s' It is 80% if the death or the total disability resulted from work injury or occupational diseases. 
54 The Government is planing to make it compulsory. 
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2. Egyptians working for international bodies and regional organisations inside 
Egypt and emigrants who keep their nationality; 
3. The scheme provides coverage against old age, death and invalidity contingencies; 
4. The insured person is not eligible to receive any of the scheme's benefits if 
contributions were not paid for 6 continuous months; 
5. Insurable income levels range between LE 100 and LE 1000 and the insured 
person can select any of these levels but can not change it to a higher one unless it 
has been in the previous level for at least one year; 
6. Contributions are paid at a rate of 22.5% of the chosen insurable income level 
with the Government making up any deficit; 
7. The insured person may increase the expected pension on retirement by buying 
additional periods of non-contributory service following the age of 2055; 
1.5.1. Qualifying Conditions 
1. Attainment of age 60 with at least 180 months of contributions; 
2. In the case of early retirement, a contributory period of 240 months is required; 
3. In the case of death or invalidity before age 60, a period of at least 3 continuous 
months of contributions is required. 
1.5.2. Old Age, Death and Invalidity Pension 
1. The pension is determined according to the Formula 1.10 with Min. pension of LE 
35 and Max. of 80% of the monthly career average pensionable income level; 
2. In the case of early retirement, the pension at age 60 is reduced by 15% if the age 
is less than 45,10% if the age is less than 50 or 5% if the age is less than 55; 
3. In the case of death or invalidity, the same formula as for the old age pension is 
applied, except that an extra 3 years (or the remaining period to age 60 if less) is 
added to the contribution period. The Min. pension is 65% of the monthly average 
insured income level or LE 35 whichever is greater and the Max. is 80%. 
4. If the insured person does not qualify for a pension or in case of final departure 
from the country (emigration and other similar cases), a lump sum is payable. It 
ranges from 267% to 20% (144% on average) of the average monthly insured 
income level during the contribution period according to the age of the insured. 
5. There are some additional rights, which are the same as in Section 1.3.6. 
ss A lump sum or instalments to the scheme can pay off the cost of buying additional periods. 
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1.6. Law 112/1980 (The Casual Workers Scheme)56 
This scheme is called the Comprehensive Social Insurance Scheme (CSIS) and it has 
the following characteristics 
1. Applies to some of the working population not covered by any of the other social 
insurance schemes, which are collectively described as casual workers57; 
2. It is the unfunded tier of the ESSPS, which is supplementary to the funded part of 
the system (ESIS), and is a basic anti-poverty and means-tested scheme financed 
mainly from general revenues and other indirect resources; 
3. Provides coverage against old age, death and invalidity contingencies; 
4. It contains another pension arrangement called "Sadat Pension Plan (SPP)58" 
introduced in 1980 and operating under article No 5 of the scheme. The SPP 
provides a special pension to the poorest segment of the population59 who have 
had no previous coverage by any of the other social insurance schemes in the past 
and no contribution is required; 
5. The SPP provides benefits under the same conditions as the CSIS and benefits are 
financed completely from the State's budget. However, the SPP is now closed to 
new entrants who must join the main CSIS. 
1.6.1. Financing the CSIS 
The CSIS is supposed to be financed from the following sources60: 
1. Very small contributions from the active members (apart from the members of the 
SPP) at a flat rate of LE 1 per month61. 
2. A subsidy from the Nasser Social Bank62; 
56 Law No. 112/1975, which established a non-contributory and obligatory scheme, was amended to the 
current Law. 
s' Casual workers do not, as a rule, have a fixed place of employment and this distinguishes them from 
the self-employed persons. Such workers are temporary workers, tenants of small agricultural lands, 
proprietors of buildings with annual revenue of less than LE 350, sailboat owners and owners of light 
transportation who employ no workers, travelling street vendors, rural social service workers and 
domestic servants and others. 
sg Sadat was the president of Egypt over 1971/81. 
59 The number of beneficiaries of this category has fallen from 1.43m in 1986-87 to 0.435m in 1998 
and significant proportion of recipients are women. The reason for that is because the Government is 
integrating this category within the CSIS. 
61 Income from such resources is not stable and in general, it has been significantly declining over time. 
61 The Government is planing to ask the Parliament to increase it to LE 10 per month from 2002, as this 
is a very small proportion of contribution income for the scheme, even after investment. 
62 This is a social bank in Egypt, which finances some social security benefits. Nasser was the president 
of Egypt over the period of 1952-1970. However, after the privatisation of public sector enterprises the 
Bank was no longer able to contribute to this scheme. 
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3. A maximum of 2% of basic salary contributions under Law 79/1975 (the public 
and private sector employees only) to be decided by the management of the PPSF; 
4. A social duty levied on landowners, which varies between LE 0.25 to LE 5 per 
acre, according to the kind of land usage; 
5. Fees paid by land tenants at the rate of LE 0.2 per unit of cultivation; 
6.50% of the fishing licence fees for sailing boats and a charge of LE 1 for each 
work permit and; 
7. The balance from the Treasury. 
1.6.2. Qualifying Conditions and Benefits 
1. NRA of 65 with a contributory period of 120 months (no contributions for SPP)63 
2. Benefits are payable on the death or invalidity of an insured person before age 65 
with at least 6 months of contributions (no contributions for the SPP). 
3. Benefits take the form of a fixed amount of pension equal to LE 80 per month 
(from January 2001)64; 
4. A funeral benefit of LE 200 is also payable; 
5. The SPP provides the pensioner with a fixed amount of pension of LE 45 per 
month (from January 2001). 
1.7. Law No. 64 of 1980 (Contracted-out Scheme) 
This Law on alternative social insurance schemes was introduced during the "open- 
door" period at the end of the 1970's when multi-national companies were 
encouraged to invest in Egypt. It governs the operation of the contracted-out schemes 
of the ESIS and meant to reduce the State's liability for providing retirement incomes 
and to give a chance for occupational pension schemes to maximise their role in this 
field. Contracting-out is a statutory arrangement under which members of a pension 
scheme that meets certain conditions obtain certain rights if the scheme replaces all of 
their earnings-related state scheme benefits. This involves replacing the entire state 
pension by a pension from the accumulated funds of each member. The contributions 
to the state scheme are refunded to the contracted-out scheme. 
63 It can be also deducted from the first awarded pension if the member had not satisfied this condition. 
It was LE 63 before 2001. 
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1.7.1. Qualifying Conditions for Contracted-out Schemes 
The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISAs) was concerned with the 
approval, supervision and control of the contracted-out schemes. Approval was given 
under the following conditions: 
1. The number of permanent working staff in Egypt must be at least 100065; 
2. The actual issued share capital of the company is not less than LE 10 million; 
3. The scheme must provide better benefits than the state scheme, with the 
employees' contribution percentage no higher than in the state scheme; 
4. They must equal or better any enhancements that are made to the state scheme; 
5. They must submit annual financial statements and a report on fund activities 
(including on the status of reserves and investments) each year to the MISAs; 
6. They must submit actuarial reports on their financial status at least every 5 years; 
7. They must contribute 1% of their contributions to the MISAs each year. 
A statute had to be established by the contracted-out scheme and submitted to the 
MISAs. This statute must include the following data: 
1. Types of benefits paid by the scheme, conditions for entitlement to benefits from 
the scheme and formulae used in calculating the benefits; 
2. The resources for financing the benefits and contribution rates for the members; 
3. The rules for the payment of transfer values to any other fund which is subject to 
the Employees Social Insurance Scheme (79/1975). 
1.7.2. Management of Contracted-out Schemes 
The management of contracted-out schemes is undertaken by a general assembly 
consisting of the members of the scheme and a board of directors appointed by the 
general assembly. By law, the funds can invest half of their money in assets such as 
listed equities or properties. But the other half of the funds must be deposited with the 
NIB in return for bonds (giving the same rate of return as that given on the GSF and 
PPSF assets). The government's stated reason for this requirement is to guarantee 
members' rights. However, another unstated reason may be to take advantage of using 
65 This was also to cover international companies operating in Egypt who have large numbers of 
employees in total and only small part of them are working in Egypt. Most of the existing schemes now 
do not satisfy this condition although it was satisfied at the time of establishment. 
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these funds at lower interest rates than the prevailing in the market66. These schemes 
and their members obtain taxation privileges on all the scheme transactions (including 
contributions, investment proceeds and benefit payments). However, there is no 
treasury subsidy to the contracted-out schemes, unlike the ESSPS. 
No new funds are now allowed to join this scheme and any new established scheme 
must co-exist with the State Scheme (Law 79/1975). This action has reduced the 
impact of this part of the Egyptian pension system in spite of its importance in 
reducing the dependency of employees on the State for providing income after 
retirement. The contacting-out option has been suspended for various reasons such as: 
1. The state wants to have control of the pension system for the whole population 
through its own Funds; 
2. The state wants to control the investment of the funds available; 
3. The higher benefits and lower contribution rates available to members of these 
schemes seemed inequitable; and 
4. The past experience of bankruptcy for some sponsoring employers67. 
Eight contracted-out schemes were established when the Law was introduced in 1980. 
Egyptian Banks with strong international affiliations operate most of these schemes as 
well as some large companies68. However, looking at the contracted-out companies, it 
can be noticed that they are financially strong and pay high salaries. Therefore, it can 
be argued that contracting-out would not only be contrary to the principle of 
solidarity, but would also weaken the income redistribution effect between the high- 
paid and low-paid workers. 
1.8. Law No. 54 of 1975 (Private Pension Funds) 
Individual organisations are allowed to have a complementary occupational pension 
scheme. This provides a second tier of social insurance protection for workers in 
public and private sector enterprises and institutions but it is not obligatory according 
to the Law. It can be argued that a comprehensive state pension scheme providing a 
66 The average interest rate given by the NIB over the period of 1996-1998 was around 9% while the 
average interest rate on deposits in commercial banks was around 11-12%. 
67 In April 2001, the owner of an electronic company called "The Transistor Company" used the 
pension fund assets of his employees to finance his new projects and left the scheme without assets to 
finance its liabilities. 
61 They cover some 5,600 workers and invested assets amounted to LE 6992m at the end of 1999. 
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high level of benefits limits the need for extensive private/occupational provision69. 
Purposes for encouraging the development of private pension funds are to supplement 
the benefits available from the ESSPS and also to limit the reliance that individual 
members have on the state system. These schemes are operated and sponsored by 
employers for their employees and supervised by the Egyptian Insurance Supervisory 
Authority (EISA). They provide additional income protection against some 
contingencies, such as death, invalidity and old age, for the workers, particularly for 
those with low incomes. The majority of benefits that offered by these schemes to 
their employees take the form of a lump sum on retirement. 
1.8.1. Experience of the Private Pension Funds 
The number of private pension funds has been increasing steadily at about 4% every 
year and as at the end of 1999 there were 591 funds registered with the EISA 
(compared with 535 as at the end of 1995). Government authorities and public 
institutions, rather than private enterprises, have established the majority of the 
existing funds, as less than 10% of these funds were set up by private sector 
employers70 as shown in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4. The value of assets of the private pension funds in Eavnt over 1995-99 
Fund's Assets 
(LE m) 
1995 
No. % 
1999 
No. % 
% 
change 
200 or more 3 0.56 6 1.02 0.46 
100 
- 
200 2 0.37 5 0.85 0.48 
50-100 8 1.50 15 2.54 1.04 
10-50 42 7.85 79 13.36 5.51 
1-10 219 40.93 246 41.63 0.7 
Less than 1 206 38.51 219 37.05 
-1.46 
Funds with less than 
one year in force 
55 10.28 21 3.55 
- 
6.73 
Total 535 100 591 100 
Source: EISA, annual reports over 199 
-1999 
The table shows the increasing trend of the number of private pension funds and the 
value of their assets over 1995-99. There were about 4m members covered by these 
schemes in 1998. Often contribution rules similar to the state scheme apply, but also 
to the higher tranche of earnings not covered by the ESIS. These schemes collected 
69 However, countries such as Spain and Portugal have high social security benefits but a growing 
occupational pension sector, generally providing supplementary pension benefits to higher paid 
employees on a formula which integrates with the social security benefits. 
7° More details about the private pension funds in Egypt can be found in the report prepared by the 
Government Actuary Department (GAD) of the UK, 1997. 
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contributions of some LE 1,250m in year 1997/1998, LE 850m from employees and 
LE 400m from employers, and the total contributions to these funds have been 
increasing at an average yearly rate of 40% over the last five years. This amount of 
contributions was more than double the premiums made towards life insurance 
policies, which were LE 559m in 1998/1999. These schemes paid benefit payments of 
LE 11 19.64m in 1999 compared with LE1047.23m in 1998. The total income of these 
funds in 1999 was LE 2264.4m compared with LE 2116.7m in 1998 with a net cash 
flow of LE 1036.2m in 1999 compared with LE 982.85m in 1998. 
About 97% of these funds are classified as defined benefit, and the majority of them 
provide salary-related benefits in return for salary-related contributions made by 
employees and employers. Although entitlements are usually determined on the basis 
of certain proportions of final average salaries, benefits often take the form of lump 
sums with a minimum of 10 to 20 months' salary paid at retirement or death. The 
number of defined benefits scheme which are "lump sum only" was 570 out of 591 
funds in 1999. There were just 12 defined contribution funds, which pay benefits in 
the form of a lump sum equal to the individual accumulated account, and only 6 funds 
out of the 591 provide their members with pension rather than lump sum benefits. 
These 6 funds are the largest regarding the number of members and also the amount 
of assets, and most of these funds belong to the public sector and mainly in the 
construction or industrial fields. 
1.8.2. Investment Strategy 
The investment policy of the private pension funds is limited by many restrictions 
imposed by the government, which affects their investment performance. The law sets 
up the investment regulations for private pension funds in order to protect the 
members' rights according to Article 14 of Law No. 54 of 1975. Restrictions are in 
relation to the types of assets which may be held and also in terms of the maximum or 
minimum allocation to particular types of asset. The investment rules strongly restrict 
foreign investments in order to safeguard the country's foreign exchange reserves. 
The maximum and minimum proportions allocated for different investment 
instruments are defined in the regulations as follow: 
1. At least 25% in securities guaranteed by the Government; 
2. At most 60% in some or all of the following sectors: 
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(a) Ownership of real estate situated within Egypt, 
(b) Ownership of listed shares up to a maximum of 50% of the fund, 
(c) Deposits in one of the Egyptian banks offering a fixed rate of interest, 
(d) Loans to the scheme's members in accordance with the fund's statutes, 
(e) Any other investments of guaranteed return subject to EISA's approval. 
3. At most 15% in a current account in one of the Egyptian banks. 
In December 1999, these schemes had assets of LE 6991.4m (compared with LE 
2,800m as at 30 June 1994) with an annual investment income of LE 809.4m. 
Investment returns in 1999 were 11-14%7' (compared with 9-11% in 1997), assisted 
by privatisation issues in a buoyant stock market. Some 12 schemes control 50% of 
all these assets. The largest schemes include those provided by the Arab Contractors 
Company (with assets of LE 700m, 55,000 contributors and 18,000 pensioners as of 
1997), the Suez Canal Authority, the Teachers Syndicate, and the National Bank. 
The investments of these funds are predominantly in bonds or fixed interest assets, 
rather than equity-based assets. In 1999,30.6% of the funds' assets were invested in 
fixed bank deposits and loans, another 61% were invested in government bonds and 
only 8.4% of the funds' assets could be regarded as being invested in equities and 
"real assets". This means that at least 91% of the funds held could be classified as 
fixed income or non-equity assets72. This is inconsistent with the investment 
philosophy that equities and real assets are expected to maintain their real values in 
times of high inflation and, therefore, are good match for salary-related liabilities. 
1.8.3. Management of the Occupational Pension Funds 
Every fund is managed by a board of directors appointed jointly by the members of 
the fund and the employer. The board of directors manages the fund and, in doing so, 
may undertake any action which realises the fund's objectives within the limits of the 
law and the fund's statutes. The EISA defines all the rules and assumptions required 
for calculating the funds' reserves. Private pension funds are exempt from all duties 
71 The Complementary Scheme of the Arab Contractors Company, which is an example of a large 
complementary scheme, achieved an average rate of return on the invested funds of 16.25% in 1997. Its 
investment portfolio was spread across fixed deposits, NIB bonds, estates and shares. 
72 The World Bank has noted that "lack of professional management capacity for investment, the dearth 
of financial instruments and the risk-averse nature of these funds have been cited as the main reasons 
for the concentration of investments in bank deposits and government paper" (World Bank, 1998). 
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and taxes on their collected contributions, benefit payments, and investment proceeds. 
These funds can be fully integrated with the basic state system for administrative 
efficiency and customer service. For example, in the case of the Arab Contractors 
Company scheme73, integrated payments are made to beneficiaries (with only the 
difference between contributions collected and benefits paid out on behalf of the basic 
state system being remitted to the NOSI). 
There are major issues affecting occupational pension schemes in Egypt such as: 
1. The legal and regulatory framework for the private pension funds needs to be 
revised and the supervisory capacity of EISA needs to be further developed 
(World Bank, 1998); 
2. Inefficient management, particularly concerning the management of the funds' 
assets. Investment performance might be improved by managing the funds' assets 
through specialised institutions; 
3. The majority of occupational pension schemes are lump sum only schemes with 
no significant market for annuities in Egypt; 
4. Defined benefit plans can give very favourable benefits to employees who receive 
large pay increases close to retirement and this is an aspect which needs to be 
addressed in terms of financing the schemes; 
5. Those private funds that provide pensions under the defined benefit system are 
effectively underwriting annuity business and, therefore, it would be possible to 
permit such funds to transact annuity business from other pension arrangements, 
particularly from defined contribution arrangements (GAD of UK; 1997). 
1.9. Annuity Market 
The insurance sector in Egypt comprises 15 insurance companies (4 of them are state 
owned and 11 are privately owned in which 2 of them are working in the free zones74) 
and has essentially been State-controlled and supervised by the EISA. There are only 
7 insurance companies in the Egyptian market which are allowed to underwrite life 
insurance business. Life insurance coverage is not particularly extensive in Egypt, 
with only 614,606 individual policies in force at 30/6/2000 (mostly group insurance) 
73 Its administrative costs represented 5.5% of the value of contributions in 1997. 
74 These special zones are governed by special laws, which are different from the laws governing 
companies operate outside these zones. Most of these zones are located in the ports and insurance 
companies working in such zones are not normally allowed to underwrite business outside these zones. 
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and the collected premium income was LE 595m (EISA, 1999-2000). There were 
only 910 annuity policies in force in 2000 issued by one company (probably issued 
for one group), as life companies are not providing a significant number of annuity 
policies. One of the reasons for this is that the insurance industry in Egypt is still 
under-developed and highly concentrated, although some of the insurance companies 
should already have a sufficient level of expertise to transact annuity business. In 
reality, most of these companies depend heavily on their foreign partners in providing 
most of the technical expertise, particularly in the pricing of individual policies. 
New companies need to be formed in Egypt, especially for pension business, which 
might assist in the development of private pension schemes. Such companies might be 
restricted to transacting annuity business. It may be also desirable to have separate 
funds held within the other insurance companies for this class of business (to be easily 
supervised). In general, the insurance sector in Egypt is in the process of being opened 
up through privatisation and competition from international insurance companies. 
1.10. Social Assistance Programmes 
Social assistance to those in need is also provided by a wide diversity of organisations 
in Egypt. The MISAs manages a number of social assistance programs but these are 
not actually significant. However, the Nasser Social Bank, the Ministry of Al-Awqaf, 
non-Governmental organisations, various community development programs, and 
local organisations provide effective social assistance programs. This social assistance 
system has its unique financing characteristics, which are beyond this thesis. 
1.11. Analysis of the System 
The characteristics of the ESSPS imply that this system is expected to continue in the 
future with the same main structure. This conclusion is based on the economic, 
political, social and legal environment in which this system operates. However, there 
is a question needs to be answered: Is the ESSPS a good system? In order to analyse 
this question, we need to consider some critical points such as benefits, cost, 
redistribution, financing, adequacy of pension and impact of inflation, contribution 
evasion and administration. Therefore, the following sections focus on issues and 
problems that should be addressed to provide the basis for the formulation of 
recommendations for reform programme. 
62 
1.11.1. Benefits, Cost and Redistribution 
The adopted pre-funding strategy makes entitlement to benefit payments independent 
from the State's financial position which increases the degree of certainty that the 
promised benefits will be paid, alongside the State guarantee of benefits. Looking at 
the eligibility requirements for benefits, it appears that the scheme rules treats 
different groups of members equitably regardless of their professions and do not 
distinguish between men and women, who are treated equally regarding retirement 
age, levels of benefits and contributions. The system may be seen as offering 
reasonable benefits in respect of termination of employment as a consequence of any 
of the insured contingencies, provided that the eligibility requirements are satisfied. 
The recent pension increases have resulted in a reasonable level of pension for those 
pensioners on low earnings (LE 355 and LE 285 on average for the GSF and PPSF 
respectively in 1997/98), provided a full contribution period has been made. 
However, there are limitations in the scope of the benefits in most of these 
contingencies and they are not available to all of the insured categories. Benefits in 
respect of sickness, maternity, employment injuries, unemployment are in general, 
only available to people covered by Law 79/1975. It is found that the invalidity 
pension is usually the minimum pension because of the difficulties in determining 
medically whether someone is permanently incapable of work. The casual workers 
scheme does not provide an acceptable minimum income (flat rate pension of LE 60 
per month). As a result, many provisions in the system as a whole are inadequate. 
Also, those with an income above LE 12,000 per year in 2000 would need additional 
pension provision in order to maintain the lifestyle they enjoyed during their working 
lifetime. This could only be achieved through private pension plans, which are not 
generally available in Egypt and even the occupational pension schemes are not 
available in the majority of occupations. Therefore, a strategy of shifting some 
responsibility to the private sector by introducing some sort of private pension plans 
which target high-income earners and offer some tax incentives to encourage 
participation and widen the extent of coverage is urgently needed. 
There is also a case for simplification of, and perhaps even for limiting the range of, 
survivors' benefits. The current provisions try to provide income protection for a 
broad range of surviving dependants. However, it seems inappropriate for the 
63 
aggregate of the pensions payable to surviving dependants to exceed the pension 
entitlement of the deceased member 75, which is the case in many situations under the 
current provision. The early retirement provision also needs careful consideration and 
it is discussed in Chapter 2. 
It is argued that the ESIS is relatively expensive for employers and employees as they 
pay high contributions rates with the employers pay approximately two-thirds of the 
total cost as explained before. These high rates may be due to the fact that the pension 
rights include a variety of benefits that are mainly funded through contributions and 
not by the state budget. It might also be as a result of the current poor investment 
strategy (discussed in Chapter 2), which yields a low return on the assets. However, 
the problem of high contribution rates, particularly for employers, is an important 
issue for the government to consider when encouraging multi-national companies to 
shift production to Egypt, as it raises the overall labour costs. 
The ability of the system to accommodate individual needs does not exist as nearly all 
the benefits are predetermined and individuals have to take what is offered by the 
system. The system has the advantage of tax exemption, as contributions, 
investments, investment returns and benefits paid are all tax exempted. This 
advantage enables the system to increase benefits without any pressures are put on the 
shoulders of the insured person. 
There is no special treatment to assist lower earners in the system, except for the 
minimum pension set by the State, which is very low and does not help much in 
improving their standard of living. Although the ceiling for the pensionable salary 
combined with the minimum pension may achieve some sort of redistribution, the 
ESSPS would need some improvement in order to be able to assist lower income 
earners and achieve the redistribution objective. 
1.11.2. Funding or PAYG 
The issue of whether the ESIPS should be operated on a PAYG basis or to maintain a 
specific degree of pre-funding of future liabilities76 has been under debate for a long 
75 The deceased's pension entitlement is supposed to be shared amongst the survivors within the overall 
maximum level limit of 100 %, however, it can exceed this percentage when a minimum pension value 
is imposed by the State on all pensions in payment. 
76 As stated before, the system was initially established to operate on a full funding strategy. 
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time. The system was established on the basis that the contributions from employers 
and workers with only a contribution rate of 1% of the pensionable earnings from the 
Government (as well as its own contributions as an employer in respect of its 
employees) would fund its liabilities. 
The rationale for funding is to achieve the long-term objectives of benefit security, 
contribution stability and flexibility and thus to increase the likelihood that the 
benefits will be paid in accordance with expectations 77. In addition, pre-funding of the 
system may have contributed to the increase of aggregate national savings (and hence 
capital accumulation and growth), reduced the financial obligations of the state, and 
created a specific link between contributions and benefits. It also has averted any 
major increases in contribution rates over the last 3 decades. The gradual development 
of the system gives a strong indication that the government still intends to provide 
social security on a contributory basis and in accordance with insurance principles. 
Thus, pre-funding is a fundamental issue of the state strategy for the ESIPS. 
There are many difficulties facing PAYG social security pension systems around the 
world, particularly for those countries in the transition period of their economic 
reforms78 and those with unfavourable demographic trends (ageing populations) in the 
developed world. However, as the ESIPS was established as a pre-funded insurance- 
based system, this removes the system from the current debate regarding shifting from 
PAYG to pre-funded social security pension systems. These factors have led to 
growing support for keeping the current pre funding strategy. 
It is only those workers who are unable to finance their future liabilities who are 
provided with benefits on an unfunded or even non-contributory basis. The 
Government has been providing significant resources to the system, particularly in 
financing pension increments and the CSIS, as analysed in Chapter 2. Therefore, this 
classical financial structure has been subject to three modifications: 
77 This might not be the case for a state sponsored social security pension arrangement (particularly if it 
is a funded one), which is supposed to provide high level of security, particular regarding the continued 
existence of the system. However, the recent experiences of some countries showed that the need for 
security applies also to the state sponsored schemes, particularly when the availability of the promised 
level of future income, is in some doubt. 
78 The governments of certain countries (e. g. Chile and Australia) have introduced funded, defined 
contribution state pension schemes as a replacement for the PAYG. The future development of state 
pension systems in other countries may move in this direction. 
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1. Government subsidies are provided to finance the costs of incremental adjustment 
to pensions; 
2. There is a personal subsidy to finance the casual workers scheme; 
3. The responsibility for investment lies with the NIB. 
As a consequence, the linkage between the source of the funds and their purpose in 
financing benefits has been obscured within the new mechanism. It is understood that 
there is a close link between the level of the non-contributory benefits and the level of 
resources available from general tax revenues to finance them. So provided that the 
tax base is broad and yields sufficient resources, increases in benefits provided on 
non-contributory basis may be extensive, as they do not dependent on individualised 
financing. Eventually, the ability of the Government to continue financing such 
obligations will depend on the performance of the economy. 
1.11.3. Pension Indexation and the Impact of Inflation 
The backup for the benefit promises under a funded system is the system's ability to 
have enough resources to meet its liabilities. This should facilitate the protection of 
the elderly from different risks, such as those arising from the performance of the 
economy. One of the most important risks is the effect of inflation. Although the way 
of determining the pension on the basis of the average income during the last two 
years of the working lifetime tries to keep the standard of living for retired persons 
unchanged, pensions are not indexed to price or salary inflation. The legislation does 
not provide for pensions to be adjusted after award but rather are adjusted at the 
discretion of policy makers by statute. 
The average inflation rate was about 20% and reached its highest level of 27% by the 
end of the 1980s. It was in the second half of the 1990s that inflation was brought 
under control and the rate declined to reach around 5% over 1997-99. These high 
inflation rates affected the real value of benefits very badly and made the real value of 
retirement incomes inadequate after few years of retirement, especially for people on 
low incomes who are the most vulnerable group. This effect can be seen when the 
monetary value of a unit of pension in 1976 is compared with the real value of this 
unit over 1977-98. It is found that the real value of a pension unit provided in 1999 
was 48.4% of that unit in 1976 taking into account the entire pension increases over 
66 
this period. This indicates that the real pension value has decreased substantially to 
less than 50% of its value in about 20 years as shown in Figure 1.1. 
To deal with this problem and its effect on the real value of salaries and pension 
benefits, two measures were introduced. The first, was the redefinition of the variable 
salary as pensionable salary (as explained before). The second was the introduction of 
an annual increment in the pension79, which is determined yearly on the budget date. 
This annual increment is usually equal to the proposed increase in the salary of civil 
servants and public sector employees and it has been about 10% or more since 198781 
as shown in Figure 1.2. However, these increases did not improve the real pension 
value until 1995, when inflation was brought down to around 5% and pension 
increases exceeded the rate of inflation. 
High inflation created the necessity to level the inequalities of pensions granted in 
different years and to implement a system of inflation-related revaluation of pensions. 
79 The government is using some of the proceeds of privatisation to finance these annual pension 
increases which extended to include the self-employed and the Egyptians working abroad from 1992. 
Assuming that 1976 is the base year (1976 = 100), the real value of a pension unit over 1976-1999 
year 1999 (I+ API. ) 
was calculated using the following function: Ij as API; is the annual pension i=1976 (1 + CPI; ) 
increase and CPI; is the annual consumer price index. The nominal value of a pension unit over 1976- 
year 1999 
1999 was calculated as the: rl (1 + API1) 
. i-1976 
a' Pensions were also increasing before 1987 but at lower rates and not on a regular basis. A 10% 
increase was declared for the year 2001/02 as over the last 15 years. The inflation rate over 1999/2001 
was around 4% but it is estimated to be increase again over 2002/03. 
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Figure 1.1. Monetary value versus real value of a unit of pension over 1977-9880 
Linking the benefit values to an index such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or an 
Average Salary Increase Index can reduce the inflationary impact on benefits. 
However, the Government is worried about indexing pensions to an index because of 
its inability to finance the increases at a time of high inflation such as experienced in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Given that the current investment strategy (discussed in Chapter 
2) does not hedge against inflation, a compromise solution might be achieved by 
linking pensions to an index subject to an upper limit, such as price inflation up to 5% 
p. a. (as in the UK). By re-valuing the pension benefits yearly in this way, the scheme 
would maintain a proportion of standard of living for the pensioners. 
Figure 1.2. Nominal and real annual pension increments of the average pension over 1977-99 
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1.11.4. Contribution Evasion 
In some countries, low coverage is the result of widespread contribution evasion. 
Analysis of contribution income of the ESIPS (explained in detail in Chapter 2) shows 
that the system is experiencing an increasing widespread contribution evasion 
particularly in the PPSF as the role of the private and informal sectors of the economy 
grows82. This influences the financial status and the actuarial soundness of the system 
and it may seriously undermine the system with revenue falling far short of that 
sufficient to meet the current and future liabilities. 
82 This was stated by the Minister of the MISAs in the Egyptian Parliament in March 2001. She 
suggested that there is a need for new legislation to deal with the change in environment from a 
predominantly public sector economy to a predominantly private sector economy. 
68 
Contribution evasion could be due to many factors such as high inflation, corruption, 
lack of trust in the system, high unemployment, low earnings, no efficient system of 
income tax or loose of connection between contributions paid and benefits received. 
In general, contribution evasion can occur if three conditions coincide: 
1. Employers wish to evade, or to under declare the contributory earnings, or place a 
low priority on making social security contributions relative to other expenses; 
2. Employees with non-payment of contributions are reluctant to report to the 
authorities in order not to upset the employer or loose their jobs; 
3. Government enforcement tolerates evasion or is inadequate to prevent it. 
There are some other factors and circumstances, which are relevant to this 
phenomenon in Egypt such as; 
1. Contribution rates may regarded as high for employers and employees; 
2. Having more than two million people working abroad and large informal sectors 
of the labour force83 in which earnings cannot easily be monitored84 or 
contributions collected with a growing trend among them not to be covered; 
3. The rigidity of the labour legislation85 with the low levels of earnings in the 
informal sector indicating a close relationship between the growth of the informal 
sector and the growth of evasion and exclusion from coverage; 
4. As a result of the right given to these categories to choose the pensionable salary, 
they normally choose the lowest level throughout their career and would change it 
to a higher level before retirement; 
5. Members of private sector have their benefits based on the average earnings of the 
last two years, therefore, they have every reason to under-reporting their 
pensionable income and minimise their contributions in all but the last two years; 
6. Given the high rate of unemployment, some private sector employers force their 
employees to accept a lower pensionable salary than the actual salary or even 
provide no coverage at a1186. 
83 A report by the US Embassy in Egypt in 1997, estimates that the informal sector accounts for at least 
50% of the total economy: the rural and urban self-employed and the others who are employed, in one 
way or another, by informal sector enterprises. Definitions of the term `informal sector ' are both 
difficult to formulate in aggregate and to apply to individuals. 
84 Unrecorded salaries are a common phenomenon in Egypt particularly with the informal categories. 
85 The labour legislation and environment is examined in Chapter 6. 
86 Some employees accept this situation in order to keep their jobs. This problem may grow in the 
future with growing shift towards private sector, the increase in the number of workers in the informal 
private sector and the increase in the unemployment. 
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This phenomenon was reflected in the growth of the average pensionable salary, 
which is growing at a lower rate in the business (private) sector and the self-employed 
schemes than in the civil servants scheme as shown in Figure 1.3. The average 
pensionable salary of the civil servants is growing faster than in the business sector 
and much faster than in the self-employed persons' scheme. 
Figure 1.3. Development of the average pensionable salary of different schemes, 1973-98 
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These differences emerged from the second half of the 1980s, which is the starting 
period of privatisation and the increase in the private sector role in the economy. This 
contradicts what is believed in Egypt that the private sector's salaries are much better 
than the Government's and public sector's salaries. It was found that 96% of the 
regular private sector employees' insured salaries were less than L. E. 200 per month 
in 1999. It was also found that 77% of the members of the self-employed persons 
scheme who aged 35+ have selected the minimum pensionable salary. To avoid low 
salary selection more stringent measures should be taken, for example, for a worker 
who used to be covered under Law 79, the contributory salary should not be less than 
60 % of the last salary. 
Although the legislation is comprehensive, considerable evasion occurs, in particular 
schemes and thus, a system which seeks to be redistributive and to provide earnings 
related benefits for earnings related contributions is undermined by weak compliance. 
This problem is expected to be a future critical issue, therefore, the system needs to be 
adjusted to be able to cope with an economy predominant with a formal and informal 
private sector. It is unrealistic to rely on a system for collecting contributions which 
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was designed for the formal sector with the majority of contributions coming from the 
public sector and civil servants. The government needs to reconsider its responsibility 
to maintaining compliance which requires an enforcement policy and mechanism. 
1.12. Conclusion 
The social dimension has been given priority in the on-going economic reform in 
Egypt, which is regarded as a very critical factor for most developing countries, 
otherwise these reforms may not succeed and the country may have some internal 
unrest. The nature of the system makes the Government the main provider of 
pensions, while occupational pension schemes provide an extra income usually in the 
form of a lump sum on retirement. In addition, there is no provision of group pension 
policies in the Egyptian insurance market. Although there are supplementary schemes 
operated by larger employers, neither these nor private insurance play, as yet, a 
significant role. 
The overall system is well established and sustainable under conditions of moderate 
economic growth and, although it has its weaknesses, it is far from experiencing an 
acute crisis. It is a relatively well-organised and mature system which has been 
operating for more than half a century. It is regarded as one of the most 
comprehensive social insurance systems, not only in Africa, but also in the Arab 
world and among developing countries. The system has been improving over time and 
has generally satisfied many of the criteria for a good pension system such as, 
redistribution, fairness, certainty, adequacy, and coverage. 
However, demographic, economic and social developments in the 1980s and 1990s 
caused significant changes in addition to the system's internal problems, which need 
to be addressed in a reform program for the whole system. Only growing economies 
can guarantee adequate pensions, which are protected against inflation, as legislation 
alone can only improve benefits in short term. In the long term one of two situations 
might arise: either the benefits will again suffer from the effects of inflation or the 
cost of providing benefits will be too expensive. Therefore, the Egyptian economy has 
to grow and through this growth can better pensions be guaranteed. 
The structure of the system is summarised in the following Diagram 1.4, which shows 
the ESSPS components. 
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Chapter 2 
Demographic and Economic Experience of the 
ESSPS 
2.1. Introduction 
A state pension scheme is one of the comprehensive socio-economic and political 
institutions which functions within an environment of national demographic and 
economic significance. The future development of such schemes depends on the 
economic and demographic characteristics not only of the population covered by the 
scheme but also for the whole country, because the structure of every scheme has 
obvious links to that in the whole country. 
The financial management of such schemes on the basis of a sound long-term 
financial perspective is crucial for the their viability. The future income, outgo and 
actuarial liabilities of such schemes depend on many factors. Such factors as labour 
force growth and participation, employment, productivity, inflation, fertility, 
mortality, net migration, marriage, divorce, retirement patterns, and disability 
incidence and termination. Income will depend on how these factors affect the size 
and composition of the working population and the general level of earnings. 
Similarly, future outgo will depend on how these factors affect the size and 
composition of the beneficiary population and the general level of benefits. 
In general, all pension projections and valuation models require data on demographic 
and economic developments. Their effects are crucial, as well as the pension schemes 
themselves. Demographic and economic factors are usually regarded as exogenous 
factors for pension projections. Assumptions about them are usually derived from 
outside the schemes. However, the structural factors related to the schemes 
themselves are endogenous factors, which are obtained from within the schemes. 
Development of the factors contributing to the costs of the pension scheme have to be 
investigated and the results are used in the projection and valuation of the future 
income and expenditure of the scheme. 
To develop ranges for cost projections, assumptions about the future behaviour of the 
demographic and economic factors have to be made in an objective manner according 
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to current understanding. Therefore, the aims of this chapter are to analyse the 
demographic and economic construction and experience of the ESSPS over 1975-991. 
This analysis constructs the current demographic and economic structure of the 
system and extrapolates a new structure for each projection year. The analysis with 
expected future changes is used in setting the assumptions needed to build a discrete- 
time model for the projection of possible future scenarios of the system. These 
assumptions will form the basis in the model for the projection and valuation of the 
ESSPS over 1997-2025. 
The issues explored in this chapter relate to: 
1. The main economic and demographic indicators of Egypt; 
2. The administration and financial management experience of the ESSPS as a 
whole, the two Funds2 and every individual scheme of the system3; 
3. Trends in the cash flow of the two Funds and past actuarial valuation results; 
4. The investment policy of the system's assets in connection with the NIB; 
5. The past returns on the invested funds experienced over 1977-99; 
6. Coverage and compliance rates and membership stability; 
7. Salary and pension increases; 
8. Survivors' benefits experience and assumptions; 
9. Marriage rates and age differences within the Egyptian families; 
10. Mortality, invalidity, early retirement and unemployment decrements. 
2.2. Factors Affecting the Projection and Valuation of 
Pension Schemes 
Haapa-aho (2000) grouped the factors affecting the actuarial valuation and projection 
into three groups: demographic, economic and scheme-specific. 
2.2.1. Demographic Factors 
Demographic factors have a decisive influence on the development of pension 
schemes and their financial balance, particularly in long-term projections. Population 
projections are needed to provide a basis for estimating the numbers of the active 
1 Data before and after this range of years is used whenever it is available and appropriate, as the data is 
not available for all the indicators for the same period of time. 
2 Every Fund is an autonomous organisation, and there is no financial transfer between the two Funds 
except in the case of an employee is moving from the GSF to the PPSF 
This approach is consistent with the actuarial projection and valuation of the system as carried out. 
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population and pension recipients and consequently forecasting the scheme income 
and expenditure. Estimates of current and future liabilities of the state pension system 
require assumptions about many demographic factors, such as trends in future 
population growth. Therefore, the relevant models for demographic projections have 
to produce projections about the following components: 
1. Mortality rates in the base year (Life table); 
2. Mortality improvement factors; 
3. Fertility rates and net migration; 
4. National population; 
5. Other relevant demographic assumptions such as marriage statistics and age 
differences within the families; 
These points are covered in details in Chapters 4&5. 
2.2.2. Economic Factors 
The general economic situation affects pension schemes in a variety of ways, 
therefore, economic assumptions are critical to the projection and valuation models 
and the results they produce. Such economic variables are: 
1. Labour force participation rates; 
2. Employment and unemployment rates; 
3. Estimation of the insured population: 
4. Salary growth, average salary, legal minimum and maximum pensionable salary, 
5. Inflation, interest rates and average rate of return on the invested funds; 
6. Growth Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate; 
7. Pension increases etc. 
Some of these factors are needed to estimate the size of the active population and 
project income and expenditure levels. Changes in earnings and labour force 
participation rates relate directly to the income from contributions. Depending on the 
revaluation rules applied to pensions, inflation and changes in the earnings level also 
affect the level of expenditures. In a funded system such as the ESIPS, interest rates 
play a key role in forecasting investment returns. Variables 1 and 2 are covered in 
detail in Chapter 6 while other variables are covered in this chapter. 
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2.2.3. Scheme-Specific Factors 
The unique features of each pension scheme affect the pension projections and the 
interdependencies between individual variables and schemes. These dynamics can be 
quite complicated. Identifying internal and external dynamics and dependencies 
requires careful evaluations of different statistical data about the schemes. The 
analysis of the structural factors of pension schemes depends on the objectives of the 
projections and valuations, good statistical data available and sophisticated analytical 
tools. The crucial point is to be able to use the analysis to identify the main structural 
features of the schemes and their interdependencies. 
2.3. Main Economic and Demographic Indicators of Egypt4 
Although Egypt has enjoyed economic stability in the 1990s, it remains a relatively 
poor country with 23% of its population living below the poverty line5 (ILO, 1999). 
Macroeconomic stabilisation since the early 1990s led to GDP growth accelerating 
from 4.7% in 1995 to 5.3% in 1997: an average of 2.5% per capita during 1996-97. 
But it has declined since then to less than 4% in 2000-01. The Gross National Product 
(GNP) growth rate over 1997-98 was 5.1% (4.9% in 1996-97) which ranked Egypt as 
number 40 in the world in that year (World Development Report, 2000). The inflation 
rate declined from 20% at the end of the 1980s to 14% during 1991-95, to 6.2% in 
1997 to around 4% in 1998-99 as explained in Chapter 1. 
Egypt's demography has moved from a period of high fertility and mortality in the 
1970s and 1980s to a period of declining fertility and mortality from the beginning of 
the 1990s. The total population increased from 41m in 1980 to 66.55m in 1999 with a 
young population structure. The average population growth rate has declined from 
more than 2.6% p. a. during the 1970s and 1980s to around 2.1% p. a. over 1995- 
2000 
. 
The young population structure is reflected in the proportion of population 
Sources: UN, World Population Prospects, 1997 Revision, ILO 1999 and CAPMAS, 1990-98. 
With a per capita income of LE 3811 in 1996, Egypt took a moderate position in international 
ranking. The 1996 Egypt Human Development Report has established several poverty lines to assess 
the incidence and severity of poverty in Egypt. The overall poverty line ("lower expenditure poverty 
line") is estimated to be LE 4,168 per household and LE 814 per capita in 1995/96 (=21% of per capita 
income). A second, ""food based" poverty line of LE 3,148 per household and LE 594 per capita 
(=16% of per capita income) is used to determine the "ultra poor". Some 22.9% of the Egyptians 
(13.9m) are estimated to fall below the expenditure-poverty line, with some 7.4% (4.4m) considered to 
be ultra poor. A further 25.1% are considered to be living in "mild poverty". 
6A recent report published in May 2001 by the CAPMAS warned that Egypt's population is growing 
faster than expected and warns that it could double to 123 million by 2029. 
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aged 0-14, which represented 39.0% in 1998, although it has declined from 43.0% in 
the 1960s. It is also reflected in the median age7, which stood at 21.4 years in 1998, 
increasing from 18.4 in the late 1960s, but still relatively young. 
The proportion of the population aged between 15-64 was around 57% over 1970-99. 
The proportion of the population aged 60+ increased from 1.5% in 1958 to 3.8% in 
1998. The Dependency Ratio (DR)8 has been around 11-12% since 1950s, though it 
was between 10.5-11.0% over 1985-1995 but it increased again to 11.1% in 1998. 
The workforce was estimated to be 18.3m in 1998-99 with around 2.3m Egyptians 
working abroad, mainly in the Arab Gulf states. In 1998, the work force was broken 
down as follows: Government and public sector 36.0%, agriculture 34.0% and private 
sector 30.0%. Unemployment as a percentage of the workforce, according to official 
sources, was 9.6 % in 1995,8.3 % in 1997-98 and 9.5% in 1998-99, but unofficial 
estimates are higher than these figures. Some other demographic indicators are 
included in Table 2.1 of Appendix 2. 
Indications show that the population of Egypt has undergone a change in its 
demographic structure in the 1990s. This is having a major impact on the overall 
future development of the country's demographic and economic situation, particularly 
on the ESSPS. It is known that the growth of new members in the state pension 
system is mainly affected by the growth in the workforce, labour force participation, 
and employment rates, theses are analysed and projected in Chapter 6. Growth of 
membership of the ESSPS is analysed and assumptions regarding the future growth in 
new entrants of each scheme are projected separately in this Chapter. 
2.4. Administration of the ESSPS 
The ESSPS is managed by the GSF and the PPSF and each Fund is responsible for the 
social insurance of specific categories of the population. Every Fund keeps an account 
of the income and outgo of every scheme and for every covered contingency. The two 
Funds are responsible for collecting contributions, paying benefits and carrying out 
the required actuarial valuations. They work independently from each other in respect 
of finance, management, assets allocated (including those from the State's budget) 
and actuarial valuation results. 
The Median age is the age such that the populations above and below that age are equal. 
8 Measured as the total of the population aged 60+ as a percentage of the total population aged 15-60. 
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According to Law 79 of 1975, all the schemes within the system, except the CSIS, are 
required to operate on a full funding basis. This resulted in large funds accumulating 
over time which became a permanent feature of Egypt's financial structure and an 
essential element of economic stability. The assets of the system are separated from 
the state budget, this is desirable to secure the pension benefits independently of the 
financial health of the state's economy. However, the investment policy of the funds 
is subject to political interference. The Government relies heavily on these funds as 
the main sources of income for the NIB as explained later. 
2.5. Financial Framework and Cash-Flow Statement 
The relationship between the Treasury, the NIB and the two Funds is an essential 
factor for understanding the financial structure of the ESSPS. The flow of funds 
between these three parties is presented in Figure 2.1. This shows income, 
expenditure and cash-flow surplus and explains many of the policy issues in the 
system. The Figure shows that to finance expenditure, every Fund receives four 
sources of income: contributions, Treasury transfers (subsidy) to the Funds9, 
investment return, and other indirect resources (such as fines and legal compensation). 
Table 2.2 of Appendix 2 summaries the transactions of both Funds over 1977-99 
together with the trends of some financial indicators. The following subsections 
present an analysis of income, expenditure, surplus, reserves and main financial 
indicators. 
9 The two Funds pay all the benefits including the special increments and other unfunded promises, and 
the Treasury transfers the required subsidy on a monthly basis to them. 
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During the fiscal year 1998-99, the system had a total income of LE 28.5 billion (LE 
13.7 billion for the GSF & LE 14.8 billion for the PPSF) which represented 9.43% of 
GDP (at market prices) in that year. The total income comprised LE 11.3 billion of 
Public and Private 
Sector Fund (PPSF) 
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contributions by insured workers and their employers (LE 6.0 billion for the GSF & 
LE 5.3 billion for the PPSF), which represented 3.73% of GDP. 
There was LE 5.5 billion of subsidy from the Treasury in respect of the special 
increments, increasing the minimum pension level and financing the CSIS (LE 1.9 
billion for the GSF & LE 3.6 billion for the PPSF), which represented 1.82% of GDP. 
There was LE 10.9 billions of earned interest on the invested funds (LE 5.6 billion for 
the GSF & LE 5.3 for the PPSF), which represented 3.61% of GDP. There was also 
LE 0.8 billion of other incomes such as compensations and fines (LE 0.3 billion for 
the GSF & LE 0.5 for the PPSF). The development of the distribution of the annual 
income between these four sources over 1977-99 is shown in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: Distribution of annual income of the ESSPS over 1977-99. 
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This Figure shows that income from contributions as a proportion of the total annual 
income has decreased from 67.5% in 1977 (67.4% for the GSF & 67.7% for the 
PPSF) to 39.6% (43.4% for the GSF & 36.1% for the PPSF) in 1998-99. It can also be 
seen that the income from the Treasury has increased from 2.1% of total income in 
1977 to 19.3% in 1998-99. These recent changes to the financial structure of the 
system have let some researchers to say that the system has moved from a fully to a 
partially funded system (Ibrahim F. et al., 1994). 
However, the most rapidly growing source of income is the return on invested funds. 
It represented 38.3% of the total income in 1998-99 (40.6% for the GSF & 36.2% for 
the PPSF) which is very close to the income from contributions. This explains why 
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the investment strategy of the accumulated funds will be crucial for the solvency and 
stability of the system in the future. This is also reflected in the increasing ratios of 
the total income and net cash-flow to GDP (at market prices) since 1991-92, which is 
the same year the investment return started to increase as shown in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3: Income, net cash-flow and expenditure as a percentage of GDP over 1977-99 
10 
9 +" 
-F - +. i+ 
6 
+0 
"" 
f 
-" " ' " 4 s ýý, ! r 
3 
xrK--x -x-x-x`x 
-K. x. >(ýX"x- X*-x. fit-x' 
x 
2 
` 
-x"ac-x 1 
0 
Yea 
f- 
1- 
CO Of 0 w- N CO) V 1n to (- 
1- F- 00 00 CO 00 00 00 CO CO 
00 01 0-N (0 CO Of W (n M e! to (0 CD 0) 01 0) 
1- 00 0) 
Of 0) 0) 
01 
r 
'M C1 0) Ö aL NA4N( rrh CO 00 CO CO CO 00 00 
1' OÖ ChÖ "L 00 CO CO 0) 0) 
Nt4u 
Of (n C) Of 
6 1ýL OÖ 
0) Qf Of 
Q) O1 0) O> O> W Of Of Q) 0) C) 0) O) O1 Q) Qf G) O) Of Of 
F -4- - Total Income - -X- - Expenditure -b- Net cash-flow 
2.5.2. Expenditure 
Expenditure on benefits has been rapidly increasing at an average rate of 21.3% per 
year over 1977-99 (18.9% for the GSF & 23.4% for the PPSF), particularly in the 
1990s when the rate of annual increase exceeded 20%. The expenditure in 1998-99 
totalled LE 9.7 billion (LE 3.7 billion for the GSF & LE 6 billion for the PPSF) which 
represented 3.2% of GDP. It comprised LE 9.44 billion of benefit payments1° and LE 
0.26 billion of administration and other costs. This rapid increase in benefit 
expenditure creates cash-flow pressures on the income side, which is reflected in the 
ratio of expenditure to contributions as shown in Figure 2.4. 
This ratio increased from 38% in 1977 (47.6% for the GSF & 29.7% for the PPSF) to 
86% in 1998-99 (61.6% for the GSF & 113.4% for the PPSF). This means that the 
percentage of income from contributions which is invested has been decreasing 
rapidly over time and that there might be a need for more income to meet expenditure 
10 Health care benefits, for which contributions are transferred to the POHI, are excluded and in the 
financial statements of both Funds, the health care contribution is reported on the income side as a 
deduction from total contributions. 
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in the coming years. In 1998-99, there were sufficient contributions to cover the total 
expenditure of the GSF but not of the PPSF. Part of the Treasury subsidy to the PPSF 
has been used to cover the shortage in cash-flow from contributions since 1996-97, 
although the Fund still has an overall cash-flow surplus. 
Figure 2.4: Expenditure as a proportion of Contributions over 1977-99. 
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There is a growing indication that future cash shortages are likely to occur, 
particularly in the PPSF. The PPSF seems to be suffering growing imbalance between 
contribution and expenditure and needs considerable attention from the managers of 
the system, as its members have changed from predominantly public sector employees 
to predominantly private sector employeestt. 
2.5.3. Treasury Role in the Financing Structure 
The Government has committed itself to meet the following liabilities: 
1.1% of the total payroll towards old age, death and invalidity benefits; 
2. The cash-flow deficit of the CSIS and all the liabilities of the SPP; 
3. Pension increments including raising the minimum pension12; 
4. Grants for pensioners arising from political decisions, e. g. Labour Day Grant 13; 
" In the public sector, it was easy to treat the employee's entire earnings as pensionable salary. 
Contribution evasion in the private sector as a result of an inadequate collection mechanism for social 
security contributions can be regarded as one of the main reasons for this problem. 
12 The government finances all pension increases after pensions are awarded, as pensions are not 
automatically adjusted. These increases were extended to include the self-employed persons and 
Egyptians working abroad schemes after abolishing the upper limit for these pensions from 1/7/1992. 
13 It represents a special allowance equivalent to two-thirds of the monthly pension (up to a maximum 
of 75 LE per person in the fiscal year 1998-99) awarded on the I' of May and paid to all pensioners. 
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5. Any actuarial deficit in the Funds, to be repaid to the Treasury when there is a 
surplus. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a rapid increase in the Treasury subsidy to both Funds has 
occurred and a substantial percentage of the Government expenditure was allocated to 
the ESSPS (about 21% of Government expenditure in 1998-99). Pension 
expenditures, financed by the Treasury, were growing at an average annual rate of 
33.4% over 1977-99, which was much faster than the growth in GDP (6.3% over the 
same period). It grew by a rate of more than 19.3% per year over 1982-9914 compared 
with average GDP growth of around 5.1 % per year over the same period. 
The ratio of pension expenditures financed by the Treasury to GDP rose from 0.12% 
in 1977 to 1.82% in 1998-99 as shown in Figure 2.4. The percentage of the Treasury 
subsidy relative to the total expenditure of both Funds has also increased from 8.2% 
in 1977 (7.8% for the GSF and 8.7% for the PPSF) to 56.7% in 1998-9915 (52.5% for 
the GSF and 59.2% for the PPSF). The Treasury subsidy to the PPSF, particularly, 
represented 67.2% of the income from contributions and 48.8% of the total income in 
1998-99. Some of the reasons for this dramatic change in the financial structure over 
the 1980s and the 1990s are: 
1. Extending coverage to categories of the population who have no resources to 
finance their liabilities (the CSIS) and have to be financed by the Treasury; 
2. Unfunded pension increments, which have been promised every year since 1987 
and have an increasing effect over time on the State's budget. 
The increasing Treasury subsidy to the system over time may be seen as contradictory 
to the objective of a fully funded system. But as the system has been forced to invest 
its assets in low interest loans to the NIB, the Government may have realised its 
responsibility to take care of financing the cost of extra benefits (including any 
pension increases) from its general revenues. The proceeds of its privatisation 
program may have helped the Government to finance annual pension increases of 10- 
15% p. a. However, its ability to do that in the future will depend on whether it will be 
able to find enough revenue from its budget to achieve that. But ultimately the 
14 This period followed the introduction of the CSIS and SPP with about 90-95% of their finance 
coming from the Treasury. The rate of growth over 1979-82 only was 117% p. a. 1s It can also be seen that the percentage annual increase in finance from the Treasury has risen from 
2.7% in the 1970s to 6.9% in the second half of the 1990s. 
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Government subsidies to the two Funds are indirectly used as a source of income for 
the NIB and hence for financing public projects. Government subsidies that are not 
used to cover primary cash deficits simply increase the tax burden of future 
generations, without increasing the financial "safety" of the social insurance schemes. 
This is because the safety of the investments depends on the Government's ability to 
raise taxes or refinance the debt on the capital market. 
2.5.4. Cash-flow Surplus and Reserves 
The excess of contributions over expenditure, the Government subsidy, the 
investment income and other sources of income are, in total, added to the accumulated 
funds. The two Funds have been showing a cash-flow surplus every year. In 1998-99, 
they had a total cash-flow surplus of LE 18.8 billion (LE 10 billion for the GSF and 
LE 8.8 billion for the PPSF) which represented 6.2% of GDP in that year. However, 
the proportion of annual cash-flow surplus to the total income has been decreasing 
over time particularly for the PPSF as shown in Table 2.2 of Appendix 2. This 
proportion has decreased from 74.4% in 1977 (79.9% for the GSF and 67.9% for the 
PPSF) to 65.9% in 1998-99 (73.3% for the GSF and 59.1% for the PPSF) which gives 
an indication of the expected future cash flow trends. 
Each Fund has been accumulating a considerable amount of funds. At the end of the 
fiscal year of 1998-99, there was a total fund of LE 130.4 billion (compared with LE 
3.4 billion in 1977). The total assets of both Funds (LE 64.7 billion for the GSF and 
LE 65.6 billion for the PPSF) represented 43.2% of GDP at market prices in 1998-99. 
This represents a significant share of assets invested in the national economy. 
The increase in funds in the 1990s is mainly attributed to the earned interest rather 
than a significant excess of contribution income over expenditure, particularly in the 
PPSF. The assets of both Funds were equivalent to 13.4 years' annual expenditure in 
1998-99 (17.7 years for the GSF and 10.9 years for the PPSF). Although this indicator 
has increased in the GSF (from equivalent 14.7 years in 1993-94 to 17.7 years in 
1998-99) it has moved in the opposite direction in the PPSF (from equivalent 14.5 
years in 1986-87 to 10.9 years in 1998-99) as shown in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5. Funds/Expenditure ratio over 1977-99 
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This confirms the growing concerns about expected future shortage of cash-flow for 
the PPSF over the coming years and the Treasury's ability to inject more subsidies 
into the system. Nagib, S. (1994) discussed this problem and attributed it to a trend of 
contribution evasion and under- stated pensionable salaries within the private sector16. 
He suggests that one of the main reasons for this problem is the high contribution 
rates, which either discourage private sector employees and employers from 
contributing or cause them to use the minimum possible pensionable salary. The GSF 
does not have this problem, as it covers only civil servants and has a 100% 
compliance rate, it is in a better financial position as shown in Figure 2.5. 
2.5.5. The CSIS Financial Problem 
The ratio of income from non-government sources to the total expenditure of the 
CSIS (including the SPP) has declined from 31.8% in 1989-90 to 5.4%17 in 1998-99, 
which means that within a few years the Treasury may have to finance all the 
liabilities of this scheme. There are many reasons for this situation such as: 
1. The member's contribution of LE 1.0 per month is not significant; 
2. The income from other sources is not stable and has been significantly declining 
over time; 
16 The PPSF covers mostly the private sector' workers, where the average rate of compliance is less 
than 50% as explained later. 
17 In 1998-99, contributions from active members, transfers from public and private sector schemes, 
and indirect sources represented 0.5%, 4.7%, and 0.2% of the total benefit expenditure respectively. 
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3. Members are not required to contribute for more than 120 months, and unpaid 
contributions can be deducted from the first pension payment if the member has 
not satisfied this condition, 
4. The rapid increases in the expenditure of this scheme as a result of the annual 
pension increments and the increase in the minimum pension. 
2.6. Current Investment Strategy 
A funded scheme results in a pool of assets on behalf of the active members to 
provide for their future benefits. The important issue is how these assets are invested. 
The investment policy of the funds of a defined benefit scheme is crucial in 
determining the system's cost and its surplus/deficits. The investment of the ESIPS's 
funds has predominantly been made in government instruments and has been 
controlled by the Government. The two Funds are not responsible for investing the 
majority of their funds, as they have to be handed over to the NIB. There are very 
tight restrictions on private sector assets 18. 
Prior to January 1976, the funds were invested in government loans and deposits in 
the National Investment Fund of Deposits and Insurance Funds, offering a very 
modest interest rate of 3.5% per annum, the system was obliged by the law to invest 
in these assets. Since the beginning of the 1980s, and in accordance with the Law No. 
119 of 1980, most of the cash-flow surpluses of the two Funds, as well as the 
accumulated funds, have had to be deposited with the NIB19. As a result of this Law 
the percentage of total funds invested by the NIB has been increasing and reached 
92.1% on 30/6/99 as shown in Figure 2.6. 
The assets consist mainly of loans made to the NIB and the Treasury for various long- 
term development projects as shown in Table 2.3 of Appendix 2. The investments of 
the funds are predominantly in fixed interest assets (98% in 1998-99), rather than 
equity-based assets. Other types of investment, such as local authorities' bills, 
securities, various capital investments, Government bonds and loans to members have 
1s In his actuarial reports in 1987 and 1992 to the Minister of MISAs, the Actuary of the GSF suggested 
that in order to improve the return on the invested funds and reduce the actuarial deficit, the Fund 
should be allowed to invest at least 25% of its funds in the private sector assets. This has recently been 
approved by the NIB and the Ministry of Finance, but for a very modest proportion of less than 5%. 
1 The NIB was a replacement of the National Investment Fund of Deposits and Insurance Funds. 
According to this Law if the rate of return on the invested funds is less than 4.5% in any year, the 
Government is committed to pay the difference in return to the two Funds. 
- 
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always been, in total, less than 5% of the assets as shown in Table 2.1. It is perhaps 
surprising that only 1% of the assets are in equity related investments, which might be 
expected to match the long-term liabilities of the system, assuming that the value of 
equity related investments would increase broadly in line with inflation or/and 
economic growth. 
Figure 2.6. Percentage of Assets Invested in the NIB over 1977-99 
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Tnvestment of the system funds over 1997-99 as a nercentaQe of reserves. 
Fund GSF (%) PPSF (%) Both Fu nds 
Year 1997-98 1998-99 1997-98 1998-99 1997-98 1998-99 
Money owed to Funds 7.5 8.9 13.0 15.9 10.3 12.4 
NIB 89.6 90.7 93.1 93.4 91.4 92.0 
Deposits in Commercial Banks 5.7 4.8 3.1 2.5 4.4 3.7 
Treasury & Local Authorities Bills 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.5 3.0 2.7 
Securities & Various Projects 0.7 1.2 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.2 
Government Bonds 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Loans to Members 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: the MISAs' Report 1997-99. 
It is understood that the system's assets are there for the purpose of providing benefits 
to the insured workers and therefore both liquidity and a reasonable rate of return are 
20 This = 100 %- the percentage invested. The money owed to the Funds normally includes the money 
owed from the Government, employers, contributors, debtors and others. 
21The system allows its members (active or pensioners) who are in desperate need as a result of some 
difficult circumstances to ask for a loan from the system. This loan is calculated as a percentage of the 
accumulated contributions or the present value of the accrued benefits. This loan must be repaid by 
instalments over a specific period of time. It is no surprise to find that the majority of such loans are 
taken by the government employees (76% on 30/6/1999), as it is easier to get such a low interest rate 
loan if you are a civil servant or work for a public enterprise than if you are in the private sector. 
87 
critical factors for reducing the burden on future generations. The current investment 
policy is not achieving reasonable returns and does not protect against the inflation 
risk. The assets may not be readily liquidated when needed to meet cash-flow 
requirements in the future and the system may face a liquidity crunch in such a case. 
For those insured persons who pay both contributions and taxes at the same time, 
investment in Government financial instruments de facto represents a form of PAYG 
tax-financing for social insurance schemes. In the case of excess contributions over 
expenditure, they actually finance Government expenditure which would otherwise 
have to be financed through taxes. In the case of excess of expenditure over 
contributions, they have to finance the liquidation of Government-held assets through 
"additional" taxes, or refinancing of the debt through the capital market. The latter 
simply delays potential tax increases. Therefore, apart from some distributive effects, 
the total burden for taxes and contributions shouldered by the core group of tax payers 
(employees and employers) could be similar, or even equal to, the PAYG level. 
This investment strategy has also resulted in the two Funds having neither the 
experience of formulating an investment strategy nor the capacity for investment 
management22. Therefore, if the system is to be allowed to invest a substantial amount 
of funds freely, then a significant effort to strengthen the development of the 
necessary investment expertise to manage these funds is required23. Also the Funds 
will need to devise alternative investment strategies for their assets and carefully 
consider in detail the financial and other ramifications of such strategies, using their 
experience of the limited direct investments that have already been made. 
Improving the investment strategy requires the Government to stop forcing the 
management of the two Funds to credit the NIB with the majority of their funds and 
allows them some direct responsibilities to place a certain proportion of the funds in 
22 The NOSI has lost LE 3,500 million from investing in the Egyptian Stock Market over 1995-200 1. 
23 The board of directors of each Fund is allowed to decide on how to invest a very small proportion of 
assets (less than 1%). In 1997, the two Funds were allowed to invest part of the cash-flow surplus 
outside the NIB, but through investment companies approved by the NIB under the authority of the 
MISAs. In 1998, the following investments were made: some LE 175m were invested in the purchase 
of some 2 million shares (a 10% stake) in the Ameriyah Cement Company, some LE 200m investment 
(a 40% stake) in the Egyptian International Fund (a five year closed fund) was made with other 
stakeholders such as Misr Insurance Company and four public banks (the fund is managed by the New 
York based Concorde International Investment Group), three portfolios have been formed under the 
control of the MISAs consisting of LE 300m each and professional investment managers are contracted 
to manage the funds with a commission determined by their portfolio's performance. A fourth portfolio 
has been approved in co-operation with four public sector banks and consists of LE 500m. 
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more profitable investments. It is argued that the current investment strategy breaks 
the connection between the investment risks of the funds and the pension system, so 
the assets and the returns are kept guaranteed. 
However, the funds could be invested in a way that guarantees safety, high yield and 
sufficient liquidity, which would have major impact on the structure of national 
investment planning in Egypt. If there were higher investment rates of return, then the 
Treasury subsidy would clearly be lower. But these are not equivalents from the 
macro-economic standpoint. This depends on whether the economic returns from the 
investments undertaken by the NIB would be higher or lower than the economic 
returns on alternative investments, including greater investment in the private sector. ' 
2.6.1 Current Role of the NIB 
The NIB is responsible for investing the major part of the assets of the pension funds 
(including occupational pension schemes). The yearly cash-flow surplus of the two 
Funds is the main source of income for the NIB (more than 70% or some LE 105 
billion in 1999 compared with LE 1.1 billion in 1975). The NIB provides cheap long- 
term finance for various national investment projects and public institutions, including 
central and local governments, and public utilities. If there had not been a cash-flow 
surplus in the two Funds, many of these projects would have had to be financed 
directly by the Government. This indicates that the NIB is in fact working as an agent 
for the Government in financing its development plan. 
The NIB charges a fixed interest rate to recover operating costs and interest payable 
on its own debts. Prior to 1992, interest rates charged by the NIB to government 
projects and public enterprise were negative in real terms as a result of cheap loans 
and high inflation rates. Therefore, the NIB was offering an interest rate on the assets 
of the ESSPS at less than the market rate24. This was inadequate to meet the liabilities 
of the system. The interest rate, particularly prior to 1992, has usually been lower than 
that in commercial banks. After 1992 the NIB started to increase interest rates on its 
lending and borrowing. 
The interest rate given by the NIB is influenced mainly by two factors: firstly, the 
prevailing market interest rates on bank deposits; secondly the size of the Funds' 
24 It is negotiable after every actuarial valuation, but does not exceed the interest rate prevailing in the 
market on deposits. 
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deficit. Therefore one of the main functions of the actuary of the two Funds is to 
recommend the rate of return required on the invested funds to amortise any deficits, 
or at least maintain an equilibrium position. Although the required rate of return has 
always been less than the prevailing rates in the market, the NIB and the Government 
are not obliged to follow the actuary's recommendations. 
In conclusion, pension funds' assets became a permanent feature of the country's 
financial structure and an essential element of economic stability. This reflects an 
underlying philosophy of the state that aims to achieve specific macroeconomic and 
social objectives, at a lower cost, by using the assets of the pension funds. It is argued 
that the ESSPS is actually giving a subsidy to the state rather than getting any subsidy 
from it. The use of pension funds for the State activities would be acceptable if they 
provided a reasonable rate of return25. 
Actuaries of social insurance schemes in many countries, such as UK and US, 
develop the basic parameters used in the projections and valuations of such schemes. 
They develop assumptions for parameters which represent the best and most realistic 
estimates reflecting the real world, and draw as accurate conclusions as possible. The 
starting point for arriving at the best estimate is the consideration of past experience 
and expected future changes in these parameters. Negotiations among social insurance 
experts and other relevant authorities also influence the recommended assumptions. In 
the following sections, analysis of the past experience of the main parameters used in 
the valuation and projection of the ESSPS is carried out and assumptions regarding 
expected future values of the parameters are obtained. 
2.7. Past Return on the Invested Funds 
The average rate of return on the invested funds was around 4.5% in the 1970s and 
5.5% in the 1980s and, in general, it was less than 6.5% until 1992. In 1987, actuarial 
valuations of the two Funds were carried out assuming a rate of return of 6% p. a. and 
results were a very large actuarial deficit, which exceeded LE 1.0 billion in the GSF 
alone26. Also in the 1980s, the system experienced high salary escalation as a result of 
high inflation, and interest rates on deposits in commercial banks were rising 
2$ It is argued that such use may foster the growth of the economy and thus increase the future tax base, 
and so improve the quality of life of the citizens. 
26 The accumulated lost return over 1974-92 contributed significantly to this actuarial valuation deficit. 
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sharply27. This situation forced the Government and NIB to negotiate with the two 
Funds about the interest rates given on the Funds' assets. 
After very long negotiations carried out over 1988-92, it was agreed to increase the 
interest given on the Funds' assets by the NIB as follows: 
1. A rate of 6%p. a. on all the funds accumulated before 1/7/1989, (except for those 
arising from contributions paid on variable wages where the rate was 8%); 
2. A rate of 8%p. a. on the new funds over 1989-90; 
3. A rate of 9%p. a. on the new funds over 1990-91; 
4. A rate of 11 % p. a. on the new funds over 1991-92; 
5. A rate of 13 % p. a. on the new funds over 1992-97; 
6. A rate of 11 % p. a. on all the funds from 1/7/1997. 
However, as a significant part of the funds accumulated before 1989, the average rate 
of return on the invested assets until 1994 did not exceed 8% as shown in Figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.7. Comparison between the rate of return on the invested funds, the interest rates on 
bank deposits and the inflation rate 
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In 1996, the average rate of return reached more than 9% p. a. This was a reasonable 
rate compared with that generally obtained in the market and the inflation rate, around 
4% p. a. in 1996-97. This means that the NIB started to provide a positive real rate of 
return on the invested funds after 1995. However, the overall rate of return on 
invested assets is still below the prevailing interest rates on deposits in commercial 
"'it reached a peak rate of 21% in 1991 and since has been declining as the inflation rate declines and it 
was around 10% p. a. in 2002. 
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banks and, particularly, the average rate of return which can be achieved on the stock 
market (14% p. a. over 1994-97, IMF, 199928). One of the main reasons for this is that 
the rate of interest on the loans to the Treasury is still very low at 5% p. a. and the 
Treasury is reluctant to increase it. Figure 2.7 also indicates that there have been large 
lost returns as a result of the current investment strategy. 
The problem of low rate of return on the assets can also be illustrated by comparing it 
with the sum of the salary escalation and the growth of members rates, assuming the 
system has a stable population29, as shown in Figure 2.8. In the long run, when the 
scheme reaches demographic and financial maturity, the rate of return on the assets of 
a funded scheme should exceed the sum of the growth of the insured population and 
the salary escalation rates, which has an economic interpretation (Iyer, S., 1999). This 
is necessary for a funded scheme to be more efficient than a PAYG scheme. Figure 
2.8 shows that the average rate of return has been much lower than the sum of the two 
rates. From the second half of the 1990s, the gap between them started to narrow. This 
is a reasonable explanation for the high contribution rates required from the 
employees and employers of the ESIPS. 
Figure 2.8. Rate of return compared with the salary escalation plus the rate of growth of 
members over 1978-99 
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2S This was calculated according to the Prime Index for Initial Public Offerings (PIPO) index. The 
index comprises 47 of the 48 privatised companies listed in the stock exchange. These companies 
accounted for 51% of total trading and 34% of market capitalisation in 1997. 
29 This is when the size of the population changes over time at a constant rate that is independent of 
time and its relative age distribution is constant. 
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The actuarial valuation of the GSF was repeated in 1987 using 7% p. a. as the future 
rate of return instead of the 6% p. a. This action reduced the actuarial deficit from 
more than LE 1.0 billion to LE 170.2 million (Ibrahim F., et al. 1994). A special 
committee was set up in 1990 to investigate how to reduce the actuarial deficit of the 
two Funds. One of the important recommendations was to allow private sector 
investment of the funds in order to improve the rate of return on invested assets. 
2.8. Past Actuarial Valuation Results of the GSF and PPSF 
A full actuarial valuation is normally carried out every 5 years and a brief statement 
by the actuary, referring to the latest valuation results has to be submitted to the 
MISAs. The Objectives of the actuarial valuation of the two Funds are as follow: 
1. Determine the level of surplus/deficit, the reasons for having deficit and the means 
of remedy; 
2. Determine the amount of finance required from the Treasury, to cover the 
Government liabilities for any additional or increase in benefits granted by 
political decisions, and to eliminate or reduce the deficit level; 
3. Determine the required interest rate to amortise any deficits and to keep the ratio 
of funded liabilities at 100%30 for the two Funds; 
4. Determine whether the current contribution rates are sufficient for new entrants; 
5. Determine any significant variations in experience from the assumptions made at 
the previous valuation and the reasons for that. 
Actuarial deficit can be amortised by a loan from the Treasury over the 5-year interval 
period before the next actuarial valuation, which has to be paid off when there is an 
actuarial surplus. If the valuation reveals an existence of a surplus, it has to be kept in 
a special account, and can not be disposed of without the approval of the Fund's board 
of directors and only in one, or all, of the following: 
1. To pay off any previous deficit financed by the Treasury; 
2. To set up a special or general reserve for different purposes; and 
3. To increase the level of pensions to match the level of prices increases. 
The results disclosed at each actuarial valuation have confirmed that the current 
contribution rates are sufficient to meet the liabilities of new entrants, although it has 
'o The regulation of the ESSPS proscribes underfunding to ensure the security of the system and larger 
contributions from employees or employers are not possible practical solutions to be recommended. 
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been argued that they are very high. But all the actuarial valuation reports have 
recommended higher interest rates on the funds loaned to the NIB and the Treasury to 
match those in the market and to amortise the actuarial deficit of the two Funds. The 
Treasury was providing finance to amortise the previous actuarial deficits but the 
interest rate used in all these valuation was between 4-6%. Table 2.2, showing the 
actuarial valuation results from 1959 until 1997, indicates that the deficit was 
increasing over time. The deficit reached its peak in 1987 and has since started to 
decline significantly as a result of changing the assumed future rate of return on the 
invested assets31 from 6% to 7%. This was a result of the increase in interest rates 
given by the NIB, which contributed to both declines of the deficit as well as paying 
off of some of the debts to the Treasury. 
Table 2.2: The Actuarial Valuation Surplus/(Deficit) of the ESSPS over 1959-97 
Year 1959 1963 1968 1972 1977 1982 1987* 1987** 1992 1997 
GSF (47.9) (131.4) (166.2) (307.1) (984.1) (551.6) (1000+) (170.2) NA NA 
PPSF 
- 
7.4 (8.1) (174.6) (860.9) (1022.4) (1874) (114.0) 12.0 NA 
SSPS (47.9) (124.0) (174.3) (481.7) (1845) (1574.0) (2874+) (284.2) NA NA 
* This valuation was carried out using 6% as an average rate of return on the invested funds. 
** This was carried out using 7% as an average rate of return on the invested funds. 
Source: Actuarial Valuation Reports 1959-92 
In most of the actuarial valuation reports, the deficit was attributed to one or more of 
the following reasons: 
1. Low interest rates averaging between 4-6% per annum; 
2. Unfunded benefit increases, such as changing the accrual rate from 1/50 to 1/45 
and increasing the minimum pension in the case of death or disability in service to 
65% of pensionable salary instead of 40%; 
3. Unamortised deficits carried forward with interest; 
4. Non-payment of funds promised by the Treasury; 
5. Increase in the number of early retirements cases; 
6. Increase in administration expenditure to cope with modernisation and 
computerisation of the system; 
7. Contribution evasion on the part of employers and their workers, 
8. The difference between the actual and assumed rate of interest on Treasury Bills; 
9. The introduction of the lump sum payment of the end of service remuneration. 
31 The rate of interest on the government loans was 4.5% and on assets invested in the NIB was 6% 
over 1982/87, which resulted in a lost return of more than one thousand million pound. 
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The actuarial economic and demographic parameters are usually determined using a 
deterministic approach, using time-invariant best estimates. The actuary can refer to 
both experienced values over past periods and his own perspective for future 
developments. Therefore, assumption regarding the future average rate of return on 
the invested funds over the projection period, can be assumed to range between 5.0- 
10.0%, matching that obtained to date by the NIB. Using this range of interest rates, 
the actuarial valuation will be repeated to test the sensitivity of the actuarial outcomes 
to expected rate of return on the funds. 
2.9. Membership Coverage Rates and Stability 
Pension schemes can be classified as young32, mature33 or declining schemes in the 
light of their long-term history 34. The young and mature schemes are characterised by 
the property that the active members' age structure is relatively stable as the scheme 
continues. Young schemes are assumed to have stable membership that progresses by 
consistent application of a constant exponential rate of increase in new entrants (i. e. at 
each age is growing exponentially in a fixed rate over time). Mature schemes, in 
general, have stationary membership35 characterised by a number at each age, which 
is independent of time, and the net increase in the total number of members equal 
zero. The declining scheme is when the number of members is decreasing 
exponentially36 at a fixed rate over time (Sung, 1997). Therefore, it is important to 
explore the pattern of growth in the membership (contributors and beneficiaries) 
which is carried out in the following sections over 1975-99 and also over 1984-9937. 
2.9.1. The ESSPS 
The number of members covered by the system increased quickly in the 1990s39. The 
number of contributors increased from 3.8m in 1975 to 17.5m in 1998-99. The ratio 
of contributors to the population aged 15-59 increased from 20% in 1975 to 51.2% in 
1993-94 and decreased to 48.3% in 1998-99. The proportion of total beneficiaries to 
32 When the scheme has a growing past service at different ages and a growing pensioner population. 
33 When the scheme has stable distribution of past service by age and stable distribution of pensioners 
and active members. 
34 These three stages of a defined benefit scheme may simply be called the scheme life-cycle. 
31 Mature scheme can also have a growing population. 
36 This is might be also the case for a closed scheme. 
37 Choosing this later second period was because of the surrounding economic and social 
circumstances, which bear strong relations to the present time. 
38 The analysis showed significant differences between over 1977-99 and over 1984-99 as a result of 
the introduction of new schemes. For that reason a comparison is carried out for both periods. 
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contributors increased from 21.4% in 1975 to 39.2% in 1998-99, which is relatively 
high. The increases in the proportions of pensioners and dependants cannot be traced 
totally to demographic changes, as the pension system still shows a young population 
structure. It may be due to the following reasons: 
1. The extension of coverage to new population categories (particularly the CSIS); 
2. The inclusion of more dependants into the survivors' category because the Law 
expands the definition of dependants and gives more rights to a larger chain of 
relatives over time, as mentioned in Chapter 1; 
3. The increase in the frequency of early retirement, (a policy adopted by the 
government in the 1990s which is discussed later); 
4. High rates of unemployment in the 1990s; and 
5. The maturity of the schemes and particularly the employees' scheme. 
2.9.2. The GSF 
The GSF has only one category of members, civil servants, covered by Law 79 of 
1975. The annual growth of new entrants in this fund is affected mainly by the 
Government strategy on civil service employment. The number of contributors of the 
GSF increased from 1.8m in 1975 to 4m in 1998-99, with a relatively stable annual 
growth of 3.7% over 1975-99 (3.5% over 1984-85) as shown in Table 2.3. 
Tahlp 23_ Members of the GSF over 1973-1998 (thousands) 
Members of the GSF 1975 1979 1 1983-84 1 1988-891 993-94 11998-99 
Contributors (CON) 1750 2101 2403 3025 3621 4000 
Pensioners (PENS) 168 259 240 316 384 482 
Beneficiaries (BEN) 630 931 915 1129 1398 1727 
PENS/CON (%) 9.6 12.3 10.0 10.5 10.6 12.1 
BEN/CON (%) 36.0 44.3 38.1 37.3 38.6 43.2 
Source: MISAs, the annual reports; 1958-1998 
The contributors of the GSF represented 22.9% of the system's members in 1998-99 
(45.6% in 1975) and has been around 22-23% since 1980-81. The proportion of 
beneficiaries to contributors has increased from 36% in. 1975 to 43.2% in 1998-9939. 
This Fund has experienced little fluctuation in its demographic structure except over 
the second half of the 1990s, as a result of the economic transition of the country. It is 
expected that the number of active members of this Fund may increase over the 
39 The two years, which were exceptionally high for this proportion were 1979 and 1998-99 for one 
common reason: the increase in the early retirement rates as a result of changing Government policy. 
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coming years. This is because the Government has adopted a strategy of easing the 
pressure of high unemployment by increasing its own employees, as a political and 
social solution. It has also stopped any further employment after the age of 60, under 
any circumstances, and gives more incentives for taking early retirement at age 55. 
2.9.3. The PPSF 
This Fund comprises members of all other schemes and categories (except civil 
servants) and thus the annual growth of new entrants in this Fund is affected, mainly, 
by the overall economic conditions. The number of contributors to the PPSF was 
13.5m in 1998-99, which represented 77.1% of the system's members in 1998-99. 
The proportion of pensioners to contributors in this fund increased from 2.6% in 1977 
to 10.1% in 1998-99, and the proportion of beneficiaries to contributors has increased 
from 9.23% in 1975 to 38.1% in 1998-99. 
2.10. Membership of Different Schemes 
As mentioned earlier, different population categories were covered by the system 
under different laws (or schemes). Table 2.4 shows the number of covered active 
members to each scheme of the ESSPS over 1977-99 at five-year intervals. 
Table 2.4: Number of covered active members according to their schemes over 1977-99 (m) 
Employees 
govrL/ public/private 
En ployers and 
self-employed 
Egyptians va-king 
abroad 
The Comprehensive 
Social Inuuance 
Total 
Year Law79/1975 Law 108/1976 Iaw50/1978 Law 112/1980 Total 
1977 4.262 0.380 0.003 2.013 6.66 
1982 6.023 0.626 0.012 4.007 10.67 
1987 7.158 1.080 0.029 4.265 12.53 
1992 8.533 1.382 0.041 5.043 15.00 
1995 8.702 1.576 0.068 5.537 15.88 
1999 9.692 1.820 0.023 5.918 17.45 
Source: MISA, the annual year reports; 1977-1999 
2.10.1. LAW No. 79/1975 (Employees Scheme) 
There are three main economic categories covered by this scheme: civil servants, 
public sector and private sector employees. The number of contributors covered by 
this scheme represents the total official work force in Egypt, as the state system is the 
main provider of pensions in the country. This scheme represents the most important 
part of the ESSPS from the financing point of view. It provides the main sources of 
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finance through contributions and accumulated funds available for investment. In 
1998-99 the contributors covered by this scheme represented more than 55% of the 
total ESSPS active members (including the CSIS) and 84% of the total ESIS 
contributors (excluding the CSIS). 
There has been a steady reduction in the number of contributors from the public sector 
and an increase in the number of contributors from the private sector, particularly 
since 1978 and more significantly from 1990 when the government began the 
privatisation process. In general, there has been an overall steady decrease in the 
percentage of insured employees in this scheme, relative to the whole system, 
although it still represents the most significant scheme in the system. This decline has 
occurred for the following reasons: 
1. The Government has implemented an economic reform policy based on 
privatising the public sector; 
2. It is encouraging employees to leave work and receive early retirement benefits; 
3. It is ending temporary contracts in public sector and civil services; 
4. The increase in the unemployment rate over the last decade; and 
5. An emerging trend of contribution evasion among private sector employees and 
employers. 
This was reflected in the demographic dependency ratios of the three member 
categories, which were 11.3%, 28.0% and 8.0% in 1998-99 for civil servants, public 
and private sectors respectively (10.7% for public and private sector employees 
together). These can be compared with ratios of 9.7% for civil servants in 1986-87 
(7.1% in 1975) and 5.9% for the public and private sector employees together in 
1986-87. These increases in the demographic dependency ratios were due to the 
above mentioned economic factors as well as demographic changes and the low 
compliance rate among private sector employees, particularly non-regular workers. In 
general, changes in economic circumstances have slowed the growth in the numbers 
of contributors and pensioners of this scheme in the 1990s. 
2.10.2. Law 108 of 1976 (Self-Employed Persons) 
In 1998-99, this scheme coverage represented about 10.5% of total contributors to the 
system, compared with 5.7% in 1997. This may be as a result of the current trend of 
employees leaving the public sector and government employment and joining private 
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and self-employment. This implies an annual growth rate of 9.5% over 1976-99, 
growing faster in the 1990s than over 1976-8940. The demographic dependency ratio 
of this category was 10.8% in 1998-99 compared with 3.7% in 1986-87 
A considerable migration of employees and workers between different schemes is 
expected over the coming years, particularly from public and private sectors to 
employers and self-employed sectors, with the latter gaining more importance as a 
result of economic reform and privatisation. It would be a realistic assumption to 
assume that the current trend of moving from the public sector to the private sector 
and self-employed will stay at the current level until 2010, and slow down thereafter. 
2.10.3 Law 50 of 1978 (Egyptians Working Abroad) 
The number of contributors covered by this scheme is not stable over time. This 
scheme covered 23,000 member in 1998-99, which represented less than 0.13% of the 
ESSPS (68,000 were covered by this scheme in 1996-97 but only 18% were 
contributing to the scheme). The dependency ratio of this category was 26.8% in 
1998-99 compared with 5% in 1986-87 and it is expected to increase more in the 
coming years. This is because the number of contributors of this category is expected 
to decrease significantly over the coming years as opportunities for working abroad 
decline. The rate of compliance in this scheme is very low, particularly when we 
appreciate that this category is not supposed to be in financial difficulties. This might 
be due to the voluntary nature of the scheme, which motivated the legislator to make 
it compulsory from the financial year 2002-03. 
2.10.4. Law 112 of 1980 (The CSIS) 
In 1989-99, the proportion covered by this scheme was 33.9% of the system's total 
active members (compared with 35.23% in 1984)41. The number of active members 
grew by a stable annual rate of 2.9% over 1984-99. The system is trying to restrict the 
number of new entrants joining the scheme because of it is heavy and increasing 
ao The proportion of active employees in the self-employed scheme to the whole system has been 
increasing over time at an average rate of 1.7 % p. a. over 1984-99. It is assumed that this increase will 
start to slow and then stabilise over the projection period. 
41 This proportion may decrease further in the future for the following reasons: 
1. The expected shift in the structure of the population (particularly those aged 65+ which is expected 
to increase); 
2. ' The expected decrease in the share of this scheme to the total ESSPS as the Government desires to 
restrict the number who joins this scheme in favour of the funded scheme in order to limit its 
liabilities towards the system. 
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financial cost on the Government budget. It was found that only 13% of those covered 
by the definition of insurability under this law contributed to the scheme in 1997. The 
dependency ratio was 8.7%, but when the rate of compliance was taken into account it 
was estimated at 82% in1997. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the 
Egyptian population and the ESSPS have a young demographic structure and thus the 
ESSPS has an increasing membership of active members and pensioners. 
2.11. Projecting Future Growth of Membership of ESSPS 
With such a large national system, it is realistic to assume that the growth in the 
number of active members during the period (t, t+1) is measured in terms of a 
dynamic growth function (Act(t)) satisfying a time-varying homogeneous recurrence 
function. In accordance with the concept of a stable increasing membership, the 
assumption can be made that the new entrants occur at a fixed entry age and are 
increasing exponentially at a fixed force of growth p. In a demographic sense, the 
membership resulting from the special case when p is constant for all t is called a 
stable membership. The scheme will have ultimately a stable exponentially growing 
membership with p>0 and the number of members in each age increasing at the 
same rate p over time t. 
Therefore, (since Act(t) is dependent on the time of entry into the scheme) we have: 
Act(t+1) = (1 +Z(t+1)) xAct(t), (2.1) 
where, Z(t+1) denotes the annual growth rate during the period (t, t+1). 
Considering a stable increasing membership (i. e. a stable geometric growth in 
membership), we have Z(t+1) = Z(t) = constant for all t. This indicates that the size of 
the total covered membership grows geometrically over time t and Z(t) >0 for all t. 
Also the distribution of age structure of every scheme remains unchanged over time t. 
So the equivalent force of growth of active members over (t, t+l) is given by 
1 +Z(t+1) = exp(p(t+1)) for all t. (2.2) 
So, we obtain the number of active members at time (t+n) from: 
Act(t+n) = exp((p(t+1) + p(t+2) +.... + p(t+n)) xAct(t), for all tz1 (2.3) 
Then, over the period (t, t+n) and under the assumption of an increasing membership, 
we can use the following formula to estimate the force of growth of the active 
members over the period (t, t+n) as: 
p =1n(n (l + (Z(t + 1)) (1 + Z(t + 2)) 
............ 
(1 + Z(t + n))) (2.4) 
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Iyer S., (1999) shows that when the retired population consists only of surviving new 
entrants, the active and retired population would grow at an instantaneous rate (p) and 
the force of growth of the total insured population would become identical to the force 
of growth of new entrants and 
R(t+dt) /R(t) = Act(t+dt) /Act(t) =1+p. dt 42 (2.5) 
where: Act(t) is the active population function, and 
R(t) is the retired population function. 
This assumes that the system operates without any fundamental changes, such as a 
significant modification of the benefit provisions or an appreciable expansion of its 
scope of coverage, except for the steady flow of new entrants at a force of growth p. 
In the following sections, the force of growth of active members of each individual 
scheme are examined using the above methods. 
2.11.1. Assumptions of Membership Growth over 1997-2025 
The above methods were applied over 1975-99 assuming that the age structure of 
every individual scheme is stable. This can be considered as a realistic assumption 
taking into account the large population size and its demographic structure. The 
previous indicators and analysis show that, in general, there was a relative stable 
increasing membership particularly in the GSF. This conclusion was quite clear from 
the analysis of membership over 1984-99. 
The annual force of growth of active members, pensioners, survivors43 and 
beneficiaries of the whole ESIPS (excluding the CSIS) were 3.1%, 3.4%44,1.8% and 
2.4% respectively over 1984-99. There were relatively steady annual increases for 
contributors (except for public sector employees and Egyptians working abroad), 
pensioners, survivors and beneficiaries respectively. These results indicated that the 
average annual increases for the members of the whole system was varying around 
3% p. a. over 1984-99. This result is important in demonstrating the stability of the 
system over a long period of time as shown in Figure 2.9. This result is also important 
in connection with the rate of the population growth of the country over long term, as 
long as the system remains compulsory and without any significant change. 
42 Both functions are assumed to be continuous and differentiable functions. 
a' Survivors only and total beneficiaries were growing at 1.8% and 2.4% respectively. 
44 1998 was excluded, as increases in this year were high at 8%. 
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Figure 2.9: The average annual increase in the number of contributors, pensioners, survivors, 
beneficiaries and the assumed annual increase over 1984-99 
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The forces of growth of active members of the three economic categories of the 
employee's scheme (civil servants, public sector and private sector employees) were 
3.53%, 0.12%, and 7.87% respectively over 1975-98, as shown in Table 2.5. 
Tnhla 2S Rnrce of increase of cnntributors_ nensinners and survivors over 1975-1999 
Period Gov. Lmpl yees Public Sector 
Employees 
rivate Sector 
Employees 
Law 
79 
Law 
108 
aw 
5045 
Law 
112 
Total 
ESIPS 
Total 
ESSPS 
Contributors* 
1975-99 3.6 
-0.14 7.74 4.3 9.1 11.1 8.0 4.78 6.58 
1984-99 3.4 
-3.53 5.16 2.8 4.7 1.27 2.8 3.08 2.99 
Pensioners 
1975-99 5.6 NA NA NA NA NA NA 8.6 
1984-99 4.9 6.94 5.80 7.30 15.81 2.61 3.35 3.16 
Survivors 
1975-99 5.0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 8.50 
1984-99 4.1 4.88 4.39 6.64 10.3 4.45 1.79 2.88 
* The force of increase of new entrants of the public and private sector contributors together over iY 13- 
1998 was 4.94% and 2.5% over 1984-99. 
Source: Derived by Author 
Using the analysis of the historic data, the arguments explained before, and our 
judgement, we can set up the following assumptions about the future force of growth 
in active members: - e° =1.037 for civil servants, eP=1.03 for public and private, 
ep=1.035 for Law 79/1975 active members, e°=1.05 for self-employed person 
scheme, and ep =1.03 for casual workers scheme. 
45 The data for this scheme are not significant as a result of the voluntary nature of the scheme, the very 
small number of members, and because the scheme has been in force for a short period. 
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The assumption for civil servants results in a lower accumulated growth in 
membership than the actual growth over 1975-96 and slightly exceeds the actual 
growth thereafter. This is consistent with reality, as a lower rate of employment in the 
government sectors was witnessed over 1975-96. However, the Government has 
recently adopted a new strategy of creating more new jobs within the government 
sectors to reduce the level of unemployment over the coming years. We estimated one 
rate for the public and private sector employees together, as eventual situation after 
the end of the privatisation process. For the other schemes, we used the mentioned 
criteria and arguments in setting these assumptions. 
Although it is known that the demographic and economic assumptions vary over time, 
it is assumed that these growth rates will progress uniformly over the projection 
period. The demographic projections established on the basis of the assumed forces of 
growth, in fact, represent average or expected values of Act(t) which are used as 
stable and longstanding trends. This is the classical actuarial approach based on 
expected values 
-called the "deterministic" approach - which is used in this thesis. 
2.12. Salary Increases 
It is important to take into account the salary progress in projecting future benefit 
outgo for the purpose of funding calculations, particularly when the level of insured 
salary forms the base for calculating both the contributions and benefits. The salary 
increases have to allow for merit, seniority, long-term effects of inflation and 
increases in productivity. The increases in salary of every individual member 
normally include two elements: general salary escalation levels and salary promotion 
due to age/seniority. In a stable workforce and large scheme, the average salary 
profile should give a good indication of how much of the increase was due to 
escalation of general pay levels and how much was due to the salary scale, (Wilson, 
1992). In the following sections these two elements of salary increase are discussed 
and applied to every individual scheme of the ESIPS. 
2.12.1. General Salary Escalation 
General salary escalation is an important factor in determining the future liabilities of 
a pension scheme, particularly in the case of defined benefit final salary schemes. 
General salary escalation refers to the average pay increases experienced by the 
working population as a whole, rather than increases linked to career advancement of 
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particular individuals (Khorasanee, 1998). The general salary escalation, which is on 
top of the progression of individual salaries, should be measured by reference to 
increases in national average earnings 46 
The past and future service liabilities for active members depend on changes in future 
pay levels over these periods, so the salary increases used must be projected through 
to retirement. The valuation bases have to take into account both the effects of future 
inflation and general increases in pay levels at a rate different from the increase in 
prices. Therefore, barring exceptional circumstances (for example, during a major 
economic transition), the rate of salary escalation should be assumed to exceed the 
rate of inflation, the difference representing the gain in productivity (Iyer S., 1999). 
It is supposed that GDP in real terms grows as a result of increased productivity, 
which is shared between labour and capital. This suggests that pension systems are 
supposed to be particularly sensitive to the competing demands of profits and wages 
as the increases of the latter represent a critical factor in the future liabilities of the 
pension scheme. In the long term, it is expected that wages will increase in line with 
the increase in GDP (Wilson, 1992). The average annual growth rate in GDP and the 
general average level of earnings (salary escalation) are affected by many economic 
factors, which are not discussed in this thesis. Table 2.6 shows that the average basic 
salary in the GSF is escalating more rapidly than the variable salaries for males and 
females and female average salaries have improved better than males over 1992-9747. 
Tah! p 2.6. Average monthly basic and variable salaries in the GSF over 1992-1997 (LE). 
Average Monthly Basic Salary Average onthly Var iable Salary 
Year Males Females Total Males Females Total 
1997 145.1 141.1 143.8 145.2 139.9 143.4 
1992 91.1 85.5 89.4 97.9 85.6 94.1 
% Increase 59.3 65.1 60.8 48.3 63.5 52.4 
Source: MISAs report 1992-1997 
2.12.1.1. Estimating Salary Escalation from Insured Salaries 
The insured salary function S(t)48 (along with the expenditure function) characterises 
the financial development of a pension scheme. It is assumed that the eventual trend 
of the average amount of benefit expenditure grows at a force at which the general 
a6 They represent changes in the general levels of earnings on account of continuing inflation. 
47 Lower results were obtained for the PPSF over the same period. 
48 It is assumed to be continuous and differentiable and the projected value represents the expected 
value of this function. 
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level of pensionable salaries is growing (y), benefits being based on final salary due to 
the replacement effect (Iyer S., 1999). This means that the growth in the insured 
salary plays a crucial rule in estimating the future liabilities of these pension schemes. 
Assume that the annual growth in the average earnings in year (t, t+1) is an estimate 
of the growth in the annual insured salaries of the covered population in the same 
year. If it is assumed that the insured salary in the interval (0, dt) is dt, then the 
insured salary in the interval (t, t+ dt) would be en dt (as y represents the force of 
growth in the insured salaries). The total insured payroll in the interval (t, t+dt) is 
given by S(t) dt49. Therefore, the growth function, S(t), of the total insured salaries 
over (t, t+1) is given by following time-varying homogeneous recurrence equation 
and is independent of the age of individuals in the scheme, 
S(t+1) = (1 +rst+j) 
. 
S(t) (2.6) 
where, rst+j denotes the annual growth of the total insured salaries over (t, t+1) which 
is defined as the growth in S(t) during the period (t, t+1). 
This indicates that the size of the total insured salary grows geometrically if rs >0. 
Considering a stable increase in the general escalation of insured salaries (i. e. a 
geometric growth), we have (1 +rst+j) = (1 +rsd for all t and thus we can assume that 
there exists y+l satisfying 
(I+ rs, +t) = exp(rt+i) for all t (2.7) 
Then the insured salaries at time (t+n) is given by 
S(t+n) = exp((Y + yr+j +..... +y+) 
. 
S(t) for all t 21 (2.8) 
However, the previous arguments did not take into account inflation in estimating the 
growth in the insured salaries. So, taking the annual growth in the consumer price 
index in the tt' year as (t) gives the following formula. 
Rst+l = ((1 + rst+i) / (1 + jr+j)) -1, and (2.9) 
where Rs; denotes the growth in the total insured salaries in the tt' year net of inflation 
there exists 91+1 satisfying 
(1 + j, + j) = exp(6r+i) for all t, > 1 (2.10) 
The geometric mean of the increases in the total insured salaries over (t, t+n) net of 
inflation can be given by the following formula: 
", The assumption made here is that the general level of insured salaries is growing geometrically over 
each discrete time interval and this geometric growth is convertible to exponential growth, similar to 
the approach used for the force of growth of active members. 
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Rs, +n = Ij 
(l + rs, ) 
i=l (1 + j, ) 
This formula was applied to the data for the insured salaries covered by Law 79/1979, 
which represents the majority of the contributors over 1975-99 for basic, variable and 
total insured salaries. The assumption is that the distribution of salary by age in this 
scheme is stable so it is useful to study the experience of this scheme. Table 2.7 shows 
the growth in basic, variable and total insured salaries over 1975-99. 
Tahle 2.7. The increase in average pensionable salaries over 1976-9950 
Period % 
CPI 
Basic (%) 
Increase After Inflation 
Variable (%) 
Increase After Inflation 
Total 
Increase After Inflation 
1976-79 7.9 18.4 6.3 NA NA 18.4 6.3 
1979-89 18.7 13.7 
-4.2 30.0 5.5 20.5 1.5 
1989-99 10.1 10.7 0.6 15.5 5.0 13.1 2.7 
1994-99 6.1 11.2 4.9 10.4 4.1 10.8 4.4 
1976-99 12.1 13.0 
-0.8 19.5 5.1 16.9 2.7 
Source: Derived by Author 
Table 2.7 shows that the net escalation in the basic insured salaries was negative in 
the 1980s and over the whole period 1976-99. It was only in the second half of the 
1990s when it became positive. Some of the reasons for this trend were as follow: 
1. There were no significant increases in basic salaries over 1975-95, and the annual 
increments, which started in 1987, were included in the variable salaries for 
economic and financial reasons; 
2. The Government did not want to increase the salary level of the whole country by 
increasing the basic salary but only to give social increments to some categories of 
the working population to enable them to cope with the increasing cost of living51; 
3. The high levels of inflation over 1975-95; and 
4. In 1995, the Government started to include some of the previous salary increments 
into the basic salary after inflation was brought under control. 
The escalation of the insured variable salary net of inflation was always positive over 
1984-99 for some of the following reasons: 
50 Based on the increase in the general insured salaries covered by Law 79/1975 
s' A large proportion of variable salaries depends on the amount of the basic salary, so increasing basic 
salaries would have also resulted in increases in variable salaries. These increases have a critical 
significance because of their effect on the overall cost of production and the level of inflation, which 
are important factors in attracting foreign investors to invest in Egypt. 
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1. Variable salaries represent a major proportion of the individual's total monthly 
income, which normally exceeds 100% of the basic salary52; 
2. The inflation rate started to decline significantly from 199253; 
3. All the salary increments since 1987 were included first in the variable salaries. 
However, using general escalation of insured salaries to estimate the force of general 
salary escalation needs special considerations. This is because some of the growth in 
the insured salaries are related to the growth in the active members, and not to 
escalation in salaries. This is explained in the following section and a special formula 
for estimating the force of salary escalation is derived. 
2.12.1.2. Estimating Real Salary Escalation from Insured Salaries 
Part of the growth in insured salaries is due to the growth in the number of 
contributors. It is recognised that when the scheme reaches what may be termed 
"financial maturity", there is a certain relationship between the total insured salaries 
over consecutive years, given by (Iyer S., 1999): 
S(t+1) 
_ 
p+y, foralltz1 (2.12) S(t) 
where S(t) is the total insured salaries function in year t; 
p is the force of growth in new entrants; and 
yis the force of escalation in the total insured salaries. 
Assuming that the employees' scheme has reached "financial maturity" the following 
formula can be used to estimate the real growth in general salary escalation taking 
into account both the growth in contributors and inflation: 
(1 +St+j)= exp(yr+i 
- 
pt+j 
- 
O+i) for all t21 (2.13) 
where s1+1 = rate of real general salary escalation over (t, t+1) 
This formula was applied to the data of the employees' scheme (the general scheme) 
over 1975-99 for basic, variable and total insured salaries under the assumption that 
the distribution of the salary by age of employee was stable. Table 2.8 shows that the 
real escalation in the average insured salaries were not stable over 1975-99. It was 
Negative for most of the period for the basic salary, with an overall average of 
-5.0%, 
$2 Over the 1990s, this proportion was between 100-130% of basic insured salaries. 
The Financial Times on 9`h of May 2001 estimated the inflation rate in Egypt over 2001-03 to be 
between 3.9-4.2% per annum. 
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except for the second half of the 1990s, which was positive as a result of including 
some of the earlier salary increments within the basic salary. 
Takle 2. R. Average force of real escalation in insured salaries nver the nerinrl 1 Q7_99 
Period Basic Insured Salary Variable Insured Salary Total Insured Salary 
1976-79 
-2.2 NA 
-1.5 
1979-89 
-9.0 1.5 
-2.9 
1989-99 
-1.6 2.6 0.6 
1994-99 3.3 2.5 2.8 
1976-99 
-5.0 2.3 
-1.2 Source: Derived by Author 
The expected future trend is to have positive real escalation in the basic salary but not 
as much as that experienced over the second half of the 1990s. This is because the 
Government has committed itself to include more increments in the basic salary over 
the coming years. The trend has been positive for the variable insured salary since it 
was introduced in 1984-85, as all the annual salary increments were initially included 
in the variable salary. Also employers find it more convenient to give rises in variable 
salaries as they can cancel them at any time. The average real escalation in the 
variable salary was between 2.0-2.5%. The overall trend experienced in the 1990s is 
expected to continue over the coming years. 
When the results from formula 2.13 were compared with the real escalation of the 
average insured salaries, which was calculated as: 
(1+iv1+j) = 
S(t+1)/(1+ j, 
+, 
) 
Act(t + 1) 
for all t 21 (2.14) 
where iv, +l = the real average annual rate of salary escalation 
The real average annual salary escalation of the insured salaries over 1975-99 were 
similar to those obtained using formula 2.13 (-4.8% for the basic and 2.75% for the 
variable). From 1984-85, there was no difference between the two results. This 
analysis indicates that the general salary escalation is not stable in general, with the 
basic salary varying much more than the variable salary. 
2.12.2. Experience of Salary Increments and Pensionable 
Salaries 
There is no index which reflects the average level of salary inflation in Egypt, and 
salaries have been increasing annually on budget day since 1987 by political decree. 
These increases have been between 10-20% (10% since 1993) of the basic salary. The 
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maximum and minimum insurable salaries are up-rated at the start of each budget 
year (on the 1St of July) by these increments. These increases apply only to civil 
servants and public sector employees and are not obligatory for any other categories 
of workers. However, these increases affect the minimum and general salary levels in 
the market, particularly for regular private sector employees, as workers and 
employees unions usually ask for similar increments. The maximum insured part of 
basic salary was LE550 per month and the minimum was LE 45 per month in 
1999/2000. The ceiling of the insured part of the variable salary was LE 6000 per year 
(LE 500 a month) in 1999/2000. The maximum total insurable salary in 1999/2000 
was LE 12,600. 
Using the previous analysis and arguments, it can be assumed that the reasonable 
range for real salary escalation (before any allowance for salary scale) will be 1.0- 
2.0% p. a. for the real basic salary escalation and 2.0%-3.0% p. a. for the real variable 
salary escalation. The analysis in Chapter 1 of past inflation rates over 1977-98, 
indicates that the reasonable inflation rate to be assumed is 5% p. a. Therefore, the 
rates of nominal general salary escalation rates (the rates above the assumed inflation 
rate) will be a range of 6-7% for the basic salary and 7-8% for the variable salary. 
These ranges are consistent with past experience and are prudent enough to be used in 
the actuarial projection and valuation of the employees' scheme (Law 79/1975). 
In 1987, the Actuary conducted an investigation on insured salaries of private sector 
employees, and it was found that they were roughly constant among different ages. It 
was also found that the level of insured salary changes only with time (Nagib. S., 
1994). This was strongly confirmed in 1998-99, when it was found that 64% of the 
regular private sector employees' insured salaries were between L. E. 45-100 per 
month. It was also found that the total average insured salary (basic + variable) of 
private sector employees was L. E. 195, which was very much less than the general 
level of earnings for civil servants and public sector employees in this year (L. E. 392 
and L. E. 350 respectively). This casts a huge doubt that the private sector is using their 
employees' actual earnings for their pensionable salaries. The problem is supposed to 
be more severe for non-regular private sector employees. 
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2.12.3. General Salary Escalation of the other Schemes 
Although the self-employed and Egyptians Working Abroad schemes may be 
regarded as not relevant in this matter as they have the right to choose the level of 
their pensionable salary (basic only), they can apply salary increases by moving to a 
higher pensionable salary every number of years. In 1998-99, it was found that 68% 
of the members of the self-employed (compared with 83.3% in 1994-95) and 55% of 
the members of the Egyptians working abroad schemes were using the minimum level 
of L. E. 50 as the pensionable salary. The system has been trying to find a solution to 
this problem by convincing the members of these schemes to choose a level of 
pensionable salary which best matches their actual incomes and the system has 
increased the minimum level to LE 100 from 200154. 
A similar analysis to the above was carried out on the insured salaries for these two 
categories of insured members. The analysis gives much lower results for the 
escalation of the basic salary than in the employees' scheme and therefore, a lower 
range of rates will be applied to these two categories. 
So, we conclude these sections by stating the following assumptions regarding the 
real general salary escalation: 
1. For civil servants and public sector employees the real growth rate is 1-2% p. a. for 
basic salaries and 2-3% per annum for variable salaries. 
2. For private sector employees the real growth rate is 0% p. a. (only the assumed 
inflation rate) for basic and variable salaries. 
3. For self-employed and Egyptians working abroad a real growth rate of -2% p. a. 
for insured pensionable salaries. 
2.12.4. Salary Scale 
Salary scale represents the rate at which earnings are expected to increase by 
promotion rather than by general wage inflation. The salary scale will provide a basis 
for the projection of future earnings whatever types of, earnings are involved. 
Obviously, the extent of such increases will depend on the particular employee, but it 
is reasonable to assume that those who have worked longer will, on average, receive a 
higher salary S5. The approach normally taken is to assume that the average salary at 
sa Since 1993/4, the PPSF has been undertaking intensive inspection on its members and, as a result, 
the percentage of private sector workers who contribute at the minimum wage level has been 
significantly reduced from 52% in 1993-94 to 16% in 1996-97. 
ss In some countries such as UK it is found that the average salary peaks in the mid-40s age group, and 
then declines for older members. 
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each age varies according to a promotional scheme. The type of function almost 
invariably used in practice for this purpose is a relative scale, that is a scale 
representing the ratio of average annual earnings in each future year to present 
average annual earnings. 
For the majority of the employed population in Egypt, pay generally increases with 
experience and age, and the standard of living is much better for the older employed 
than for younger employed. This is indicated in the basic structure of the annual 
periodical increments for civil servants and public enterprise employees as shown in 
Table 1.1 of Appendix 1. A typical salary scale, based on data from the ESSPS 
statistics for members covered by Law 79 of 1979, shows the estimated average salary 
at different ages, measured relative to the lowest average salary at the youngest age 
shown in Table 2.4. A of Appendix 2. 
However, the ongoing changes in the economic and social environment due to 
economic reforms and privatisation of the public sector enterprises may have some 
effects on the salary structure. In 1982, the Actuary of the ESSPS recommended that 
actuarial valuations should distinguish between the salaries of public workers, private, 
employers and the self-employed, and Egyptians working abroad. In the private 
sector, the level of such increases depends on individual employees in different 
companies although, in general, the assumption that those who have worked for 
longer will, on average, receive a higher salary is still exist. 
The approach taken by the Actuary in conducting the actuarial valuation of the two 
Funds in 1987 was to assume that the average salary at each age varies according to a 
promotional scale, where a starting salary of LE 100 and an entry age at 20 were 
assumed. The following two linear formulae were applied for the salary scale for 
employees covered by Law 79/1975. 
For civil servants and public sector employees the formula used was: 
SAL(M, x, B) = 100 +15 (x 
- 
20), (2.15) 
For private sector employees the formula used was: 
SALM, x, B)=100+12(x-20) (2.16) 
Following the actuarial valuation conducted in 1992 it was decided to use a 
promotional salary scale of 5% compound, for both public and private sector 
employees according to the following formula. 
III 
SALM, x, B) = 100 x (1 + cp(M, B))s'2056, b 
.: 
5x <r and 0 St 528 (2.17) 
where, SAL(M, b, B)57= loo 
However, it was found that the salary structure of private sector employees is different 
from that of public sector employees. Therefore, for the promotional salary scale of 
the basic salary, after investigating the available data over 1992-96 we will assume 
the following: 
1. For civil servants, public sector employees and private sector employees, Formula 
2.17 is applied with 4= 5%, 4.5% and 4% respectively; 
2. For private sector employees Formula 2.17 will be used but with SAL20 = 80; 
3. For other categories, there are no assumed changes in earnings with age. 
Both the promotional scale according to function 2.17 and the general salary 
escalation assumptions (y) are used to project forward the basic insured salary of the 
scheme's active members. For variable pensionable salary, it is only the general salary 
escalation (y) is used to project forward the variable pensionable salary of active 
members covered by Law 79/1975. 
2.13. Rates of Compliance 
It is observed that one of the critical factors effecting the ESSPS is the rate of 
compliance. This problem is faced only in the PPSF, which had a very low rate of 
compliance in the 1980s and the 1990558. The levels of compliance for casual 
workers, Egyptian working abroad, non-regular private sector workers, regular private 
sector workers, self-employed persons and civil servants and public sector employees 
were estimated at 13%, 18%, 25%, 62%, 69% and 100% respectively in 199759. These 
rates are used in the projection and valuation of contribution income and benefit outgo 
of these schemes 
The casual workers' scheme creates incentives for non-compliance until late ages 
(50+) by not having a strong linkage between contributions and benefits. In the 
56 This function is usually assumed to be a step-shaped function with a constant level throughout any 
given year of age. This assumes that rises were granted on a fixed date each year. This is consistent 
with the actual situation in Egypt as salaries increase at the beginning of each financial year. However, 
for the self-employed and the Egyptians working abroad schemes, the pensionable salary level is 
allowed to be increased at the middle of the financial year (on 1 s` of January of every year). 
s' It is assumed in the actuarial valuation that the earliest age for joining the system is 16 and the 
relative salary scale will be 0.95,0.91,0.86, and 0.82 for ages 19,18,17 and 16 respectively. 
sg There is a decline in social security receipts from private employers because of the non-compliance. 
S9 It is measured as the percentage of active members paying contributions in a specific year. 
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private sector, generally, there is significant evasion in respect of workers who are 
engaged without a labour contract because neither the employer nor the worker 
wishes to accept the related obligations as explained. Egyptians working abroad 
scheme's low levels of compliance presumably influenced by the voluntary nature of 
the scheme. Self-employed compliance rate may reflect the use of a narrow definition 
of `self-employment', which transfers the problem to the casual workers scheme. 
2.14. Dependants 
The pension of a deceased member is divided among survivors according to a legal 
schedule (with various maximum allocations of pension), which includes many 
dependants as explained in Chapter 1. Religious and cultural considerations have been 
understandably taken into account and the provisions apparently correspond to the 
Shariaa Law60. The process of establishing and verifying entitlement is very complex 
and time consuming. In designing provisions for surviving dependants, it is often 
difficult to strike the right balance between responding to the large variety of family 
relationships and simplifying the scheme. It is also difficult to ensure that all the 
relevant facts have been obtained and that there is no significant change in the 
circumstances of dependants. 
By examining the data of the whole system (both Funds) on 30/6/1999, it was found 
that the total number of death pension cases in force on that date, were 2.024 million. 
This number of death cases created a total number of survivors of 5.012 millions who 
claimed benefits on the same date as shown in Table 2.9. Death benefits represent a 
significant share of the total benefit expenditure of the whole system as survivors 
represent 73% of the total beneficiaries. 
Table 2.9. Number of pensioners and survivors of different schemes in 1998-99 (thousands) 
Type of insured persons Pensioners Survivors Total 
Employees; (79/1975). 1089 2418 3507 
Self-employed persons (108/1976) 135 400 535 
Egyptians working abroad; (50/1978) 4 2 6 
The CSIS (112/1980) 567 1535 2102 
SPP 39 657 696 
Total 1834 5012 6846 
Source: MISA, the annual year report; 1998-99. 
60 It is taken from Koran, the Muslim holy book. 
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The most significant two categories of survivors in the system are widows and 
orphans as shown in Figure 2.10. This makes modelling the scheme and the cost of its 
benefits very hard. Therefore, it is assumed in the valuation and projection model that 
100% of the pension value is divided between a widow (50%) and two orphans (25% 
for male orphan and 25% for female orphan). In the case of the death of a female 
member, it is assumed in the valuation and projection model that two-thirds of the 
pension value is divided between two orphans61 (one-third for male orphan and one- 
third for female orphan). 
Figure 2.10. Proportion of each category of Survivors to the total death pension cases of the 
whole system on '30/6/1997. 
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Type of Survivors 
The other beneficiaries such as parents and siblings are assumed ineligible according 
to this analysis. This assumption is consistent with reality and it is prudent as it 
assumes that the survivors inherit the full pension value. The survivors take from each 
other and replace each other in the pension entitlement according to very complex 
rules. It is noticed that high mortality groups, which receive smaller retirement 
benefits, also receive larger survivors' benefits. Combining these effects, we find that 
the old age and survivors benefits have an active role in distributing income among 
social groups, particularly women and large families who benefit the most. 
2.15. Mortality and Invalidity Decrements Experiences 
The active population is subject to two continuous decrements over the year of age: 
mortality and invalidity. A third decrement is assumed to take place at exact integral 
ages, i. e. just before each birthday: early retirement. The retired population is subject 
61 This is the rule in the case of no widower and if there are only orphans. 
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to the mortality decrement only. The force of each decrement is gender and age 
specific. The effect on the actuarial costs of assuming specific levels of mortality and 
invalidity are very significant. An increase in the force of invalidity has the same 
effect as a similar increase in the force of mortality at the same age62 in relation to the 
cost of normal retirement benefits. 
However, in the Egyptian case, where 100% of the pension is inherited in the case of 
death or paid as an invalidity pension, this would not have a significant affect on the 
total actuarial cost. This produces a mutually compensating effect in a comprehensive 
social security pension scheme covering all three risks of age retirement, invalidity 
and death (Thullen, 1973). 
Figure 2.11. Invalidity rates in the GSF and PPSF experience over 1990-92. 
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Mortality rates for death in service, after old age retirement and after invalidity 
retirement, are derived in Chapter 4 according to the national mortality experience of 
Egypt over 1994-96 and in comparison with the English mortality tables employed in 
the valuation of the ESSPS. Detailed data about invalidity cases by age and sex were 
not available. However, invalidity rates for both funds were provided by the system as 
shown in Figure 2.11 and in Table 2.4. B of Appendix 2. 
2.16. Early Retirement Experience 
Early retirement option is a very important measure, as its effect on the actuarial 
soundness of the ESSPS needs careful consideration. The most important 
62 This is equivalent to the increase in the rate of interest in the calculation of the actuarial cost of 
retirement benefits only and thus, a decrease in the actuarial cost of such benefits. 
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determinants of early retirement are length of pensionable service and state of health 
rather than level of pay. In Egypt, of more significance than the pension age, is the 
facility for early retirement and for the receipt of retirement pension considerably 
earlier than age 60, which is a very important factor in determining the pension cost. 
There are too many pensions being paid to people who are young and healthy enough 
to be in the labour force, but the system allows (and may be said encourages) the 
receipt of retirement pension earlier than the NRA. 
An insured person can claim an early retirement pension after 20 contributory years 
(except casual workers) with a reduction in the pension calculated at NRA varying 
between 15% and 5%63 for retirement between ages 40-55. Given that this reduction 
rate is not actuarially adequate or fair for the system, and there is no reduction for 
retirement from age 55, early retirement results in an increase in the pension costs. 
This is because pensioners are receiving pension for significantly longer than was 
envisaged in the legislation. This facility played a very significant role in increasing 
the overall benefits cost64 of the system in the 1990s, as a consequence of 
privatisation and public sector retrenchment. 
The Government is encouraging many civil servants and public sector employees to 
take early retirement benefits to achieve two goals. First, to reduce the effect of the 
high unemployment and easing the pressure on the labour market65, as it is thought 
that this measure would stabilise the labour market and free new vacancies for young 
entrants66. Second, facilitating the process of privatising the public sector companies 
and accelerating economic reform. 
An increasing trend of early retirement over 1989-99, was reflected in a steady 
increase in the percentage of early retirement pensioners to the total number of 
pensioners during this period. In 1998, this percentage represented 12.43% compared 
63 The rate of reduction is set at a level lower than equitable rates. It is estimated on an actuarial basis 
that the rate of reduction should be in the order of 5% p. a. which is applied to the variable salary. 
6" The actuarial reports indicate that these increases in the early retirement rates contribute to the deficit 
of the system (Ibrahim et. al. 1994). 
6$ Early retirement is often seen as a "painless way to cut unemployment by enabling the long-term 
employed to retire and alleviating youth unemployment. 
66 This has not materialised, as labour force participation among the young continued to decrease in the 
1990s. Also, many of early retirement pensioners are receiving the benefits when they are still working 
in some other sectors. Although pension entitlement is subject to suspension on return to work, there 
are considerable opportunities for informal employment outside the scope of insurable employment 
under the social security scheme. 
116 
with 4.04% in 1979. Early retirement benefits represented 11.5% of the total benefits 
paid in 1998 compared with 9.8% in 1992 and 5.8% in 198167. Most newly awarded 
early retirement pensions in the 1990s are in the public sector and concentrated 
around age 50. 
An analysis of pensioners of 1998-99 reveals that early retirement is slightly more 
prevalent in the public sector: 26.5% of all public sector pensioners are in receipt of 
an early pension against 23% of all private sector pensioners. It is found that the rates 
of early retirement for females represented more than three times those of males for 
the age range 45-59 over 1992-9868 as shown in Table 2.4. C of Appendix 2. Early 
retirement results also in workers having a lower level of social protection as the 
cumulative structure of the pension formula, combined with the penalty for early 
retirement, has an effect of producing a relatively low retirement pension69. 
Thus, early retirement provision is used to provide a response to the problem of 
unemployment. It is undesirable for this labour market problem to be tackled by 
generous early retirement provisions which place a burden on the ESSPS. Special 
programmes to facilitate public sector downsizing and unemployment should be 
designed rather than permitting all insured persons to make early retirement choices 
which may be against their own interests and certainly the interests of the system. 
2.17. Administration Costs 
Pension projection models also incorporate forecasts of administration costs, which 
are usually quite simple technically. In long-term projections at least, administration 
costs are estimated as a share of total expenditures, contributions, pensionable salaries 
or. assumed to follow the price or earnings index. According to the experience of the 
two Funds over 1977-99, the total administrative cost, as a share of total expenditure, 
was around 2.0-2.5% in the GSF and decreased from 6.2% in 1977 to 2.63% in 1998- 
99 in the PPSF. As a share of total contribution income it was 1.35% in the GSF and 
67 It is expected that the number and cost of early retirements may increase over the next few years for 
the purpose of releasing more jobs for young unemployed people. 
68 Early retirement rates were obtained from the experience recorded in both Funds over 1992-98. 
69 For example, retirement at age 49 results in a pension reduction of 11/45 plus the 10% penalty (a 
total of 34 %). The average new pension award for public sector workers in 1998 at age 60 was LE 433 
whereas the average new early retirement award was LE 125 (this could also have an adverse effect on 
survivors' benefits). This is also due to the fact that the special annual increments were not applicable 
for early retirement pensioners until recently when some early retirement pensioners managed to get a 
rule from the constitutional court to receive these increments. 
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3.3% in the PPFS as shown in Figure 2.12. These are roughly equivalent to 0.45% and 
1% of the total pensionable salaries in the GSF and PPSF respectively. Therefore, in 
the projection and valuation of the two Funds, these two proportions of pensionable 
salary are assumed to be the administration costs of the two Funds. 
Figure 2.12. The proportion of administration costs to total contribution income over 1977-99 
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2.18. Unemployment Insurance Experience 
The scope of coverage against the consequences of unemployment is very limited as 
take-up rates for unemployment benefit seem low, they are of short duration and very 
little is available to members in terms of amount paid and job protection. 
Unemployment benefits are not significant70 and are only applied to public and 
regular private sector employees 71 as explained in Chapter 1. It is found that the 
annual paid unemployment benefits is less than 1% of the annual unemployment 
contributions (paid to less than 1% of the covered contributors) over 1972-98. 
Unemployment benefits do not play a major role because the vast majority of "open" 
unemployment represents new entrants to the labour force who do not qualify for 
unemployment benefits72. Therefore, for unemployment benefits to be effective they 
have to be made available to the vast majority of the unemployed. It is the 
responsibility of the state to create job opportunities, particularly for those young job- 
seekers without a record of insurable employment. The Treasury can finance any 
deficit in the unemployment provision if there are not enough resources. As data 
70 Its annual liabilities represents less than 0.001% of the total annual expenditure of the PPSF. 
71 This is may be inconsistent with policies aimed at introducing greater flexibility in the labour market 
and a shift from public to private sector employment. 
72 Some 94% of the unemployed are in the age group 15-29. 
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about unemployment insurance in the PPSF is not available and the insurance does 
not represent a significant part of the system's cost, the projection will have to be an 
approximation as explained in Chapte3. 
2.19. Conclusion 
The ESSPS is giving indications that it may experience financial difficulties, both in 
the short and long term. This is because of increasing unfunded benefit promises, an 
inability to collect all the revenues due to it and to invest its assets wisely. It is feared 
that the funding position will worsen in future years, placing an increasing burden on 
the Government to put more funds into the system in order to reduce its cash flow 
deficit. This will affect the actuarial soundness of the system. 
The current investment strategy set by the government has resulted in rates of interest, 
which depend on the discretion of the NIB and the Government. The Government has 
used the assets of the pension system to finance its development plans by investing 
nearly all the funds in government vehicles, in return for a low interest rate. This 
policy has resulted in low, or even negative, real returns and effectively transfers 
resources back to the state. It can also be regarded as a significant factor for the deficit 
of the system. 
The increasing incidence of early retirement is having an impact on the financial 
structure of the ESSPS. This may result in the system becoming expensive to 
maintain, and requiring increases in financing or increases in the system's deficit. In 
general, the ESSPS, practically, can not be regarded as a full funded system and it 
may be looked at as a different model of PAYG national insurance systems. 
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Chapter 3 
Projection and Valuation of the ESSPS 
3.1. Introduction 
The financing of national pension schemes is threatened by possible disruptions 
arising from various types of demographic, economic and political crises. Therefore, a 
key objective for national pension insurance is to ensure its financial sustainability. 
Decision-makers need analyses of the outcomes of pension policy decisions-both 
those that strengthen and those likely to weaken the schemes. The projection results 
may affect the government budget to a large extent. If the share of GDP allocated to 
social insurance pension expenditure is expected to increase, this may exert pressure 
on the government budget and cause either the tax burden or the budget deficit to rise. 
The models applied to analyse questions related to social insurance systems have 
tended to be either actuarial models with few economic linkages or economic models 
with little detail on the mathematics of pension systems (Mackellar, L., et al., 2000). 
However, there are models take account of the linkages between social insurance 
systems and the economy containing both economic behaviour and structural detail of 
the social pension systems. In this thesis we model the structural detail of the ESSPS, 
the future evolving of the distribution of the population of the country and the ESSPS 
and the level of unemployment. 
Actuarial projections and valuation models play a key role in this task as they can 
help in understanding the financial stability of the system and how to protect it from 
adverse deviations. They are the tools which can provide long-term estimates of 
future expenditure and income. They provide estimate of the actuarial long-term 
soundness of the system and financial management on the basis of sound actuarial 
assumptions. Periodical actuarial projections and valuations are means of providing 
the quantitative basis for information about the likely future development of pension 
schemes and policy-making decisions about such schemes. Whatever the pension 
scheme, one requirement common to all pension projections is that they must be able 
to' produce reliable information on income and expenditure, i. e. the financial balance 
of the schemes. In complex financial systems; ' such- as national insurance pension 
120 
systems, projection and valuation require an integrated and comprehensive set of 
interconnected models, which fit the available data. 
In Chapters 1&2, the main features and experiences of the ESSPS were discussed. In 
this Chapter, a projection and valuation model for the ESSPS is constructed. The 
model deals with two main objectives. The first is to project the annual cash-flow 
surplus/deficit' of the two Funds under different demographic and economic scenarios 
over the projection period. The second is about how to keep the two Funds in actuarial 
equilibrium according to the concept of fully funded liabilities. 
3.2 Factors Influencing the Design of Projection and 
Valuation Models 
In each country, pension schemes are a product of their unique historical 
development, therefore, differences between them can be significant. However, 
projection and valuation methods have plenty of features in common, regardless of 
the fact that such models are usually custom-made to fit the requirements of each 
scheme. This is because the role of projections and valuations and the mechanisms 
affecting the development of pension insurance are similar. 
Various factors affecting the scheme impose certain requirements on the choice and 
development of actuarial projection and valuation models which predict expected 
future inflows and outflows. Such factors include: 
1. The level of coverage in the scheme (whole population/certain categories); 
2. Financing (contributory, general revenues); 
3. Type of funding (funded, partially funded, PAYG); 
4. Benefits (flat rate, earnings related); 
5. Type of scheme (public, private); 
6. The rules operating the scheme; 
7. Potential outlook of the demographic and economic characteristics of the 
population covered by the scheme; 
8. 
- 
The regulations and policy guidelines governing the funding and investment 
strategies of the scheme. 
1 This includes the initial surplus/deficit (defined as difference between contribution income and 
expenditure) and the net surplus which includes the investment return and the Treasury subsidy to the 
system. 
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The choice of projection method and model is influenced by whether the projections 
are made for the short, medium or long term2. The time span of the projection sets 
certain requirements on the model's structure. In short-term models, devised primarily 
to serve the needs of short-term liquidity management, different factors are 
emphasised than is the case with long-term models extending several decades into the 
future. In long-term models, demographic factors play an important role. In some 
countries, long-term projections must be made every 3 or 5 year. Therefore, the 
projection methods and basic assumptions used and the general results obtained, differ 
from one country to another. However, the ESSPS does not conduct any projections 
for any term. Therefore, it is very important to conduct a medium term projection. 
A projection and valuation model of the ESSPS must allow for future membership of 
the system, project future annual cash-flow surplus/deficit and enable actuarial 
valuation of the system. These projections require modelling of the demographic 
structure of the system, to estimate the number of contributors and beneficiaries, and 
of the financial factors in order to estimate the future income and expenditure. 
There are two actuarial approaches for the analysis of a pension scheme, the 
projection technique and the present value technique. In the case of a state scheme, 
both techniques can be used in quantitative financial analysis to determine the future 
long-term financial soundness of the scheme under certain national economic and 
demographic circumstances. In the following sections, both techniques are explored 
and used to design a model for the projection and valuation of the ESSPS. 
3.3 Actuarial Projection Technique 
The actuarial projection technique is appropriate in the case of partially funded and 
PAYG social security pension schemes. Projection models can be quite complex and 
may incorporate a wide variety of calculatory rules. Pension projection models can 
consist of a number of modules, which are usually combined in order to discover the 
scheme's financial balance. They may have linkages e. g. to outside econometric 
models. Among the modules are ones dedicated to demographics, financing and 
investment, and income and expenditure. Separate modules are often devised for 
? The financial status of the system can be evaluated on the basis of estimates made over three time 
periods: short range (5-10 years), medium range (25 years), and long range (75 years). It has to be 
borne in mind that the projections become increasingly uncertain the further one looks into the future. 
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different pension categories (old-age, disability, survivor pensions etc. ). Contributions 
by employers and the insured may also be modelled separately. In addition, funded 
schemes have separate models for forecasting funding levels, returns on investment 
and liquidity. An overlapping generations model has also been devised in the form of 
a dynamic equilibrium model, as in the German pension scheme. 
The projection method most commonly used in a pension projection scheme is 
deterministic simulation (normally based on aggregate data), but also extrapolation, 
stochastic models3 and sample-based methods have been used. This means that, given 
the underlying parameters, the outcome in terms of the actuarial functions is taken as 
uniquely determined. Deterministic simulations operate by modifying an observed 
starting position via various parameters. It is especially common in forecasts of 
pension expenditures and to some extent also in contribution income projections. How 
accurate a projection technique is used depends on issues such as the nature of the 
scheme and the availability of data. 
The primary objective of scheme-specific actuarial projection models is to produce 
estimates on future income, expenditure and financial balance of the pension schemes. 
It is also to give a picture of trends in the existing scheme and the impact of possible 
changes, and to simulate the future development of the scheme under different 
national demographic and economic scenarios. Pension insurance schemes need also 
other types of projection data, including the number of pension recipients, the active 
population etc. Projections can also anticipate the accumulation of funds, support 
investment activities and determine the funding level in the case of a funded social 
insurance scheme. Therefore, many countries have imposed statutory requirements on 
pension institutions to perform projections. 
Income forecasts for contributory schemes are designed to use, as demographic and 
economic variables, labour force participation rate, increases in the earnings level and 
possibly various income distribution parameters. In universal schemes and in schemes 
financed out of general revenues, the projections of income are often made by using 
general macroeconomic variables. Pension expenditures forecasts complement 
demographic projections by projecting benefit levels that are peculiar to each scheme. 
3 The resulting value of an actuarial function under the stochastic approach is the expected value of the 
outcome. The actual outcome has a probability distribution, hence its precise value is uncertain. 
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The basic elements of the projection approach are the expenditure function B(t) and 
the insured salary function S(t). Projection models dealing with expenditure and 
income are based on the age and sex structure of the insured population and expected 
changes. A common way to design such models is to analyse the baseline position at 
the level of one-year age cohorts and to make year-by-year forecasts based on various 
transition scenarios. The results of projections are presented at nominal and constant 
prices. Long-term projections are usually made at constant prices, which provide the 
advantage that the real value of money can be more easily compared with present-day 
figures. In practice, projection models distinguish between a real component and a 
price component. 
3.4. Sensitivity Analysis of the Projection Results 
Since it is not possible to precisely forecast economic and demographic factors which 
may change repeatedly, even over the course of a single year4, a degree of uncertainty 
necessarily attaches to these quantities and consequently to the projections. Therefore, 
it often makes sense to assess the impact of uncertain future experience by providing a 
variety of scenarios, especially where long-term projections are concerned, based on 
different sets of assumptions, labelled "alternatives". Long-term projections cannot 
predict the outcome, but they can illustrate the sensitivity of the result by considering 
possible, and plausible, future changes in the parameter values and give early warning 
of a situation where the results may be considered unfavourable5. 
The sets of alternatives are derived on the basis of consistency with historical 
experience, expected changes in the economy and population, and other assumptions. 
The alternatives achieve different projections in two manners. The first is in the 
timing of changes and the second is in the level of the rates of change. Clearly the 
number of alternative projections which might be shown is infinite. However, 
projections are normally prepared under a range of assumptions, including low cost 
(alternative I (optimistic assumption)), intermediate cost (alternative II, (the principle 
assumption)), and high cost (alternative III, or the pessimistic assumption). This set of 
° The most difficult problem faced by actuaries in the social security field is the development of 
reasonable and appropriate economic assumptions to be used in the cost estimates, both short-range and 
long-range (Robert J. Myers, 1983). 
s Such analysis does not add a great deal to the traditional actuarial philosophy of using `prudent' 
assumptions. 
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assumptions is generally regarded as suitable for actuarial projections. A simple form 
of sensitivity analysis is required for all cash flow income and outgo projections. 
In this thesis, examination of the financial status of the ESSPS over the projection 
period under different future scenarios concentrates on particular combinations of 
assumptions. Sensitivity analysis illustrations for the projection results are carried out 
using three cost alternatives (explained in details in Chapter 66) with two different sets 
of pension and salary increase ranges. This determines the level of surplus of the two 
Funds under these three alternatives. Another sensitivity analysis of the valuation 
results is carried out using a range of assumptions for earned interest rates on the 
invested funds (as explained in details in Chapter 27). This will illustrate the valuation 
results of the estimated level of funding in connection with future investment returns 
and salary increases. This sensitivity analysis is undertaken in Chapter 7. 
3.5. Designing the Projection Model of the ESSPS 
There is considerable uncertainty about future cash flows for two the Funds of the 
ESSPS. Each future year of the scheme's operations will involve the receipt of 
contributions from members and employers, investment income, the Treasury's 
subsidies to the system, and expenditure upon benefits of various types. A projection 
of expected annual revenue and expenditure over a long period could thus be 
constructed. These series of cash flows depend on many factors such as the cost of 
benefits payable, contribution rates, level of Treasury subsidies, future interest rates 
given by the NIB, future fertility, future longevity, economic growth and 
unemployment. The model has to project and simulate income and expenditure and 
evaluate the surplus/deficit for the two Funds over the projection period. 
Therefore, the actuarial projection model of the ESSPS' main objectives are: 
1- Project the system's annual cash flows and funds (through year-by-year 
, 
simulations over the projection period) under the three mentioned alternatives; 
2- Project the initial and net surplus/deficit of the two Funds (and the system as a 
whole) under the three mentioned alternatives; 
6 These alternative projections represent combinations of lower and higher fertility, mortality 
improvement, labour force participation and unemployment than assumed in the principal projection. 
7 The Government Actuary Department of the UK uses sensitivity analysis in the quinquennial review 
of the UK national insurance scheme. In determining the contribution rates required to sustain the 
PAYG state pension, projections are made by varying key variables, such as mortality, fertility and 
growth in average earnings (Khorasanee, 1999). 
125 
3- Project the annual Treasury subsidies8 to the system under the three mentioned 
alternatives. 
The results from that model will include projections of other various amounts critical 
to the system, including total insured salaries, the number of active members9, the 
number of benefit receipts, and benefit increases. The financial assessment and 
projection of different amounts of income and expenditure are carried out by 
reference to each scheme of the system, as they are currently structured. 
3.5.1 Modelling Future Active Members of Different Schemes 
Whether the elderly are supported by a State pension scheme on a pay-as-you-go 
basis or by funded pension schemes, the effective burden of supporting them falls on 
the economically active population, unless wealth can be transferred over time by 
investment outside of the economies affected (Young, A., et al, 1987). Therefore, the 
projection of the number of active members of the scheme in year (t, t+l) will be 
critical in determining the annual cost of the system. 
The proportion of active employees in a scheme to those in the whole system may 
increase or decrease over time at a specific average rate per annum. This has to be 
taken into account for the projection of future active members1°. In assuming how 
such changes will occur, the most common approach is to assume that they increase 
or decrease for a specific period until the rate starts to slow and then stabilise over the 
remaining projection period. Therefore, the model has to project the future 
membership of each scheme as was discussed in Chapter 2. It is also assumed that the 
increases or decreases will only affect active members over specific ages (e. g. 
between the youngest age at entry and an assumed older age) as the mobility of active 
members occurs at specific ages 1. 
= These represent, mainly, annual increments, most of the cost of the CSIS and other benefits which the 
state has committed itself to finance. 
The development of the active and retired populations will be projected under various assumptions 
regarding mortality, fertility, labour force participation and unemployment. 
10 As a result of economic reforms and the privatisation process, it is expected that, in the near future, 
the system may experience a considerable migration of workers between different schemes, particularly 
from public and private sectors to self-employed sectors, with the latter gaining more importance. It 
would be a realistic assumption to assume that the current trend of moving from the public sector to the 
private sector and self-employed will stay at the current level over 1997-2010 and slow thereafter. 
After investigating the available data it was assumed that these ages are 39 for M=V and P, 44 for 
M=E, 39 for M=W and 49 for M=C. 
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The construction of membership of different schemes in year t can be derived from 
the following formulae'?: 
For xi <x Sx2 
Z(M, x, t, s)=(1+g)` (3.1) 
where x1= the youngest age at entry and x2 = the assumed oldest age for entry 
Forx>x2 
Z(M, x, t, s) =1 when x2 
-x>t and (3.2) 
Z(M, x, t, s) _ (1 + g)' when t 
_>x2 -x (3.3) 
Act(M, x, t, s) =1.05 xPC(M, x, t, s) x Z(M, X, t, s) xEM(x, t, s)'3 (3.4) 
In general, the methodological core of demographic projections is the iterative 
"moving forward" of a matrix (consisting of the scheme's members, active 
contributors, inactive registered members and beneficiaries) on a year-to-year basis. 
This means that on the basis of a demographic matrix for year t, a matrix for year (t + 
1) of the same structure is produced. The transition from t to t+1 is governed by a set 
of transition rules which are established on the basis of past experience or expected 
future conditions (Cichon M. et al, 2000). 
3.5.2. Effect of the Density Factor 
The density factor is the proportion of potential time that members in the active age 
range are effectively contributing to the scheme. Assuming that the density factor 
uniformly affects all individuals of a given age, the total contributory service of a new 
entrant at age b on reaching retirement age r would be: 
PS (M, x) =f 2(M, x) dx (3.5) b 
X(x) over the age range (b, r) is approximated using the following function: 
j dc(M, x) dx 
=6 b 
(3.6) 
r- 
Function 3.5 can be approximated by: 
PS (M, x+t, t, s) = PS (M, x, 0, s) + dc (M) xt 14 (3.7) 
12 It is assumed that Z(M, x, t, s) ZI for some schemes and <I for some other schemes as a result of 
negative growth in new members. This is may be interpreted as signifying that there are decreases in 
new entrants in some schemes which resulted in increases in other schemes within the ESSPS. 
13 The coverage rate is projected to stabilise at about 105% of the total employed members. 
14 It is assumed that the contribution density (dc(M, x, t)) equals the average compliance rate P(M) 
which equals the benefit density (db(M, x, t)) (which is the proportion of the potential period of service 
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where dc(M) is assumed to follow the following function: 
dc(M, x, t, s) = dc(M) = db(M, x, t, s) = db(M = P(M) (3.8) 
As the approach taken in this thesis is deterministic, the densities were assumed to be 
uniform at the compliance rates's at all ages. Service credit during non-contributory 
periods is ignored here. 
3.5.3 Modelling Annual Contribution Income 
There are two main different methods that can be used in modelling future insured 
salaries, (Iyer, S. 1999). The first method, the classical method, models the age- and 
time- related insured salaries using an age-related salary scale and an assumption for 
general salary escalation over time. However, this method does not allow for variation 
in the age-wise salary structure and also does not allow for the salary distribution at 
each age. The second method 16, which is more accurate but more complicated, models 
the salary distribution by age. It models changes in age-related average salary 
structure over time. However, the first method is adopted in this thesis, as it is the 
more common and simpler method, which is used in actuarial valuations. 
When contributions and benefits are defined as a percentage of the salary (final or 
career average), it is necessary to project future salaries in order to evaluate 
contributions and benefits. The total annual contribution income of active members of 
the scheme depends, mainly, on the following factors 17 
1. The growth in the membership of the scheme (p); 
2. The average annual contribution density (dc(M, x, t, s)) which is taken as the 
average compliance rate (P(A4)), representing the proportion of members who pay 
contributions in year (t, t+1) under the assumption that the dc(M, x, t, s) is unity 
for this proportion; 
3. The general salary escalation in the scheme (y)18; 
4. The contribution rate for basic and variable salary C(M, B/I'); 
5. The salary scale is taken into account only for the employees scheme and ignored 
for the other schemes where the insured income level is not a function of age. 
in the age interval (x, x+l) which is effectively taken into account for the pension purpose). This 
function assumes that the average past service increases linearly over time. 
15 The rates of compliance are taken as assumed in Chapter 2. 
16 This method is based on the ILO-DIST Models, 1997. 
17 Details of the assumptions underlying the projections are given in Chapters 1,2,4,5 & 6. 
18 In models analysing future pension expenditures for earnings-related pensions (such as the ESSPS), a 
link between past work history and the resulting pensions is required. 
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3.5.3.1. Employees and Public and Private Workers Scheme 
3.5.3.1.1 Basic Salary 
The age-dependent salary scale is given by formula 2.17. So, starting from the given 
initial values at t=0 (the start of the projection period), the average basic pensionable 
salary of active members aged x last birthday at discrete time points t, (t = 1,2, 
..., 
28), can be modelled by the function S(M, x, t) 19, which represents the average total 
salary of all the insured members aged x last birthday at time t and is given by: 
S(M, x, t, B) = eY' x SAL(M, x, B) 0 St S28 (3.9) 
The maximum annual insured basic salary covered by this scheme in year t is 
determined using the following function: 
S(M, x, t, B)_<((SS0+250xer')x12) for 0St S28 (3.10) 
Hence the sum of all the basic pensionable salaries (TS(M, t, B)) in year (t, t+l) of 
this scheme is given by: 
TS(M, t, B) =EE Act(M, x, t, s) x S(M, x, t, B) (3.11) 
s x-b 
Subsequently the total contribution income can be calculated as: 
TC(M, t, B) = dc(M, t) x C(M, B) x TS(M, t, B) (3.12) 
ForM=C&P 
3.5.3.1.2 Variable Salary 
The variable salary is not linked to the salary scale and only changes because of salary 
escalation. So, the average variable pensionable salary of active members aged x last 
birthday at discrete time points t, (t = 1,2, 
..., 
28), can be modelled by the function 
S(M, x, t, J), which represents the average total variable salary of all the insured 
members aged x last birthday at time t, and is given by: 
S(M, x, t, i'= eT'x S(M, x, 0, V) (3.13) 
The maximum annual insured variable salary maximum covered by this scheme in 
year t is determined using the following function: 
S(M, x, t, B)S((500xe'`)x12) for 0: 5 t <_28 (3.14) 
Hence the sum of all the variable pensionable salaries (TS(M, t, V)) in year (t, t+l) of 
this scheme is given by: 
19 This represents per capita amounts of insured salary relevant to the social security scheme, summed 
for the active members in year t. It is a weighted average of the salary cohort surviving from t and that 
of new entrant cohort entering in the year (t, t+l), assumed to enter at age x last birthday. 
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TS(M, t, iý =EE Act(M, x, t, s) x S(M, x, t, 19 (3.15) 
s x-b 
Subsequently the total contribution income can be calculated as: 
TC(M, t, J9=dc(M, t)xC(M, J)xTS(M, t, J9 forM=C&P (3.16) 
3.5.3.2. Self-Employed and Egyptians Working Abroad Schemes 
In these two schemes there is only one pensionable salary which is regarded as the 
basic one, which is determined as follows. 
S(M, x, t) represents the average total salary of all the insured members aged x last 
birthday at time t and is given by: 
S(M, x, t)=eY'x S(M,, x, 0)for 0St <_28 (3.17) 
The sum of the pensionable salaries (TS) in year (t, t+l) of this scheme is given by: 
TS(M, t, B) =EE Act(M, x, t, B) x S(M, x, t, B) 0: 9 t <_ 28 (3.18) 
s x-b 
Subsequently the total contribution income can be calculated as: 
TC(M, t, B) = dc(M, t) x C(M, B) x TS(M, t, B) for M=E&W (3.19) 
3.5.3.3. Casual Workers Scheme (CSIS) 
No contributions are projected for this scheme. The proportion of contribution income 
from active members and non-government sources to the total expenditure of the 
CSIS (including the SPP) is not significant (around 5%) and has been declining over 
time, also the Treasury finances most of the benefits. It is predicted that within a few 
years the Treasury will finance all the liabilities of this scheme20. Therefore, 
modelling of the CSIS concentrates on projecting future liabilities. 
In the following sections, general formulae for modelling the projection of annual 
benefits expenditure of the schemes (except the CSIS) are derived, and the differences 
between schemes are indicated where applicable. Separate formulae are derived in 
later sections for the CSIS. 
20 This assumes that the annual expenditure is covered totally by the Treasury and if there is any 
income from any sources, it will only reduce the Treasury liabilities. Over the projection period it is 
assumed that the Treasury will cover 95% of the annual expenditure. 
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3.6. Modelling Annual Benefit Outgo2' 
The benefits are mainly payable on old age (including early) retirement, ill-health 
retirement and the death of the member. We shall focus on the benefits of a group of 
members all aged x last birthday. Projections will have to determine when benefit 
payments are to be made (demographic projection) and the level of benefits to be paid 
(economic projection). The actuarial formulae used in the model are constructed from 
the following main elements: 
1. Multiple decrement tables for employee members ('service tables'); 
2. Scales for estimating members' future earnings; 
3. Mortality tables for pensioners; 
4. Mortality tables for widows and orphans of deceased members and pensioners; 
5. Proportions married amongst active members and pensioners dying at each age; 
6. Age differences of husbands and wives and orphans and other family statistics; 
7. Compound interest functions; 
8. The rules of the scheme for benefits provided on old age retirement, ill-health 
retirement and death. 
The main benefits which subject to actuarial calculations are as follows: 
(a) Pension payable for life from the attainment of the retirement age. 
(b) Pension payable to widows and dependants on the death of members, both 
when they die whilst actively employed and when they have retired; 
(c) Pension payable on total disability or lump sum payable on partial disability; 
(d) Additional benefits such as end of service remuneration, death and disability 
compensations, death and funeral grants and orphan female's marriage grant. 
The number of beneficiaries is given by the following formula: 
TNF(M,, x, t, s)=EG(M, x, t, s)where G=R, N, E, I,, W, DandU (3.20) 
The total annual benefit expenditure of the scheme M over (t, t+1) is estimated as the 
sum of the costs of providing benefits under the covered contingencies, as given by 
the following formula: 
TB(M, t)_y- TGB(M, t) where G=R, N, E, 1, W, DandU 
G 
(3.21) 
21 The modelling of the CSIS is not included in this section as it has different characteristics of the 
other schemes and it is included in the later sections of projection in this Chapter. 
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Decrements are assumed, in general, to spread evenly across each year except for 
retirements, which are assumed to occur only at exact ages. Therefore, it is assumed 
that the service (multiple decrement) table for the active members of the ESSPS 
allows for two decrements, death and invalidity. The basic and variable amounts of 
pension are constant once the pension has been awarded. However, the total amount 
of pension for every individual pensioner in year (t, t+1) is the sum of these two 
amounts plus the total annual increments, which are proportion of the basic pension. 
Therefore, the total amount of pension benefits is affected by three factors: 
1- The annual pension increment for surviving beneficiaries; 
2- The decrement of beneficiaries as a result of death and other cessation's; 
3- The increment of new pensioners as a result of retirement. 
Hence, the total annual benefit outgo of pensioners of the scheme in year (t, t+1) is 
given by the following formula: 
Benefit outgo = Pensions of surviving beneficiaries + Pensions of new beneficiaries 
+ Lump sum benefits 
3.6.1. Normal Retirement Benefits 
(3.22) 
The total annual benefit outgo for old-age pensions in year (t, t+1) is determined 
using the following formula. 
TNB(M, t+1)= (E ETNP(M, x, t+1, s)I+(ETNLS(M, r, t+1, s)) (3.23) 
s x=º 
) 
`a 
Total normal old-age annual pension outgo in year (t, t+1) starting from the total 
annual pension outgo a year earlier, is 
TNP(M, x+1, t+1, s) (3.24) 
TNP(M, x, t, s)x(1-qX)+TNP(M, x, t, s, B)x(1-gs)x x>r 22 
"d"r 
1NP(M, 
r, t+1, s, (B + V)) x Act(M, r 
-1, t, s)x(1- q, 
_, 
- 
qrI) x=r 
for t=0,1,2 
, ...., 
28, where 
22 The second term of the formula gives the amount of pension increment over the year (t, t+1) which 
will be added to the pension increments in payment at the start of the year. It is a proportion of the total 
basic pension at time t. This total pension increment in year (t, t+1) is reduced by mortality over the 
year (t, t+l). New pensioners do not get a pension increment until the beginning of the next financial 
year following their retirement. 
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TNP(M, x, t, s) 
TNP(M, x-1, t-1, s)x(1-qX 1) x>r 
_ 
(3.25) 
NP(M, r, t, s, (B+V))xAct(M, r-1, t, s)x(1-'q; 1 -'q', 
_ý) x=r 
forr=60forM=C&P&Wand r=65 forM=E, t=0,1,2,..... 28and 
NP(M, r, t, s, B) and RP(M, r, t, s, i) are determined as follows: 
NP(M, r, t, s, B) 
{max(max( (min(36, PS(M, r, t, s, B)) 
, 
0.5) x AS(M, r, t, s, B), 55 PS >9 45 23 (3.26) 
0 PS 59 
for t=0,1,2, 
...., 
28, and 9< PS(M, r, s, B)536 24 
NP(M, r, t, s, J9 
AS(M, r, t, s, I9 x (min(36, (max(PS(M, r, t, s, Iß), 22.5) 
x 45 
= 
(1 + 0.02 x PS(M, r, t, s, 19) PS >9 (3.27) 
0 PS<_9 
for t=0,1,2,...., 28, and 22.5 < PS(M, r, s, J) 
_<3625 
Final basic pensionable earning is taken as the average earnings over the last two 
years immediately before retirement as follows. 
S(M, r-1, t-1, B)+S(M, r, t, B) AS(M, r, t, B) = FS(M, r, t, B) =2 (3.28) 
forM=C&PandL =B 
However, for variable salary it is taken as the career average salary as follows: 
r-1 
ES(M, x, t, V) 
AS(M, r, t, V) = CAS(M r, t, P9 _ x-b b-r (3.29) 
"AS(M, x, t, s, B) is the career average pensionable salary in the case of self-employed and Egyptian 
working abroad schemes and FS is the final salary in the case of other schemes. The minimum pension 
for the self-employed and Egyptians working abroad is LE 35 and not LE 55. 
24 In the calculations, it is assumed that all active members who attain the NRA (r) will be eligible for 
old-age pension as they will satisfy the condition of 9 years +1 month. The reasons are: 
a- The rules of the scheme permit members of the scheme to continue paying contributions until they 
satisfy the condition or pay the remaining contributions in lump sum; 
b- It is more prudent to assume that all the active members who attain the NRA (r) will be eligible for 
old-age pension. 
25 Even if the past service of the variable salary at the NRA is less than 22.5 years (but > 9), it is taken 
as 22.5 years in the calculations to give a variable pension of 50-80% of the CAS, as variable salary 
pension provision started on 1/4/1984. This concept of variable salary does not exist for the self- 
employed and Egyptians working abroad schemes. 
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ForM=E& WandL =B and also ForM=C&PandL =V 
TNLS(M, r, t, s) (3.30) 
= Lump sum for the end of service remuneration + Lump sum compensation for either 
contributory years above 36 or if the insured person does not qualify for a pension 
TNLS(M, r, t, s) = FS(M, r, t, s, B) x max(PS(M, r, t, s, B), 10) x 
Act(M, r-1, t, s)x(1- 'q;, 
- 
'q', 
_, 
) 
AS(M, r, t, s, B)xmax((PS(M, r, t, s, B)-36), 0) 
x 1.8 x Act(M, r-1, t, s) x (1 
- 
'q;, 
- 
*q1_1) 
AS(M,, r, t, s, B)x PS(M r, t, s, B)x1.8 
+x Act(M, r 
-1, t, s) x (1- 'q; ,- 'q',. 1) 
AS(M,, r, t, s, i'9x(1+0.02xPS(M, r, t, s, 19)x1.8 
x Act(M, r 
-1, t, s) x (1- 'q; I 
forG=R 
if PS > 36 
if PSS 9 26 (3.31) 
for t=0,1,2 
, ...., 
28, and for G =R if PS < 10 it is taken as 10 and M , -H 
3.6.2. Early Retirement Benefits 
The total annual benefit outgo for early retirement pensioners in year (t, t+1) is 
determined using the following formula27: 
TEB(M, t+ 1) 
= 
(Z ETEP(M, x, t+1, s))+I, sf 1 TELS(M, x, t+1, s)) (3.32) 
s x-b+l `s xb+l 
The total annual pension outgo in year (t, t+1) starting from the total annual pension 
outgo a year earlier is determined as follows: 
TEP(M, x+1, t+1, s) 
TEP(M, x, t, s)x(1-qz)+TEP(M, x, t, s, B)x(1-qs)x 3,28 (3.33) 
+EP(M, x, t, s, (B+V))xAct(M, x, t, s)x(1-'qz 
-'q')xgz+1 
for x 
_> 
b+20 for L=B&xz 50 for L= V29, t=0,1,2,.., 28 
Z6 The end of service remuneration is payable for any cause of retirement with a minimum of 10 month 
of the monthly average final basic salary as it was introduced on 1/4/1984. In the case of x> 36, the 
lump sum compensation is paid only in respect of the basic salary however, in the case of xS9 it is 
paid in respect of both basic and variable salaries. 
7 Early retirement is assumed to take place at exact integral ages, just before each birthday. 
28 The second term of the formula gives the amount of pension increment over the year (t, t+l) which 
will be added to the pension increments in payment at the start of the year. It is a proportion of the total 
basic pension amount at time t. This total in the case of xz b+20, consists of the basic pension at (t 
- 
1) 
reduced by qx. i plus the new basic pension amount arise from the new early retirees over (t - 1, t). New 
pensioners do not get pension increment until the beginning of the following financial year. This 
Pension increment in year (t, t+1) is reduced by the mortality over that year. 
9 Variable pension only exists for M=C&P. 
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TEP(M, x, t, s) 
TEP(M, x-1, t-1, s)x(1-qX)+EP(M, x, t, s, (B+i9) (3.34) 
txAct(M, 
x-1, t-1, s)x(1-qx_1-'gz1)xq' 
x-b+20for(forL=B), xz50(forL=i'9, M=C&Pand t=0,1,2,.., 28 
EP(M, x, t, s, B) 
= 
PS(M, x 
45 
t, s, B) 
x AS(M, x, t, s, B)x(1-RF(M, x, B)) PS >- 20 (3.35) 
0 PS < 20 
EP(M, x, t, s) 1930 
(min(max(PS(Mx, t, s, V), 22.5), 36) 
xAS(M, x, t, s, 1)x(1-RF(M, x, ig) 45 
=x (1 + 0.02 x PS(M, x, t, s, i» x >_ 50 & PS z 20 (3.36) 
0x< 50 or PS < 20 
S(M, x+z-1, t-1, B)+S(M, x+z, t, B) AS(M, x+z, t, B) = FS(M, x+z, t, B) =2 (3.37) 
x 
ES(z, t-x+z, s, B/V) 
AS(M,, x, t, i'9 = CAS(M, x, t, J' = z=b+1 
x-b 
(3.38) 
PS(M, x, t, B/J) >- 20, b+20 Sx < r, t=0,1,2, 
...., 
28 and MOH 
RF(M, x, V) = [(r - x) x 0.05] (3.39) 
0 555xS60 
[r-x+0.05] 50 <- x5 54 45 
RF(M, x, B) =[r 
45 
x+0.10] 45 <- x <_ 49 
(3.40) 
[rx+0.15] x544 45 
TELS(M, x+1, t+1, s) (3.41) 
= Lump sum for the end of service remuneration + Lump sum compensation for either 
contributory years above 36 or if the insured person does not qualify for a pension 
3o The variable pension in the case of early retirement (only for M= C& P) is not payable if the age at 
retirement is less than 50 even if the contributory years at early retirement is more than 19 years. 
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TELS(M, x+l, t+l, s) = FS(M, x, t, s, B)x max(PS(M, x, t, s, B), 10) 
xAct(M, x, t, s)x(1-'qX 
-'gx)xqx+, for G=R (3.42) 
AS(M, x, t, s, B)x max((PS(M, x, t, s, B)-36), 0) 
x1.8xAct(M, x, t, s)x(1-'qx 
-'gs)xqx+1 if PS>36 
AS(M, x, t, s, (B/i'7)xPS(M,, x, t, s, (B/i'9)x1.8 
x Act(M, x, t, s) x (1- 'qX 
- 
'qz) x qx+r if PS < 20 and/or x< 50 for V 
b Sx 
_<r-1, and t=0,1, Z...., 28 and M -H 
3.6.3. Invalidity Benefits 
The total annual benefit outgo for invalidity retirement pensioners in year (t, t+1) is 
determined using the following formula: 
TIB(M, t+ 1) 
-IE 
ETIP(M, 
x, t+1, s))+ IExEýTILS(M, x, t+1, s)) (3.43) 
s x=b s x=b 
The total annual pension outgo in year (t, t+l) starting from the total annual pension 
outgo a year earlier is determined as follows: 
TIP(M, x+1, t+1, s) 
(TIP (M, x, t, s) x (1 
- 
qX°) + TIP (M, x, t, s, B) x (1 
- 
qxd) xß, (3.44) 
+IP(M, x, t, s, (B+i'9)x Act(M, x, t, s)x(1- 0.5'gX)x'qX 
for b Sx 
_>r-1, t=0,1,2,...., 
28, and M -H 
where 
TIP (M, x, t, s) 
TIP(M, x-1, t-1, s)x(1-qz!, )+IP(M, x, t, s, (B+19)x (3.45) 
= 
Act(M, x-1, t-1, S)x(1- 0.5 'qX)x 'q' + 
WP(M, x, t, s, B/i'7xAct(M, x-1, t-1, s)x(1- 0.5'q')x'gx 
IP(M, x, t, s, B)= (3.46) 
max max 
min(PS(M, x, t, s, B) + min(3, (r 
- 
x)), 36) 0.65 x AS(M, x, t, s, B), 40 45 
forbSx>- r-1, t=0,1,2,...., 28, andM, -H 
IP(M, x, t, s, i'9 = (3.47) 
1min(max(PS(M, x, t, s, 19 + min((r 
- 
x), 3), 22.5),, 36) 
min 45 
, 
40 
lxAS(M, x, t, s, iq)x(1+0.02xPS(M, x, t, s, V)) 
The pension for invalidity retirement pensioners arising from work or illness injuries 
is determined as follow: 
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WP(M, x, t, s, BIV) = (max(AS(M, x, t, s, (B + V)) x 0.80,35)) 
b 
_<x 
? r-1, t=0,1,2, 
...., 
28 and M , -H 
AS(M, x+z, t, B) = S(M, x+z, t, B) 
AS(M, x, t, s, iJ is determined as in formula 3.38. 
TJLS(M, x+1, t+1, s) 
= 
Lump sum for the end of service remuneration 
+ Lump sum compensation for contributory years above 36 
+ Lump sum compensation for the invalidity or work injuries contingencies 
TILS(M, x+1, t+1, s) 
FS(M, x, t, s, B) x max(PS(M, x, t, s, B), 10) 
x Act(M, x, t, s) x (1 
- 
0.5 'qz) x 'q' 
AS(M, x, t, s, B) x max((PS(M, x, t, s, B) 
- 
36), 0) 
x 1.8 x Act(M, x, t, s) x(] - 0.5 'qx) x 'qz 
AS(M, x, t, s, B37 x Pr(x) 
x Act(M, x, t, s) x (1 - 0.5 d)X x 'qx 
AS(M, x, t, s, B/I'9 x Pr(x) x 1.5 
,x 
Act(M, x, t, s) x(1 
- 
0.5'gX)x'qx 
b<x<r-1, and t=0,1,2...... 28and M# H 
forG=R 
PS > 36 
(3.48) 
(3.49) 
(3.50) 
(3.51) 
3.6.4. Death Benefits 
Social security pension schemes almost invariably cover the risk of death and provide 
pensions to survivors (generally, widows/widowers and orphans31) of those who die 
during active service or when in receipt of a retirement or invalidity pension. The 
ESSPS provide survivors' benefits as explained in Chapters 1&2. Survivors' benefits 
form a significant part of the liabilities of the ESSPS, as the system's rules make the 
likelihood of distributing the full pension between the survivors of the deceased 
member approximately certain. 
By examining the data over 1990-99, it was found that the number and amount of 
benefit for siblings, parents and widowers32 were not significant in proportion to 
31 Also siblings and parents in the ESSPS; however they are ignored in our model as a simplification 
and it is assumed that the 100% of the pension is divided between the widow and two orphans. 
32 The recorded number of widower pension cases over 1990-99 represented less than 1% of the total 
death cases and the likelihood that this situation will change in the future is not significant. However, 
the expected increase in female labour force participation may represent an increasing share in the 
future expenditure for widowers' pension 
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widows and orphans. Therefore, it was decided to ignore them in modelling future 
survivors' benefits of the system33. Therefore, the assumption is that every deceased 
male will leave behind a widow, son and daughter and they will share the 100%34 of 
the pension amount of the deceased member in the proportions 50%, 25% and 25% 
respectively, as explained in Chapter 2. In respect of the death of a female member, it 
is assumed that there will be son and daughter survivors and only 2/3 of the pension 
amount is inherited (50% for each of the 2/3 of the pension of the deceased member). 
Daughters will act as a proxy for sisters and mothers and sons will act as a proxy for 
brothers and fathers. This assumption takes a prudent view and reduces the tedious 
levels of assumptions and calculations of survivors' benefits. 
The inclusion of survivors' pensions requires the derivation of actuarial formulae for 
death benefits provided to adult dependants and dependent children. This includes the 
use of proportions for married members and for average age differences of members 
and dependants. The total annual death benefit outgo for the beneficiaries of the 
system over a year (t, t+1) can be determined using the following formula: 
Death benefit outgo = Death in service benefits + Death after retirement benefits 
+ Funeral and death grants' costs 
Survivors Benefits = Widow Benefits + Orphans Benefits 
(3.52) 
(3.53) 
The total annual benefit outgo for death benefits in year (t, t+1) is determined using 
the following formula: 
TDB(M,, t+1) 
E ETDP(M, (yx &z), t+1) I+(E ITDLS(M, (x&z), t+1)J (3.54) 
(yx 
x-dj z=0 J \x=bz=l6 
where 
TDP(M, (yx & z), t+ 1) 
TDP(M, yx+1, t+1)l +E TDP(M, Zf+1, t+1) (3.55) 
s=x-dx JZf. 0 y 
(10 
TDP(M, Zm + 1, t+ 1) + 
Q-2 
33 The available data on the 1/7/1997 of brothers, fathers and widowers were integrated with sons and 
of sisters and mothers were integrated with daughters. 
'a This assumption is supported by the following arguments: 
1. The system is generous in giving benefits to survivors as it gives benefits to a large chain of 
relatives of the deceased member, a phenomenon which puts a heavy liabilities on the system; 
2. The system's experience shows that a significant share of the expenditures goes to the survivors; 
3. The actuaries of the system usually make the same assumptions. 
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Similar formulae to that developed for old age and invalidity retirement are used here 
with the introduction of `proportions married' into the factors35. Widows' pensions 
are usually valued by formulae of the same general type as those developed for 
members' pensions, but including extra functions, when required. The total annual 
pension outgo for widows in year (t, t+1) starting from the total annual pension outgo 
a year earlier is determined as follows: 
TDP(M, y+1, t+1) 
TDP(M, y, t) x (1- 'q d- 
- 
'qy d) + TDP(M, y, t, B) 36 (3.56) 
x (1- 'qy^" 
- 
q; d) x ß, + 0.5 x NDP(M, yx, t) 
for (x-d, ) Sy Savfor t=0,1,2,.., 28 
The annual pension outgo for orphans (females and males respectively) in year (t, t+l) 
starting from the total annual pension outgo a year earlier is determined as follows: 
TDP(M, Zf+1, t+ 1) 
TDP(M, Z1, t) x (1- 'qd f- 'qZf) + TDP(M, Z f, t, B) (3.57) 
x (1- *qi f- ýqiý) x+0.25 x NDP(M, (z1), t) 
for 0 
_<Zf 2a for t=0,1,2,.., 28 and 
TDP(M, Z, +1, t+1) 
TDP(M, Z, ) t) x (1- 'qdm) + TDP(M, y, t, B) (3.58) 
x (1-qim) x ß, + 0.25 x NDP(M, (z, 
x), t) 
for 2 
_<Z,  ? Z* 
3? for t=0,1,2,.., 28 
NDP(M, x, t) =E DKP(M, x, t) K-Acf&G 
(TNP(M, x, t, s)+TEP(M, x, t, s))xgz xhs +TIP(M, x, t, s)xgf' (3.59) 
x hX + DP(M, x, t, (B + TO) x Act(M, x, t) x (1 - 0.5 'qz) x *qz dxh., 
for b Sx 2w for t=0,1,2,.., 28 
DP(M, x, t, B/J7 is found by using the formula 3.46 & 3.47 and AS(M, x, t, s, B) and 
AS(M, x, t, s, P) are found from formulae 3.49 and 3.38. 
33 This is known as the `collective' method of valuation (Lee, 1986). 
36 By examining the data for female marriage and remarriage, it is found that the probability of female 
remarriage is significantly lower than the probability of marriage for the first time. 
37 Invalid sons and brothers can continue receive their pension beyond the age of Z*. By examining the 
data of the system, it was found that only 10% of the number of sons and brothers continue to receive 
pension after the age of Z*. 
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3.6.4.1. Lump Sums and Additional Survivors Benefits 
There are some other survivors' benefits, which are paid in the form of a lump sum as 
explained in Chapter 1. These include the following: 
TDLS(M, x+1, t+1, s) (3.60) 
= 
Lump sum for the end of service remuneration 
+ Lump sum compensation for the death contingency 
+ Lump sum compensation for contributory years above 36 
+ Death and funeral grants38 + Marriage and student grants39 
TDLS(M, x+1, t+1, s) 
FS(M, x, t, s, B) x max(PS(M, x, t, s, B), 10) 
xAct(M, x, t, s)x(1-0.5 qz )x 'qx for G=R 
AS(M, x, t, s, B/I'9 x Pr(x) 
x Act(M,, x, t, s) x (1 - 0.5 'qX) x 'qz 
AS(M, x, t, s, B) x max((PS(M, x, t, s, B) 
- 
36), 0) 
x 1.8 x Act(M,, x, t, s) x (1 
- 
0.5'gx )x 'qF PS > 36 (3.61) 
5x((TNP(M,, x, t, s)+TEP(M, x, t, s))xgs 
+TIP(M, x, t, s)xgX +DP(M,, x, t, (B+I'9) 
x Act(M, x, t) x (1 - 0.5 'qx) x 'qs ) 
max(12 x (TDP(M, Zp t) + TDP(M, y, t, B) x (3 
,) 
x (1-'qif) x(gif), 100) J Zf ý 15 
b 
. 
<x Sr-1, t=0,1,2 
, ...., 
28 and M oH 
Similar formulae to 3.52-3.59, without the term for widow's pension, the inclusion of 
the proportion of 2/3 in the formula 3.47 and the proportion of married females (hy) 
are applied in the case of the death benefits for deceased female members. 
38 The death grant is 3 month of the total monthly pension amount and the funeral grant is 2 month of 
the total monthly pension amount with a minimum of LE 200. 
39 A "marriage grant" equal to the maximum of one-year's daughter pension and LE 200 is given to the 
daughters of the deceased member when they marry or remarry but it is payable only once. The 
pension itself ceases on the marriage of the female orphan of the deceased member. A "student grant" 
is given to the orphan male student when he finishes study and stops receiving pension. However, 
because there is no available data to project the cost of the "student grant", only a small loading would 
be added to the additional cost of survivors' benefits. The loading for the "student grant" benefit would 
be in keeping with the past experience of the scheme. 
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3.6.5. Unemployment Benefits 
Such benefits are often allowed for in projection and valuation by loading the value of 
benefits by a percentage, or by setting up a contingency reserve as appropriate, in the 
light of the general experience. For modelling the annual unemployment benefits 
expenditure, we will be prudent and assume that the full benefit as explained in 
Chapters 1&2, is paid for each claim. The annual amount of unemployment benefits 
can be projected in year (t, t+1) using the following formula: 
TUB(P, x, t, s) 
AS(M, x, t, s, B/i '9 x 0.6 x7x Act(M, x, t, s) x (1 
-'qx-0q z) xq X+1 (3.62) 
3.7. Projection of Benefits outgo of the CSIS 
This scheme has to be modelled separately. It is not insurance-based like the other 
schemes and is mainly intended to provide social assistance benefits rather than social 
insurance-based benefits. Therefore, the aim is to estimate the amount of money that 
would have to be set aside annually to cover the emerging pension obligations of the 
scheme. The total annual expenditure on benefits to pensioners and survivors of this 
scheme will be mostly financed by the treasury (assumed to be 95% in this model). 
No reserves of any kind are held for this scheme. 
The benefit expenditure is split between the original CSIS and the SPP (the CSIS' 
pension amount is always greater than that of the SPP40) as explained in Chapter 1. 
However, the number of SPP members has been decreasing significantly41, as it has 
been closed to new members since the second half of the 1980s42 and the majority of 
its members were already above the age of 65. Therefore, the SPP is no longer a 
significant scheme. It is assumed that there is only one category of beneficiaries 
belonging to the main CSIS and the total cost of providing benefits is calculated under 
this assumption. This reduces the tedious level of calculations of benefits and takes 
the prudent side, which is the normal approach in actuarial projections and valuations. 
3 
40 Examination of the data indicates that the scheme should not have any pension cases from the SPP 
by year 2010. 
41 Only people aged 65 and over and without any type of pension were allowed to join this scheme, 
particularly widows and divorced women. 
2 The proportion of the SPP pension cases to the total pension cases under the CSIS has been 
decreasing significantly over time. 
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The modelling of future benefit expenditure will depend on the future structure of the 
beneficiaries of this scheme which is determined by the following formula43: 
TNF(M, x, t, s) = EG(H, x, t, s) where G=N, I, andD (3.63) 
Hence, the total annual benefit expenditure of the scheme over (t, t+l) is estimated as 
the sum of the costs of providing benefits under the covered contingencies, as given 
by the following formula: 
TB(M, t) =E TGB(M, t) G where G=N, I, and D (3.64) 
The basic pension plus the total annual increments is a flat amount to all pensioners in 
year (t, t+1) (of course different for the survivors of the deceased member). 
Therefore, the total amount of pension benefits is affected by the three factors 
mentioned in section 3.6. Hence, the total annual benefit outgo of pensioners of the 
scheme in year (t, t+1) is determined according to the formula 3.20. 
3.7.1. Normal Retirement Benefits 
The total annual benefit outgo for old-age pensions in year (t, t+1) is determined 
using the following formula". 
TNB(H, t+1) = 
(S2: TNP(H, x, t+1, s)x-r (3.65) 
Total normal old-age annual pension outgo in year (t, t+1) starting from the total 
annual pension outgo a year earlier, is 
TNP(H, x+1, t+1, s) 
TNP(H, x, t, s)x(1-qx)+TNP(H, x, t, s, B)x(1-gz)xß1x > r4,5(366) 
AM(H, t) x Act(H, r-1, t, s) x (1 
- 
'qmm 
,- 
'q; 
_, 
) x=r 
forb =21, r=65, t=0,1,2,...., 28, 
where 
TNP(H, x, t, s, B) 
43 Retirement is assumed to occur only at exact age 65. Therefore, it is assumed that the service table 
for the active members of the CSIS allows for two decrements, death and invalidity with the 
assumption that they spread evenly across each year of age. 
44 The assumption here is that all active members who attain age 65 will be eligible for old-age pension 
as explained earlier. 
as The second term of the formula gives the amount of pension increment over the year (t, t+l) which 
will be added to the pension increments in payment at the start of the year. It is a proportion of the total 
basic pension amount at time t. This total pension increments in year (t, t+1) is reduced by the rate of 
mortality over the year (t, t+l). It has to be noted that new pensioners do not get pension increment 
until the beginning of the next financial year following their retirement. 
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TNP(H, x-1, t-1, s, B)x(1-qx_1) x>r 
_ 
(3.67) 
AM(H, t) x Act(H, r-1, t, s) x (1 
- 
'q; 'q'_, ) x=r 
for1,2,...., 28 
3.7.2. Invalidity Benefits 
The total annual benefit outgo for invalidity retirement pensioners in year (t, t+1) is 
determined using the following formula: 
TIB(H, t+ 1) 
= 
(E ETIP(H, 
x, t+1, s))+I Ex r1 TILS(H, x, t+1, s)) b \ 
(3.68) 
x s- 
in year (t, t+1) starting from the total annual pension The total annual pension outgo 
outgo a year earlier is determined as follows: 
TIP (H, x+1, t+1, s) 
TIP(H, x, t, s)x(I-qi)+TIP(H, x, t, s, B) x(1-gx)x (3.69) 
+AM(H, t)x Act(H, x, t, s)x(1- 0.5'gX')x'qX 
forb-<x_<r-1, b =21, r= 65, t= 0,1,2,...., 28, and 
TIP (H, x, t, s, B) 
TIP(H, x-1, t-I, s, B)x(1-gXa1)+AM(H, t) (3.70) 
_ 
x Act(H, x-1, t-1, s) x(1- 0.5'gx')x'qX 
TILS(M, x+1, t+1, s) =Lump sum compensation for the invalidity contingency (3.71) 
TILS(M, x+1, t+1, s) 72) (3 (AM(H, t) x Pr(x) x Act(M, x, t, s) x (1 
- 
0.5 'qXi) x 'qx) . 
b Sx Sr-1, t=0,1,2....., 28 
3.7.3. Death Benefits 
The CSIS provide survivors' pension, in addition to retirement and invalidity 
pensions, in the same manner as other schemes, as explained in Chapter 1. The 
arguments mentioned in section 3.6.4. apply to the death benefits of the CSIS. The 
total death benefit of the scheme is determined using the formula 3.50. The total 
annual benefit outgo for death benefits in year (t, t+1) is determined using the 
formulae 3.52-356. However, the total death pension amount of a new deceased 
member is determined using the following formula: 
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DPT(H, x, t) =E DKP(H, x, t) K-Act&G 
(TNP(H, x, t, s)xgx xh, +TIP(M, x, t, s)xq,, d xhx (3.73) 
L+ AM(H, t) x Act(M, x, t) x (1 
- 
0.5 'qx )x 'qX x hX 
forb Sx Sr-1, t=0,1,2, 
...., 
28, 
3.7.3.1. Lump Sums and Additional Survivors Benefits 
There are some other survivors' benefits, which are paid in the form of a lump sum as 
explained in Chapter 1. These include the following: 
= 
Lump sum compensation for the death contingency + Funeral grant46 
TDLS(M, x+1, t+1, s) 
AS(M, x, t, s, B/i9 x Pr(x) 
x Act(M, x, t, s) x (1 - 0.5 *q X) x'qX 
mczx 2x 
2TNP(H, x, t, s) x qz + TIP(M, x, t, s) x q° 200 
+ AM(H, t) x Act(M, x, t, s) x (1 
- 
0.5 'qz) x 'qx 
b Sx Sr-1, t=0,1,2 
, ...., 
28 
(3.74) 
(3.75) 
3.8. Projecting Future Treasury Subsidy 
The Treasury subsidies to different schemes are also considered as part of the 
projections of the income and outgo of the annual cash flow using the following 
formula: 
TTS (ESSPS, t) (3.76) 
=1% xE TS(M, t, B/ V) +E TGP(M, x, t, s, I) + 95 %xE TB(H, x, t, s, B) M 
-V 
, 
P, T vm 
3.9. Total Income, Expenditure and Surplus of the System 
In projecting future income and expenditure of the ESSPS the following formulae 
were also employed: 
TI(M, t)=TC(M, t)+TIR(M, t)+TS(M, t) forallM (3.77) 
F(M, t+1) = 
[F(MI 
t)xeb' + 
[I(Mt+1)-TE(M, 
t))xe2s (3.78) 
for M= GSF & PPSF 
TS(GSF, t)=1.0%xTS(C, t)++TB(C, t, 1) (3.79) 
46 
. 
The funeral grant is 2 months of the flat monthly pension amount with a minimum of LE 200. 
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TS(PPSF, t, I) = 0.95% x TB (H, t) + 1.0% x TS(P, t) + TB(M, t, 1) (3.80) 
forM=P, E, W 
TB(GSF, t) = TG(C, t) = TGP(C, x, t, s) + TGLS(C, x, t, s) (3.81) 
TB(PPSF, t) = TGP(M, x, t, s) + TGLS(M, x, t, s) for M=P, E, W and H (3.82) 
TAC(GSF, t) = 0.45% x TS(C, t) (3.83) 
TAC(PPSF, t) =1.0% x TS(PPSF, t) (3.84) 
TE(M, t) = TB(M, t) + TAC(M, t) for M= GSF & PPSF & ESSPS (3.85) 
NI(M, t) 47 = TI(M, t) 
- 
TE(M, t) for M= GSF & PPSF & ESSPS (3.86) 
FI(M, t) = NI(M, t) for M= GSF & PPSF & ESSPS (3.87) 
F(M, t+1)= F(M, t) + NI(M, t+1) for M= GSF & PPSF & ESSPS (3.88) 
7TS(ESSPS, t) = TS(GSF, t) + TS(PPSF, t) (3.89) 
3.10. Actuarial Present Value Valuation Technique 
The present value valuation technique provides additional financial insight and is 
therefore a useful adjunct to the projection technique. This technique considers one 
cohort of insured persons at a time and computes the probable present values of future 
insured salaries, on the one hand, and of the benefits payable to the members of the 
cohort and their survivors, on the other. This technique is naturally suited to the 
valuation of schemes which are generally fully funded. The actuarial valuation 
determines whether the scheme can be expected to remain in balance over a longer 
period and it will also determine the actuarial cost and the level of funding. 
The actuarial balance is measured as the difference between the present value of 
assets and the present value of liabilities over the period of the valuation, taking into 
account the fund balance at the valuation date. This balance (surplus/deficit) at the 
valuation indicates the actuarial funding level of the scheme which will depend not 
only on the assumptions used in preparing the estimates of the financial status of the 
scheme but also on the method of financing and/or the actuarial cost method used. 
A number of pension schemes are either fully or partially funded and buffer funds 
may also exist in many PAYG schemes48. The PAYG and partially funded pension 
"This is the `total cash-flow balance', which is defined as the contribution income plus the state 
subsidy less expenditure although recent experience has shown that there is a risk that the Treasury 
may fail to pay the full amount. 
`a The unfunded social security schemes valuation is carried out on forward projections of expenditures 
and insured-salaries with no standard contribution rate, no standard fund and therefore no asset/liability 
ratio established at each valuation based on service to date. The portion of the cost which is to be met 
each year is generally expressed as a percentage of annual pensionable salary. 
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schemes involve inter-generational transfers, which are acceptable in a social security 
scheme but are not intended for an occupational scheme49. The principles used in the 
valuation of occupational pension schemes can also apply to funded public sector 
schemes, although in practice the basis for an occupational pension scheme may differ 
from that for a social security pension scheme (Iyer, S., 1999). Occupational pension 
schemes are considerably more pre-funded than social security pension schemes and 
as a consequence, such schemes generally accumulate large funds. The funding 
methods applied to occupational pension schemes are essentially an extension of 
financing methods applied to social security pension schemes (Iyer, S., 1999). 
The ESIPS has characteristics which are not very different from that of occupational 
pension schemes50. The ESIPS applies the accruals accounting principle, which 
suggests that the cost of an employee's pension should be charged over the period of 
his/her employment. The benefits are based on a formula which is strictly 
proportional to the period of contributory service and to the terminal salary (at 
retirement) of the member. The ESIPS generally aims to achieve financial equilibrium 
on a "closed fund" basis, meaning that only the existing membership is brought into 
the 
-ý equation, thereby excluding future entrants. In this manner, equilibrium is 
established independently of the new entrants. However, provided future entrants are 
also, as a group, in financial equilibrium, the scheme will also be in actuarial balance 
on an "open fund" basis (Iyer, S., 1999). 
3.11. Main Actuarial Funding Methodssl 
In a funded defined benefit scheme the aim is to build up assets, which will be 
sufficient to cover future liabilities of the members. Therefore, the scheme actuary has 
to determine the required contribution rate to achieve this goal following every 
actuarial valuation. Actuaries have devised a number of different actuarial funding 
methods for defined benefit schemes. These methods refer to the way of determining 
49 However, the French complementary occupational pension schemes are effectively PAYG and most 
of the German occupational pension schemes are operated by establishing book reserves within the 
account of the employers to recognise the accrued pension liabilities. But in 1985, PAYG and Book- 
reserving occupational pension schemes were outlawed in Belgium because of concerns about the 
security of members' benefits in the event of the employer's bankruptcy (Daykin, 1999). 
so It can be argued that the State in Egypt works as the employer sponsoring the system and therefore, 
has to cover any actuarial deficit at any valuation. 
si When the PAYG system of financing pension schemes is excluded, the word "funding" is used and 
the funding methods are referred as the actuarial cost methods. 
146 
the amount and timing of contributions made to meet the cost of providing retirement 
benefits and also define the "target fund" that should be held at a particular point in 
time. Each method gives a general formula for calculating the contribution to the 
scheme, which applies whether or not the scheme is mature or has a stationary 
population of members. The calculations are always based on the details of the current 
population of the scheme, but in projecting the benefit payments to be made 
population development is also projected. 
There are certain requirements which should be met by all actuarial funding methods. 
Firstly, all funding methods should aim to accumulate a fund over the service life of 
each active member sufficient to pay for the benefits of that member. Secondly, the 
method has to establish the Standard Contribution rate required by each active 
member and also the Standard Fund, which is the target fund for each member 
(including pensioners). Any particular actuarial cost method could be judged on 
certain criteria. This includes, in particular, the relative stability of the cost, expressed 
as percentage of salaries and the resilience of the contribution rate to a closure of the 
scheme to new entrants and security52 (Lee, 1986). The actuarial cost methods can be 
divided into two groups: individual methods and aggregate methods. 
3.11.1. Individual Cost Methods 
Individual cost methods which are closed group methods address the adjustments 
required for achieving the closed-fund financial equilibrium of the initial population. 
In such methods the actuarial functions are applied to yield the standard contribution 
rate and the standard fund for each participant which are then summed for individual 
members. The most common actuarial valuation methods currently used for pension 
schemes are; Entry age method, Attained age method, Projected unit (and Projected 
accrued) method and Current unit method. 
Only the entry age method is mentioned in the following section as it has an important 
connection with the ESIPS. The adequacy of the level of payable contribution is 
measured in comparison with the entry age actuarial cost. The aggregate method is the 
actuarial cost method employed in the actuarial valuation of the ESIPS, and therefore, 
we concentrate on the aggregate cost method of funding retirement liabilities. 
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3.11.1.1. Entry Age Actuarial Cost Methods 
The Entry Age Method (EAM) seeks to establish a level contribution rate required to 
fund the future benefits of a new entrant at the assumed entry age. The rationale of the 
method is that the prospective retirement benefits of an employee should be funded at 
a uniform percentage of compensation or in uniform annual increment over the entire 
working lifetime. Taking retirement pension as an example, the contributions paid 
over a new entrant generation's active lifetime should, by retirement age, accumulate 
capital value sufficient to finance the benefits being provided. The standard 
contribution rate is determined as "the required rate to fund the benefits of a member 
entering the scheme at a fixed "entry age53 (Khorasanee, 2000). This rate, as a 
percentage of earnings, is found by solving the following equation: 
Present value of future contributions at entry = Present value of future benefits at entry 
(3.90) 
The "normal cost", as a function of time, refers to the total contributions then payable 
by the active members, based on the age at entry related contribution rate function. 
This cost would be unaffected if the age distribution of the active population shifted 
upwards or the scheme is closed to new entrants. The Standard Fund is found to be 
the difference between the present value of total future benefits for all members, and 
the present value of future contributions of active members of the scheme. 
Normal Entry Age Method (EANM)54: This method assumes, for simplicity, 
that all new cohorts will enter at the same age b and retire at a single age r. The 
standard contribution rate is derived by reference to an active member entering at this 
"normal" entry age which is then applied to the whole of the active membership. So, 
the contribution rate will be the average premium for all new entrants and will be the 
same. at all values of x assuming that the experience coincides with the initial 
assumptions. A stable contribution rate will be achieved only if new entrants have on 
average an entry age equal to the "normal" entry age used in the method". 
sZ May be described in terms of the required amount of the standard fund to be held at any one time in 
relation to the liabilities. 
53 The rate is normally determined by reference to an active member entering at the "normal" entry age 
and will then applied to the whole of the active membership. 
sa The "Entry Age" method = the "Entry Age Normal" method as defined in the UK and it is 
occasionally used for pension funds in the UK and Spain and it is also used in Germany for book 
reserved pension plans. 
ss The "normal" entry age is either estimated by the actuary by reference to the experience of the actual 
membership, or calculated from the decrement table employed. 
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3.11.2. Aggregate Cost methods56 
In aggregate or group actuarial cost methods (ACM) contributions are determined on 
a collective basis and not as a sum of contributions for individual participants. The 
standard fund and standard contribution rate are not defined. The aim is to establish 
for the active members of the scheme a level contribution rate such that the existing 
fund plus the future contributions will be sufficient to finance all future benefits. If the 
pension scheme is closed to new entrants, then the contribution rate calculated using 
this method should be stable (Haberman, S. et al., 1999). In this method, the time- 
related contribution is that level rate which would ensure the closed fund financial 
equilibrium of the scheme at that time, taking into account the accumulated fund. 
Such methods define a contribution rate that depends on the level of funding. 
The method used to be, in general, the most common approach to funding defined 
benefit schemes and in particular pension schemes where benefits are dependent upon 
the salary of the employees concerned. It is still used for many schemes, especially 
those which are closed to new entrants or have a small number of active members. If 
applied to a scheme with a stationary population of members, the contribution will 
tend asymptotically to entry age method's standard contribution and the fund will tend 
asymptotically to entry age method's standard fund (Khorasanee, 1997). The equation 
of equilibrium in this method is defined as57: 
Existing fund + Present value of future contribution = Present value of future benefits 
(3.91) 
The method calculates the value of the projected benefits for the members, based on 
both past and future service together. It then deducts the value of whatever assets have 
been accumulated in the fund and works out the level percentage contribution rate 
needed for existing members over their future service in order to provide the balance. 
Theoretically, the contribution rate will remain constant if all actuarial assumptions 
are borne out in practice and the group remains closed. In practice, of course, the 
assumptions will not be realised precisely and the group will have both increments 
and decrements. Hence, except for coincidence, the contribution rate will change 
following every valuation. 
s6 They are used occasionally for pension funds in the UK, Ireland and Portugal and for insured pension 
schemes in Belgium. 
S' The calculation will normally be made by reference to projected benefits. 
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3.12. Actuarial Valuation of the ESIPS 
The valuation of the ESIPS aims to specify the surplus/deficit of the system using the 
actuarial aggregate cost method. The surplus/deficit is calculated as the present value 
of the assets, plus the present value of contributions of the active members, (assuming 
a closed fund)58 less the present value of future liabilities toward the existing 
members, (active, pensioners and dependants) on the valuation date. 
This means that to have a 100% funding level (defined as the actuarial equilibrium of 
the system), the present value of liabilities, less the present value of contributions, has 
to be matched by the available assets on the valuation date. If there are not enough 
assets to match the liabilities, the balance has to be amortised by higher interest rates 
on the invested assets 59 as well as a transfer from the Treasury. The Government is 
also committed to discharge any unfunded liability, and the cost of raising pensions, 
through a transfer from the Treasury. Therefore such increases or any additional 
benefits are not taken into account in the valuation of the system. 
3.12.1. Objectives of the Actuarial Valuation 
The actuarial viability of the ESIPS is assessed in accordance with the following 
actuarial objectives: 
1- To have a funding ratio (FR) of 100%; 
2- To amortise any deficit before the following actuarial valuation; 
3- To confirm whether or not the current contribution rates are sufficient to meet 
future liabilities for new entrants under an assumed interest rate and different 
entry ages. 
In analysing the system's funding level60, there are specific questions raised, such as: 
1. What is the required interest rate61 on the invested funds to keep the 
surplus/deficit at zero over specific period (e. g. the actuarial valuation intervals); 
2. How the FR of the system would change as a result of changing the interest rate 
and the salary escalation rate (y)? 
58 The assets and liabilities of the system are determined at the valuation date, which is taken as 
30/61(1997 + t) with 0 St 528. The assets are taken at the book value. 
59 For any unfunded liabilities in the ESIPS the actuary first look at the given interest rate on the 
invested funds by the NIB and second at the Treasury debts. 
60 A funding level (FR) of 100% of the liabilities is defined as the 'equilibrium position'. 
61 The valuation interest rate is the assumed rate of investment return on the scheme's fund. Both the 
valuation interest rate and the actual rates of investment return are measured in the same terms, 
nominal or real. The real return represents the rate of investment return in excess of the general price 
inflation. 
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3. The adequacy of the contribution rates to meet the expected future liabilities of a 
new entrant under different expected rates of interest. 
In assessing the present value of liabilities for comparison with the value of the assets 
held, we will use the assumed range of interest rates mentioned in Chapter 2 to 
discount future liabilities62 and contributions and also the assumed range of rates of 
salary escalation. In this thesis, the objectives of the actuarial valuation are as follows: 
(I) Objective 1: To determine whether the assets of the two Funds are sufficient 
to meet the liabilities on a closed fund basis (determine surplus/deficit level); 
(II) Objective 2: To determine whether the current contribution rates are adequate 
for new entrants63; 
(III) Objective 3: To study the relationship between the assumed salary growth 
rates, the interest rates and the FR of the two funds. Under this objective we 
are interested in the interest rate required to stabilise the FR of the two Funds 
at 100% of liabilities at different levels of salary escalation (y) over the whole 
simulation period. 
We are interested in keeping the Funds sufficient to match future liabilities (payable 
according to the current regulations) over the actuarial valuation interval period by 
changing the interest rate required to keep the deficit at 0%64 To keep the FR at 100% 
of the liabilities constant, the required interest rate on the assets will depend on: 
Surplus/Deficit (M, t) = PVF(M, t) + C(M) x PVS(M, t) 
- 
PVB(M, t) (3.92) 
In calculating the present value of contributions, we will assume that the contribution 
rates will stay at the current level. We will assume that after the valuation of 
30/6/1997, it is required to keep the level of surplus at 0%. Therefore, the interest rate 
at equilibrium will be determined as equivalent rate to a 6eq which keeps the FR 
=100% of liabilities and determined by the following formula; 
FR(M, t) = 
F(M, t) + PVC(M, t) @ Se9 &y 
=1 for M= GSF& PPSF (3.93) PVB(M, 0@ Se9 &7 
62 Since the liabilities of the schemes extend for a long period into the future, it is necessary to select a 
valuation interest rate which is the average rate likely to apply over very many years in the future. 
63 Objectives 2&3 can be restated as the interest rates and contribution rates have to be consistent with 
long-term equilibrium of the system. 
64 The present value of future liabilities less any funds already accumulated and the present value of 
future contributions is divided by the present value of future liabilities. 
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Multiple solutions are possible: the surplus/deficit can be fixed at 0% of the liabilities 
by varying the following parameters: 
1. Higher interest rate and lower salary escalation; 
2.. Lower interest rate and higher salary escalation; 
3. The same interest rate and salary escalation. 
3.13. Present Value of Contributions 
The same discrete-time interval that was used in the cash-flow projections is used in 
the valuation of the ESIPS. The actuarial present value of future contributions in 
respect of members currently being paid a monthly income of S(x, t) is determined by 
the following function: 
PVC(M, t, B/V) = (3.94) 
r r-x (s-(BC(M, B/ V) x dc(M, t) 
xE6sE0 
e- x SAL(M, x+z, t, B/ V) x Act(x, t) x (ap)x 
=. 
b<_x<r and xSz<r 
PVC (GSF, t) =P VC(C, t) for M= C (3.95) 
PVC (PPSF, t) =M PVC(M, t) for M=P, E, and W (3.96) 
In the self employed and the Egyptians working abroad schemes, the salary scale is 
ignored and only the salary escalation is taken into account, however in the other 
schemes both the salary scale and the salary escalation are taken into account. 
3.14. Present Value of Liabilities 
The valuation of liabilities is based on the aggregate funding method (i. e. based on 
both past and future service together). This determines the present value of benefits 
payable to current beneficiaries (pensioners + survivors) and the present value of the 
future benefits due to current active members on a closed fund basis. The present 
value of liabilities is then determined using the following function: 
PVB(M, t) 
= 
PVNB(M, t) + PVEB(M, t) + PVIB(M, t) + PVDB(M, t) + PVAC(M, t) (3.97) 
3.14.1 Normal Retirement Benefits65 
PVNB(M, t) = PVNP(M, t) +PVNA(M, t) (3.98) 
61 There is no distinction between past and future service as the aggregate cost method is based on the 
value of the total projected benefits of the existing members. 
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3.14.1.1. Pensioners 
PVNP(M, t) =EE TNP(M, x, s, t, (B + i9) x äx r 
_<x 
S co (3.99) 
Isx. r 
3.14.1.2. Active Members 
PVNA(M, t) = PVNAP(M, t) + PVNAL(M, t) (3.100) 
PVNAP(M, t) = (3.101) 
x=r-1 
EENPr, t+r-x, s, B/i '7 xAx, t, s) x, 
_x 
(ap) 
xx 
ii, ' x v' -x 
a x=b 
NP(M, r, t+r-x, s, B) (3.102) 
(min(36, PS(M, r, t+r-x, s, B)) 
max 
mom( 45 , 0S) PS >9 
= xAS(M, r, t+r-x, s, B), 55 66 
0 PS <_9 
where 9<PS(M, r, s, B)S36 
NP(M, r, t+r-x, s, I'9 = (3.103) 
1x AS(M, r, t+r-x, s, J9x(min(36, (max(PS(M, r, t+r-x, s, V), 22.5) 
45 x (1 +0.02x PS(M,, r, t+r 
-x, s, V)) 
for x 
_> r, and 9< PS(M, r, s, I'9 53667 where 
y-r-1 Y(Y-s) E S(y) e 
AS(M, X) = CAS(M, X) = Y`b 
r-b 
(3.104) 
y-r-I Y(Y-x) E S(y) e 
AS(M, x) = FS(M, x) = y`r-2 2 (3.105) 
PS (M, r, t, B/i) = PS(M, x, t, B/J9 + db(M, t, B/V) x (r 
-x) (3.106) 
PVNAL(M, t) (3.107) 
= Lump sum end of service remuneration (basic only) 
+ Lump sum compensation for contributory years above 36 (basic only) 
PVNAL(M, t) 
It is assumed in the valuation, as in the projection, that active members who attain NRA (r) will 
satisfy the condition of 9 years +1 month to be eligible for pension for the same reasons stated in the 
projection. Therefore, the present value of the lump sum benefits for such a case is ignored here. 
Even if the past service at the NRA is less than 22.5 years (but > 9), it is taken as 22.5 years in the 
calculations to give a variable pension of 50-80% of the CAS as the variable salary pension provision 
started on 1/4/1984. This concept of variable salary does not exist in the case of the self-employed and 
Egyptians working abroad schemes. 
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x-r-1 r_x 
[NR(M, r, t+rx, s, B) + 
= 
sEa 
Act(M, x, t, s) x (ap) xxvx NL (M, r, t+rx, s, B) 
] (3.108) 
NR(M, r, t+r 
-x, s, B) 
= FS(M, r, t+r-x, s, B) x max( PS(M, r, t, s, B), 10) (3.109) 
NL(M, r, t+r 
-x, s, B) 
=FS(M, r, t+r-x, s, B)x1.8xmax(0, PS -36) PS>36 (3.110) 
3.14.2. Early Retirement Benefits 
PVEB(M, t) = PVEP(M, t) +PVEA(M, t) (3.111) 
3.14.2.1. Pensioners 
PVEP(M, t) =E 
x-b+20 20 
TEP(M, x, t, s, (B + 19) x ýrx (3.112) 
s 
3.14.2.2. Active Members 
PVEA(M, t) = PVEAP(M, t) + PVEAL(M, t) (3.113) 
PVEAP(M, t) (3.114) 
I z-I-x EP(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) x Act(M, x, t, s) E 
s x-b+20 z-o xz (ap)x x Vz x Qz+z x Zi +z 
EP(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) 
1x AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) x PS(M, x+z, t+z, B) (3.115) 
45 x(1-RF(x+z, B)) 
where b+ 205x <r& PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B)>20 
EP(M, x+z, t+z, s, 1968 
min(max(PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, V), 22.5), 36) x AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, Iý 
= 
45 (3.116) 
x(1-RF(M, x, i9)x(1+0.02xPS(M, x, t, s, 19) 
for. 50 
_<x 
< r, & PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) 
_> 
20 and M=C&P 
xEZS(y) er(Y-x) 
AS(M, x+z, B/V)=CAS(M, x+z, B/J) = x_ 
x+z-b 
(3.117) 
xZ S(y) 8Y(Y"x) 
AS(M, x+z, B/i9 = FS(M, x+z, B/i9 = F'Z'' 2 (3.118) 
68 The variable pension in the case of early retirement is not eligible if the contributory years is not 
more than 19 years and if it is more than 19 years is not payable until the attainment of age 50. 
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PS (M, x+z, t, B/I9 = PS(M, x, B/19 + db (M, t, B/V) xz (3.119) 
PVEAL(M, t) (3.120) 
= Lump sum end of service remuneration (basic only) 
+ Lump sum compensation for contributory years above 36 (basic only) 
+ Lump sum if the insured person does not qualify for a pension (basic & variable) 
PVEAL(M, t) = (3.121) 
r-1 z-r-1-x ((ER(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) + IEx Act(M, x, t, s) x v2 x= (ap)x x q. +z jr x. b+20 z=o ýýEL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ 
ER(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) 
FS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B)xmax(PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B), 10) (3.122) 
EL(M, x+ z, t+ z, s, B/V) 
FS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B)x 
max((PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) - 36), 0) x 1.8 PS >36 
+ (3.123) 
AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/J9 x 
PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/V)x1.8 PS <20 
b Sx 
_<r-1 
3.14.3. Invalidity Benefits 
PVIB(M, t) = PVIP(M, t) +P VIA (Al, t) (3.124) 
3.14.3.1. Pensioners 
PVIP(M, t) = F, E TIP(M, x, t, s (B + I'7) x u, ', (3.125) 
s x-b 
3.14.3.2. Active Members 
PVIA(M, t) = PVIAP(M, t) + PVWA(M, t)+ PVIAL(M, t) (3.126) 
PVIAP(M, t) 
_ 
(3.127) 
Er E IP(M, x+zt+z, s, B/I'9xAct(M, x, t, s)xvzxr(ap)xx *qx+rx ax+s 
a z=b z=0 
where IP(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) _ (3.128) 
max 
min(PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) + min(3, (r 
-x- z)), 36) 
, 
0.65 
max 
[min{ 
45 
, 
40 
x AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B), 550 
10 
for b<x< r-1 
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IP(M, x+z, t+z, s, V) _ (3.129) 
maxmin(PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, 
V) + min(3, (r 
-x- z)), 36) 
10.65 max min 45 
, 
40 
x AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/V)x(1 +0.02xPS(M, x+z, t+z, s, V)), 550 
xjZ S(y) erry-=1 dY 
where AS(M, x+z, B) = FS(M, x+z, B) - "+z'' 2 (3.130) 
x+z 
1 S(y) er(Y-x)dy 
AS(M, x+z, Pq = CAS(M, x+z, B4'9 =bx+b (3.131) 
z- 
PS (M, x+z, t, B/ig = PS(M, x, B/V) + db(M, t, B/I'9 xz (3.132) 
Invalidity retirement liabilities arising from work injuries or occupational illness have 
been increasing over time as the ESSPS gives generously on such a contingency. 
However, there is no available data to derive these rates. Therefore, it was decided to 
estimate the cost of this contingency as 0.5%69 of the present value of the pensionable 
salaries of the active members which is determined as follow: 
PVWA(M, t, s, B/V) (3.133) 
= 
0.005 x y- Eý rE e-(a-r)Z x SAL(M, x+z, t, B/ V) x Act(M, x, t, s) x= (ap)x 
s :. e z-O 
PVIAL (M, t) 
= 
Lump sum end of service remuneration 
+ Lump sum compensation for the invalidity or work injuries contingencies 
+ Lump sum compensation for contributory years above 36 
PVIAL(M, t) 
_ 
r-iz-. -i-x (IR(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) + F, x Act(M, x, t, s) x vZ xZ (ap)s x 'qx+Z 
x=n : =o 
IL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/V) 
IR(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) 
= 
FS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) x max( PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B), 10) 
IL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) 
'FS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) 
max((PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B)-36), 0)x1.8 
AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, BIV)x Pr(x + z, t+ z) 
PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, BM 
69 This is the contribution rate for the work injury risk. 
PS >36 
(3.134) 
(3.135) 
(3.136) 
(3.137) 
156 
b <x <r-1 
AS(M, x+z, t, B) = FS(M, x+z, t, B) = S(M, x+z, t, B)) (3.138) 
AS(M, x, t, s, Jq is determined as in formula 3.38. 
3.14.4. Death Benefits 
The total present value of death benefits can be determined according to the following 
formula: 
PVDB(M, t) = PVDP(M, t) + PVDS(M, t) + PVDA(M, t) (3.139) 
3.14.4.1. Pensioners' Death Benefits 
PVDP(M, t) 
=P VDPN(M, t) +P VDPE(M, t) + PVDPI(M, t) + PVDPLS(M, t) (3.140) 
PVDP(M, t) 
(TNP(M, x, t, s, (B + I'9) + TEP(M, x, t, s, (B + I'9)) 
yy xqx+j+TIP(M, x, ts, (B+i9)xq+j (3.141) 
s a. bj-0 
xvj x hx+j x SurV(M, x+j, t+ j) 
SurV(M, x, t) is determined according to the formula (11) 
PVDPLS(M, t) =Death Grant + Funeral Grant = (3.142) 
5x (TNP(M, x, t, s, (B + 19) + TEP(M, x, t, s, (B + kg» (j 
12 xqz+f+TIP(M, x, t, s, (B+i9)xq+j xý ap)sx v, 
01 3 (TNP(M, x, t, s, (B + I'9) + TEP(M, x, t, s, (B + I9)) 
max 
- 12 xx qx+f +TIP(M, x, t, s, (B+I, )x qd X+j xi ( N(M, x, t, s, (B+V))+E(M, x, t, s, (B+i9)) ap), ý x vý 
+200 a x +IM, x, t, s, B+ 19) xa qz+ (( qx+; 
3.14.4.2. Survivors' Death Benefits 
PVDS(M, t) = PVDW(M, t) + PVDO(M, t) + PVDLS(M, t) (3.143) 
P VDW(M, t) = 
y=E dý 
TDP(M, y, t, (B + V) x äy 70 (3.144) 
PVDO(M, t) (3.145) 
=ETDP(M, zfx, t, (B+IO)xä° + TDP(M, z,,,,, t, (B+IO)xäy (3.146) 
: =o zm=? 
PVDLS(M, t) = Marriage Grant7' 
70 Although calculations in respect of benefits to widowers of female members involve no new 
principles, they are ignored in our model on the ground of their non-significance. Also the formulae for 
the other non-important parts of death liabilities, such as that in respect of future parents and siblings of 
members are complicated and the small liability involved hardly ever justifies their use. 
71 This assumes that the maximum possible age for daughter's marriage is 49. 
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zf=49 J-49-2f 
_ 
Y- E TDP(M, zA+j, t+j, (B + Iý) x vj xf (ap)z fxqf +j (3.147) zfO j 15 
3.14.4.3. Death Benefits of Active Members 
We now deal with the widows' and children's benefits on death in service or after 
retirement. In valuating the present value of future death benefits, it is assumed that 
100% of the pension will be paid using the same arguments stated for the projections. 
These liabilities can be determined according to the following formula. 
PVDA(M, t, B/I9 = PVDAS(M, t, B/V) + PVDAN(M, t, B/I'9 + PVDAE(M, t, B/V) 
+ PVDAI(M, t, B/I'7 (3.148) 
3.14.4.3.1. Death in Service 
The present value of future death in service benefits is estimated using the following 
formula. 
PVDAS(M, t) = PVDASP(M, t) + PVDASL(M, t) (3.149) 
r-lz.. r-l-x DP(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) x Act(M, x, t, s) x PVDASP(M, t)=E EEz$d (3.150) 
s x-b z-0 vxs (ap)x x qx+z x hx+x x SurV(M, x+z, t+ z)) 
DP(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) and DP(M, x+z, t+z, s, I'9 are determined according to the 
formulae (3.127) to (3.128) 
PVDASL(M, t) (3.151) 
= 
Formula 3.135 + Death and Funeral Grants 
"(DR(M, x+z, t+z, s, B 
r-lsýr-l-x X 
PVDASL(M, t)=E EE DSL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V)(3.152) 
s x. b z-0 Act(M, x, t, s) xZ (ap)x x vz x qz+z 
DR(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) calculated as in the formula (3.135) and 
DSL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) 
FS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B)x 
max((PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) 
- 
36), 0) x 1.8 PS >36 
AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/I'9xPr(x+z, t+z) (3.153) 
PS(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/JO 
max(2 x AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, (B+V)), 200) 
+(3 x AS(M, x+z, t+z, s, (B + 19) 
b Sx Sr-1 
AS(M, x+z, t, B) and AS(M, x, t, s, JO are determined as in the formulae 3.130 and 
3.131 respectively. 
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3.14.4.3.2. Death after Normal Retirement 
The functions for the valuation of a pension payable to dependants on the death of the 
member after retirement at age r, or earlier retirement or on grounds of ill-health, are 
determined as in the following functions being based on the service tables and life 
tables. The liability for benefits on death after retirement has to be allowed for in the 
annuity of the dependants brought into the pension formulae. For the valuation of 
widows' and children' pensions payable on death after normal retirement we follow 
the following formulae. 
PVDAN(M, t) = PVDANP(M, t) + PVDANL(M, t) (3.154) 
PVDANP(M, t) 
_ 
ý, NP(M, r, t+r-x, s, B/P) x Act(M, x, t, s) x r. x+z (aP)x x (3.155) 
- 
ýxz 
0 ýl 
+z 
x h, 
+., 
xVr-x+z xSurV(M, r+z, t+r-x+z) 
PVDANL(M, t) = Death and Funeral Grants 
r-Iz. r-I-x I 
(DNL(M, r, t+r-x, s, B/V))x 
PVDANL(M, t) =EE7 V` d 1(3.156) z x-b z-0 Act(M, x, t, s) xr-x+z (ap)x xxq r+z 
DNL(M, r, t+r-x, s, B/ V) 
max(2 x NP(M, r, t+r-x, s, (B + V)), 200) (3.157) 
+(3x NP(M, r, t+r-x, s, (B + 0) 
NP(M, r, t+r-x, s, B/V) are determined according to the formulae (3.102) and (3.103) 
3.14.4.3.3. Death after Early Retirement 
PVDAE(M, t) = PVDAEP(M, t) + PVDAEL(M, t) (3.158) 
PVDAE(M, t) (3.159) 
r_1' z-r_I_x j, EP(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) x Act(M, x, t, s)x z+j(ap)x x EEE 
x. b+20 ==o o vz+J x 9z+: x 9x+: +j x hx+z+j x SurV(M, x+z+j, t+z+ j) 
EP(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) and EP(M, x+z, t+z, s, JO are determined according to the 
formulae (3.115), (3.116) 
PVDAEL(M, t) = Death and Funeral Grants (3.160) 
, 
_t _i_x ý, (DEL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) x Act(M, x, t, s) 
=EEEJ 
xJb+20 z-0 J-0 x +I 
(ap)x x ýIx+z x qx+z+J x yz+ 
DEL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) 
(max(2 x EP(M, x+z, t+z, s, (B + J'7), 200)' (3.161) 
x EP(M, x+z, t+z, s, (B+I9) 
b 
_<x 
Sr-1 
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3.14.4.3.4. Death after Invalidity Retirement 
PVDAI(M, t) = PVDAIP(M, t) + PVDAIL(M, t) (3.162) 
PVDAI(M, t) 
_ 
(3.163) 
r= 1I_x 
[IP(M1 x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) x Act(M, x, t, s)xr+ J (ap)x x 
x=b+20 z-o J=o Vz+J x Qx+s x qx+r+j x hx+z+J x SurV(M, x+z+j, t+ Z+ J) 
PVDAIL(M, t) 
r-1 z--1-x 0 DIL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) x Act(M, x, t, s) 
r+ 
(3.164) 
x"b+20 z=o j. o x yJxr+J (ap)x x qx+s x qx+s+J 
DIL(M, x+z, t+z, s, B/ V) 
max(2 x IP(M, x+z, t+z, s, (B + i9) 
, 
200) (3.165) 
i+ (3 x IP(M, x+z, t+z, s, (B + I'7) 
IP(M, x+z, t+z, s, B) and IP(M, x+z, t+z, s, I'9 are determined according to the 
formulae (3.128), (3.129) 
3.14.5. Administrative Costs 
The present value of future administrative cost is determined using the following 
function: 
PVAC(M, t)= ACR(M) x 
x' 
Act(x, t)Z öe-(a-1)"S(M, x+z, t, B/ V) 
= 
(ap) 
x <r and x Sz <r, M= GSF & PPSF 
3.15 Conclusion 
(3.166) 
In modelling the projection and valuation of the ESSPS two techniques were 
employed. The projection technique which deals with aggregate cash-flow and the 
present value technique which deals with cohorts of members. Due to the complexity 
of the ESSPS and to be able to study and analyse it, many simplifications in deriving 
the model are required. However, the model contains all the main characteristics of 
the scheme. The ESIPS is a relatively complex system and the models used to prepare 
actuarial projection and valuation estimates are complex as a result of the efforts to 
improve accuracy and utility of the estimates. 
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Chapter 4 
Construction of an Egyptian Life Table Based 
on 1994-96 Population Mortality Experience 
4.1. Introduction 
Mortality, migration and future fertility rates form the required components in 
projecting the future population of any country'. A starting point in the population 
projection using the component method is to have a life table, which reflects the true 
underlying mortality rates of the population in the base year. The concept of life 
tables is well known in many fields of science. They traditionally contain a set of 
mortality rates which progress smoothly with age, calculated as accurately as possible 
from death registration data and population numbers. Demographers and actuaries use 
these tables as a tool reflecting the true underlying mortality rates in population 
projections and other actuarial work. 
There are no existing Egyptian life tables which can be used for the purpose of 
population projections and other actuarial work. The standard mortality rates that have 
been used for the ESSPS valuation were those of the A24/29 Table 2 until 1992 and 
the mortality rates of the A49/52 Table with some modifications thereafter. 
Accordingly, it is considered very important to construct an Egyptian life table which 
is extracted from Egyptian population data. This table is to be used, among other 
purposes, in the projection of the future population within the ESSPS area. The 
projected population is then used to project the system's future income and 
expenditure. This chapter sets out the construction of an Egyptian life table through 
the graduation of crude central mortality rates derived from the Egyptian population 
data over 1994-96. 
4.2. Data Used in the Construction of the Life Table 
The Egyptian mortality experience is investigated over the most recent three-year 
period, 1994-96 for males and females separately, as a three-year period is normally 
'Migration is ignored in projecting the Egyptian population, as it is considered not significant as 
described in Chapter 5. 
2 Produced by the Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau (CMIB) of the Institute of Actuaries in 
the UK, which is different from the English Life Tables produced every 10 years by GAD in the UK. 
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seen of sufficient length to smooth out most of the effect of variable mortality 
experience (Chris Daykin, 1996). 
The data required for constructing life tables are the numbers of deaths and exposed to 
risk. The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) provided 
the required data in the following age-related forma (see Table 3.1 of Appendix 3): 
1. Central exposed to risk, in the form of mid-year population estimates of 1994 and 
1995; and the 1996 census split by sex and age groups; 
2. Numbers of deaths4, split by sex and age groups for each of these calendar years. 
3. Data are provided for the first year of life, the subsequent 4 years of life, and then 
in quinquennial age groups until the last available age group for lives aged 75+. 
4. Both the exposed to risk and deaths are classified according to the age definition 
"age last birthday". 
Therefore, this investigation uses the population data for ages 0-74 only in 
quinquennial age groups as there is no available data for individual ages, and data for 
ages 75+ is ignored because they are contained together in one group5. The non- 
existence of individual age data is largely due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate 
information from ordinary people, and particularly elderly people, as some of them do 
not even have an official date of birth. It is also because of errors present in the data 
as neither the population censuses are perfectly accurate or complete nor are the mid- 
year estimates of the population. Death registrations, however, are believed to be 
relatively more accurate in reporting age at death, although the problem of dealing 
with the elderly still applies. However, although the reliability of the Egyptian data is 
questionable, Egypt is regarded as one of the countries supplying reliable data to the 
UN (BAJ, Volume 4, Part I, 1998). 
4.3. Crude Central Mortality Rates, 1994-96 
The total central exposed to risk at each quinquennial age group were taken as the 
sum of the population numbers over 1994-96 and the same applies to the total 
numbers of death as shown in Appendix 4.1. Let Ak, x represents the number of deaths 
of a particular sex in calendar year 1994+k at attained age x, with k=0,1 and 2. Let 
3 They are the same as those published by the UN and they are grouped according to the classifications 
and definitions used by the UN. 
4 These include all deaths registered in Egypt including deaths abroad of residents of Egypt. 
s Males and females deaths at ages 75+ represent 19.4% and 28.8% of the total number of deaths 
respectively. 
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PAX, represents the mid-year population estimates of a particular sex aged x last 
birthday on 30 June of year 1994 +k-%, for k=0.5,1.5,2.5, and denoted 
by Py, X Py P»' x respectively. 
The central exposed to risk, R,, is defined assuming 
that Pk, varies linearly with k as follows: 
3 
Rx 
=J Pk, xdk = 
(Py, 
x+ 
P y, x+ 
P2 )/2'x) 0 
(4.1) 
As the available data is the central exposed to risk and deaths, we estimate 
, 
u-type (mx) 
G 
mortality rates. The crude central mortality rates, mx, for the age groups 0,1-4, S-9, 
10-14........ 70-74 over 1994-96 were then derived by formula (4.2) below and are 
shown in Table 4.1: 
Ao, 
x + 
A,. 
x + 
A2, 
x 
= 
A0 + A, 
', 
+ A2. 
x (4.2) 
Rz P 
, x+P x+P2 y, x yy 
Given that the number of deaths has a Poisson distribution: 
oA 
Ax 
- 
Poisson (Rx " 1n, ß) and because, mx-j , then 
x 
0 
E(mx)=mx and (4.3) 
0m Var (m 
x 
)= (4.4) R' x 
Table 4.1. Crude Central Mortality Rates of Males and Females ate each age group, 1994-96. 
Age Males Crude Mortality Rates Females Crude Mortality Rates 
0_<1 0.02750 0.02761 
1-4 0.00277 0.00293 
5-9 0.00098 0.00082 
" 
10-14 0.00086 0.00068 
15-19 0.00112 0.00085 
20-24 0.00123 0.00084 
25-29 0.00146 0.00109 
30-34 0.00203 0.00131 
35-39 0.00286 0.00198 
40-44 0.00465 0.00255 
45-49 0.00721 0.00426 
50-54 0.01071 0.00701 
55-59 0.01752 0.01057 
60-64 0.03117 0.02014 
65-69 0.04836 0.03311 
70-74 0.07665 0.05861 
Source: Derived by Author 
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The main features of the mortality trends of the Egyptian population can be extracted 
by visual inspection of the two curves of the crude central mortality rates (1994-96 
experience) for males and females as shown in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1. Crude Central Mortality Rates of Males and Females Experience over 1994-96 
versus age on a log scale. 
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Figure 4.1 shows the following features: 
1. Allowing for errors in the census data, death registration and age classification, 
the observed crude rates of mortality for the quinary age-groups show fairly 
regular progression, even before graduation; 
2. Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 show that the crude central mortality rates for males and 
females exhibit, in general, the same features of most standard normal mortality 
curves; 
3. 
-There is no evidence of an accident hump at ages under 20 although there is a very 
small hump around age 15 for both males and females; 
4. Male mortality is higher than female mortality at most ages and female mortality is 
higher only at the very young age group 0-4. 
It is clear that the crude mortality rates may not represent the true underlying 
mortality rates as these rates are subject to random errors. This is because of the need 
to' extract mortality data over a limited period of time and/or using random samples, 
which cause random fluctuations. Therefore, these rates have to be adjusted or 
smoothed in order to represent the true ones, by removing or reducing random 
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fluctuations through "Graduation". Therefore, the second stage of constructing a life 
table is the graduation of the crude rates, which is explained in the following sections. 
4.4. Graduation 
Benjamin and Pollard (1980) defined the graduation process as follows: "graduation 
is the art of smoothing the separate maximum likelihood values to obtain the best 
possible estimates of the underlying population values". This definition of graduation 
presents two main concepts, "smoothness" and "best estimates (adherence to data)". 
4.4.1. Fidelity (Adherence) to Data 
Adherence to data is achieved if the graduated rates are close enough to the crude 
ones. It should be noted that in most cases the closer the adherence to data, the worse 
the smoothness would be, and vice versa. Hence, it is usually important to find an 
acceptable balance between them. There are many statistical tests for adherence to 
data, which are mentioned later in this chapter and briefly described in Appendix 3. 
4.4.2. Smoothness 
The main assumption the graduation process is based on is that the true underlying 
mortality rates should progress reasonably smoothly, as the age X, increases for 
biological reasons. The criterion of smoothness is equivalent, in the mortality context, 
to the third order differences being small (Bizley, 1958). This criterion is used to test 
the. smoothness of the curve of graduated mortality rates. We can rewrite that 
smoothness criterion in mathematical form as follows: 
x, 
-3 
E 1,63µ, l
--* 
o (4.5) 
x=x1 
where 0'f(x) = 0r-lf(x + 1) - Ar-If(x)" 
Dý f(x) 
- 
f(X) 
4.5. Methods of Graduation 
Graduation methods are mainly classified into two groups, parametric and non- 
parametric. In the following two subsections, these two main groups of graduation 
methods will be briefly explained. 
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4.5.1. Parametric Methods 
A classic solution to the graduation problem is the parametric regression model, 
where a pre-chosen function (usually based on a polynomial) fits the data and whose 
coefficients are estimated by a least squares method or the maximum likelihood 
method. This method is based on fitting a mathematical formula, which represents the 
true underlying mortality rates, to the data over the whole age range. However, in 
many cases it is difficult to find such a formula. Parametric methods include linear 
models, generalised linear and non-linear models and many other methods that have 
been suggested throughout the history of graduation theory. 
The greatest advantage of the graduation by fitting a mathematical formula is that the 
obtained mortality rates are automatically smooth, especially when the used formula 
is a polynomial of low degree, so there is no need to test for smoothness in this case. 
However, the greater the degree of the polynomial the less the smoothness of the 
fitted curve as the number of parameters used governs the trade-off between goodness 
of fit and smoothness. There are also many data sets where it might be inappropriate to 
use a parametric model. The problem is that the data determines only the coefficients of 
the pre-chosen function to be fitted, through the least squares method, while a smoothing 
approach allows the data to determine the whole function, as shown in the following 
sections. 
4.5.2. Non-Parametric Methods 
A central problem of mathematical statistics is to summarise the behaviour of a 
dependent variable Y (e. g. mortality rates), which is a function of a set of independent 
variables X1 (ages, predictors). A tool for summarising the behaviour of a response 
variable Y, as a function of the predictor X;, is called a smoother, which is a function of 
both the response variable and the independent variable and given by the function: 
.f=S 
yjx) (4.6) 
In this case the crude mortality rates (Y, ) are a function of a set of ages (XI), which will 
be subject to random errors. It is assumed that the realised values of the dependent 
variable Y are y= (yl, y2, 
.., 
y, ), and the corresponding realised values of the 
6 Note that f 
(x, ) 
could be a parametric model as well. 
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independent variable X, are x= (x, 
, 
x2,.., x 1). The domain of f consists of the realised 
values of the predictor variable, so if x, is a realised value of the independent variable X, 
then f (xi ) will be the function: S(y/x) evaluated at x, (i. e. the fitted value at x, ). 
The aim is to fit the function f (x, ) to the data in order to obtain a new set of 
mortality rates (graduated) and this function will be an unspecified one in the case of 
non-parametric methods. The unspecified function f (xr) can be estimated using one 
of the common scatterplot smoothers and there is a wide range of methods (smoothers) 
for obtaining f (x3. The important property of scatter-plot smoothers is their non- 
parametric regression nature, which means that when using a smoother we do not 
assume a rigid form of dependence between the response variable and the predictor. So, 
the produced estimate of the mortality rates (that is the smooth curve) is less variable 
than Y itself, a feature which justifies the name "smoother". Because of their flexible 
nature, curve estimates can be produced, which usually meet the criteria of goodness of 
fit and smoothness in a satisfactory way. 
Non-parametric methods include Bin smoothers, moving-weighted averages, Kernel 
graduation, Whittaker graduation, local-polynomial graduation7 and cubic splines. In 
the following sections, two of the non-parametric graduation methods, cubic splines 
smoothing and Whittaker graduation, which are used in the graduation of the Egyptian 
data, are described within the context of the Generalised Additive Models (GAMs). 
4.6. Generalised Additive Models (GAMs) 
Additive regression models are similar to the classical linear models, but used in the 
case . of non-parametric graduation. An additive regression model can provide a 
sensible compromise between the inappropriate assumption of the linear regression 
models and the lack of structure of a general surface smoother, which is non- 
parametric regression tools but only for small dimensions. The additive regression 
model takes the general form: 
Y= a+f, (xr)+e 8 (4.7) 
7It is called Loess in the S-Plus statistical computing language. 
a+f (XI) is called the additive predictor of the model ý=t 
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where Y is the response with mean E(Y) = m; 
X (i = 1,2,..., p), are the predictors (independent) variables; 
a is a constant, e is the error in observing Y. 
It is assumed that the errors are independently normally distributed with: 
mean E(e; ) = 0, and variance Var(e) =d where o is a constant. 
'f(xi) is usually 
-but not necessarily- a univariate unspecified function of the 
covariate x,, with one for each predictor, so they are the analogues of the coefficients 
in the linear regression model. The function f will be individually estimated by using 
the scatterplot smoother corresponding to the X, variable. The main drawback of 
fitting an additive model to a set of data is that it is always an approximation to the 
true regression surface, possibly masking real effects of interaction between 
explanatory variables which, given sufficient data, could be modelled explicitly. 
The additive model, if it finally fits a given set of data, is easy to apply, but in some 
cases it is not appropriate. The reasons for this are: 
a) If Y takes values within a certain limited range, then the model: 
P 
m=E(YIX1, X2,..., Xp)=a+Eý. f; (Xj) (4.8) 
for the mean of Y, that is m, will not inherit this restriction. 
b) For many data sets, it is not always a realistic assumption to assume that the variance 
of Yis a constant independent of the mean. 
GAMs are defined as a generalisation of the additive models, which enable the use of 
the exact distribution of the number of deaths instead of the normal approximation, 
and hence the distribution of the error does not need to be normal. GAMs have a clear 
non-parametric nature, which allows the data to determine the function itself, rather 
than its parameters. Also the predictor might be a function of the response's mean 
rather than the mean itself (Mohamed W., 1997). GAMs provide solutions to the 
previously stated problems of the additive models by using the following two functions: 
a) The link function, g(- ), which describes the dependence of the mean of Y itself on 
the predictors, so that: 
Simi = BiEý) =a+i. iX r) (4.9) 
9 Some link functions (canonical link functions), used in the context of different GAMs, together with the 
corresponding variance function, are summarised in Appendix 3. 
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b) The variance function, V(" ), which describes the dependence of the variance of Y, 
upon the mean of Y, so that: 
Var(19 =0" V(m) where 0 is a constant (4.10) 
Link functions are monotone increasing and hence, by definition, invertible and 
represent link between the response and the predictor (also called systematic 
component) expressed as a function of the response's mean. If the inverse link function 
g7' is denoted by h, and function f is an equivalent and usually a more convenient 
function for relating m to the predictors then: 
m=h (a + 1(X, )) p g(m) =a+j, (X, ) (4.11) 
, =t r=t 
It is customary to denote the additive predictor by 77, that is: 
fl 
=g(m) =a+ ii f (Xi) then (4.12) 
O 
log(Mx) = log(E(mx)) = r% x= a+ f(x) (4.13) 
The link function g is the main characteristic of the GAMs as seen in 4.12. The 
additive predictor produces an estimated value for g(m). Like the additive models, 
both the coefficient a, and the functionsfb i=1,2,..., p, (of the generalised additive 
predictor), are calculated using scatterplot smoothers iteratively, using appropriate 
algorithms. The estimated functions will result and each of the calculated functions 
will be a smooth one. This means that the smoothness of the fitted (graduated) values 
is guaranteed when the GAMs are used. The appropriate algorithm is a Newton- 
Raphson iteration and is a form of an IRLS method (Iteratively Reweighted Least 
Square Method, also known as Fisher scoring). 
4.7. Cubic Splines Smoother 
Splines are used to form a continuous curve that fits the data exactly, rather than 
modelling a trend from data subject to random variation. The smoothed curve consists 
of a series of cubic curves, selected so that one cubic curve runs smoothly into the 
next with knots taken for each year of age. The method explicitly considers the two 
conflicting goals of graduation: (a) obtaining a good fit to the observed data and (b) 
obtaining a curve that is smooth. This smoother is not constructed explicitly but it can 
be shown to be the unique solution of the following optimisation problem. 
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Given a set of n values of the independent variable X, (xi, x2,..., xd and the 
corresponding set of values of the dependent variable Y, (y,, y2,..., yj, we are looking 
for a unique function f (xi) with two continuous derivatives, to fit the given data and 
to minimise the quantity: fE 
{y1 
-f 
(xl)}2 + 
'I "J{f "(t)}2dt (4.14) 
A is a fixed constant and it is called the smoothing parameter 
The quantity (4.14) is called: the penalised residual sum of squares and it is a natural 
cubic spline with knots at the unique values of x;, where 
a 
_< 
xl S x2 
_< ... 
<_ x <_ b 
The first term in (4.14) is a decreasing measure of the goodness of fit, while the second 
term is a decreasing measure of the smoothness. The two terms in (4.14) correspond to 
the conflicting criteria of goodness of fit and smoothness and these have been combined 
together as a weighted average. The aim is to fit a function to the given data by 
minimising the formula (4.14) and to emphasis the trade-off between goodness of fit and 
smoothness through the coefficient parameter, which governs this trade-off. 
Large values of A produce smoother curves while small values of it produce more 
jagged curves but closer to the data. At the extremest case where '% -+ oo then 
f"(x) 
-* 
0, `dx, and as a result the solution tends to the least squares line. On the 
other hand when A -- 0, then the second term of (4.14) tends to zero and the 
solution tends to an interpolation of the data and ceases to provide a smooth trend. In 
practice, a compromise curve can be selected by choosing an intermediate value of 
ii 
. 
The degrees of freedom of the smoothed splines play the role of the smoothness 
parameter. 
This method of graduation is flexible and easy to apply and it was applied in the 
construction of the English Life Tables No. 15 and used for the construction of interim 
or abridged life tables and for graduating fertility data (Haberman S., 1996). However, 
the cubic splines smoother may produce unreliable estimates, since data below the 
first knot and above the last knot, become, by construction, a straight line10. Cubic 
splines are not therefore well suited for producing estimates rates outside the range of 
the data. 
1° This feature was proved when the model applied to the Egyptian data. 
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4.8., Whittaker Graduation 
Although it is argued that Whittaker graduation has a very close connection with 
parametric curve fitting techniques, it is usually viewed as non-parametric method 
(Verrall R., 1995). In this method, the estimate of the function A xi) is obtained by 
minimising the quantity: 
Z (Nx- f(x))2 + lJ (V2f(t))2dt (4.15) 
where, a5x, S x2 S""""""5 x S 
V2 f(x) indicates the second difference in the estimates. The value given by the 
formula (4.15) is called the penalised residual sum of squares. It is clear from formula 
(4.15) that the first term is a measure of goodness of fit and the second is a measure of 
smoothness. It can be shown that the value (4.15) has a unique minimiser, which is a 
natural cubic spline with knots at each value of X (Verrall R. J., 1996). 
The parameter 
.% controls the trade-off between goodness of fit and smoothness and it 
can be chosen subjectively or by a mathematical method such as the cross validation 
method. The greater the value of A the smoother the fitted curve and vice versa. So, if 
A=oo, we get a very smooth curve and the solution will be the least squares solution, 
but if A=0, a very wiggly curve is produced and the solution will tend to an 
interpolating twice differentiable function. It is observed that increasing the model 
degrees of freedom produces a graduation, which is less smooth". 
4.9. Tests of graduation 
The hypothesis to be tested in this mortality investigation is that the true mortality 
rates of the population are those graduated rates. A wide selection of graduation tests 
for goodness of fit and smoothness are available which include the X2 test, individual 
standardised deviations test, the signs test, cumulative deviations test, grouping test, 
serial correlation test and smoothness. These tests are briefly mentioned in Appendix 
3. Smoothness is not tested since GAMs ensure a smooth progression of the fitted 
(graduated) rates. 
" Full details about GAMs and smoothers can be found in: Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990, Chambers and 
Hastie, 1993,1994, W. N. Venables and B. D. Ripley, 1998, and Verrall R. J., 1993,1995 & 1996. 
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4.10. Estimating Individual age Data 
As mentioned earlier, data are available only in 5-year age groups (except for age 
groups 0,1-4) and the data for ages 75+ is in one group, which is not usable or 
reliable, so that mortality rates for these ages need to be extrapolated. These features 
have to be addressed in the process of graduation as they affect the selection of the 
appropriate model to graduate the crude mortality rates. The first problem is dealt with 
in the following section. The second problem, about estimating mortality rates at high 
ages through extrapolation, is dealt with at the end of this chapter. 
4.10.1. Grouped Data 
Carrying out mortality or actuarial investigations based on data grouped into age 
ranges rather than individual years of age is not a new phenomenon, and was often 
encountered during the early years of actuarial practice. Data from some early 
censuses and from many countries, including Egypt, are available for age groups 
(usually quinary ones) both for exposed to risk and deaths. Even when data become 
available for individual ages, maintaining data in age groups is seen useful. This is 
because subdividing data into quinary groups was thought to be necessary in order to 
offset the systematic errors in the statement of age (Benjamin and Haycocks, 1972). 
The systematic errors occur because of many people's preference for certain terminal 
digits of their age, particularly those who are actually unsure of their exact ages 
amongst old people, and also in the case of countries where there is high level of 
illiteracy. Under such conditions, quinary age groups were considered to minimise the 
distortion caused by such errors, since it might be preferable to deal with the 
imprecision of a set of grouped data rather than a corresponding set of individual 
ages' data which might be doubtful. However, having to graduate a set of grouped data, 
there are some disadvantages such as: 
1. There is a relatively small number of data points in the graduation process; 
2. The average crude rate of each group together with the equivalent average age of 
each group is used to represent the whole group of ages, which may be a 
misrepresentative of the actual mortality rates of the individual ages of this group; 
3. Some important but relatively small-scale features of the true rates might not be 
detected as the representative data points may not give a clear view regarding the 
e progression of the true rates; 
4. Grouping higher ages in one-group results in losing all the details about these ages. 
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Improving the reliability and accuracy of the results of a graduation process of a set of 
grouped data might be achieved if the number of data points is increased. This can 
happen by either estimating exposures and death counts or mortality rates for each year 
of age from group totals. Theses data points (estimates of the individual age) can then be 
graduated and in this case the graduation process will have been based on a wider range 
of data points and not only on the representative ones of each group. Therefore, it is 
considered necessary to estimate the individual ages' data from the grouped ones, in 
the process of the construction of the Egyptian Life Table. 
4.10.2. Methods of Estimating Individual age Data Points 
There are many demographic and actuarial methods for estimating individual age data 
points given a set of grouped data points 12. In this section, two of the actuarial 
techniques are mentioned and the second one is applied to the numbers of both 
exposed to risk and deaths of the Egyptian data. The first is the King's/Osculatory 
method and the second is an alternative (iterative) method. Tzeis (1996) applied these 
two methods on the exposed to risk of the Greek pension scheme and also on the data 
of the ELT No 13 in order to validate the alternative method against 
King's/Osculatory method. In the next sections, the King's/Osculatory method is 
mentioned and the alternative method is described in more details as it is applied to 
the quinary Egyptian data. 
4.10.2.1. King's/Osculatory Method 
A traditional way for improving the graduation process of grouped data, as described 
by George King, estimates the intermediate data points of each group, the "pivotal 
values", us+r. The grouped totals may be denoted in the following way: 
W1 
r= 
-1 
Ux+r 
2n 
W0 ux+r 
r=O 
4n+1 (4.16) 
W- Eu 1 
r=2n+1 
x+r 
1Z For details about the demographic methods readers can be referred to the Manual X of the Indirect 
Techniques for Demographic Estimation of the United Nations, 1983. 
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where ux+r represents the data at each individual age, x+r, and is a third-degree 
function of r which could represent any chosen variable derived from the data, such as 
exposures (Rx+r ), deaths (Ax+, ) or crude rates (mx+, ). It is desired to obtain the 
numeric value of ux+, (the pivotal value), from the grouped totals of Wx+, 
, 
where 
every group extends over 2n+1 values of r. King's pivotal value formula for quinary 
groupings is: 
ux+2-02 x W-0008x dW, +""" (4.17) 
And the formula can be extended for the pivotal value of every group as follows: 
ux+2 'e 0.2 x W. - 0.008 x A2 W, 
ux+, ý0.2xW, 
-0.008xA2Wo 
ux+, 2 0.2 x W2- 0.008 x A2 W, 
(4.18) 
The method then applies osculatory interpolation in order to obtain data estimates at 
each individual age for the entire age range. Assume that we want to interpolate the 
values of u, between ux and ul, given a set of 4 pivotal values: u. J 
, 
uo 
, 
u, and 
u2. The symmetrical third degree osculatory interpolation formula, correct to the second 
differences and appropriate for the age interval [0,1] is called Lidstone's formula: 
ux=uo+ xx Du_1+ 
x(x2 1) 
xL2 U_1+ x2( 2- x A3u_1 (4.19) 
Lidstone's interpolation formula ensures the continuity of the first derivative of the 
overlapping interpolation curves at the relevant pivotal ages so that these curves join 
smoothly. 
This method was applied to national census data and used in the construction of the 
English Life Tables numbers 7-10 as data were available in quinary age groups. 
However, given a set of n pivotal values: u l, u2, 
..., 
u_ j, u,,, the only estimates that can 
be generated by King's/Osculatory method lie within the interval [u2, u_ j]. This means 
that the individual ages' estimates extend only between the second and the n-1 pivotal 
values and this weakness makes the method inappropriate for the Egyptian data, which 
13 is already insufficient. 
13 More details about the King/Osculatory method can be found in (Benjamin and Haycocks, 1972). 
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4.10.2.2. The Alternative (Iterative) Method 
Tzeis (1996) demonstrates that the alternative (iterative) method produces almost 
identical results to those of the King/Osculatory method, given a good amount of data. 
He proved that the alternative method approximates the King/Osculatory method to a 
very satisfactory degree. But it has an advantage over the King/Osculatory method of 
producing individual data estimates covering the whole age range of the initial grouped 
values, which is a critical point for the limited age range of the Egyptian data. 
This method assumes that there are n quinary age groups of data, which means that there 
is 5xn individual age data points to be estimated. These (5 x n) individual age data 
points form a vector of length of 5xn, whose ?h element equals the average of the data 
of the age group to which the individual age x; belongs. The newly formed vector is 
called "level vector", and has a piecewise constant form. This vector is to be smoothed 
subject to the constraint that the total of the new smoothed estimates of each group 
equals the initial quinary age group. 
Then, if the absolute value of the difference between the original i`" element and the 
predicted value of the i`" element is less than a certain numerical limit14 for every one 
of the n groups, then these predicted values represent the required estimated 
individual ages' data. However, if this objective was not met, another step called 
correction is carried out. In the correction step, a vector of length Sxn whose ith 
element equals: 
i`" element of the initial exposures - i`" element of the predicted exposures/S (4.20) 
is created. This correction vector is then added to the predicted vector. Then the 
smoothing and correction steps are to be repeated until the above mentioned criterion 
is satisfied, which is examined after each smoothing. 
The smoothing process is carried out by fitting cubic spline with knots at each age 
from 1 to 74. Cubic spline fitting acts as an alternative to Lidstone's osculatory 
method as it is the smoother that approximates the features of osculatory 
interpolation. Cubic spline fitting ensures the continuity of the first derivatives on the 
pivotal values, which is a property of the Lidstone's formula, because, by definition, 
14 The numerical limits for the method to converge were set as a proportion equal to the 0.000001 of the 
aggregate actual central exposures and 0.00001 of the aggregate actual deaths for each group, which were 
used in order to terminate the iterations. 
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their first and second derivatives are continuous over their whole domain. The above 
described method was applied using modules written using the statistical package S- 
Plus developed for this purpose. 
4.10.2.3. Applying the Alternative Method 
It was observed that the inclusion of age 0-1 into the iterative method distorts the 
progression of the predicted values and therefore that age group was not included. The 
grouped data, x=2,7,....., 72 are taken as applying to the mid-points of the age 
groups (BAJ, Volume 4, Part I, 1998). The iterative method produced satisfactory 
estimates of individual age exposures and deaths for both males and females over the 
age range 1-74 (see Table 3.2 of Appendix 3). Figures 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate the 
graphical results of the alternative method as a comparison between the estimated 
exposures and deaths against the average exposure and deaths of each group 
respectively. 
Figure 4.2. Individual's ages Exposure by the iterative method and the Initial Grouped Ones 
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Figure 4.3. Individual age deaths by the iterative method and the Initial grouped ones 
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The two figures show that both curves behave in a proper manner and that the fitted 
curves lie within the means of the actual grouped data, which implies a satisfactory 
fitting. There were no significant fluctuations in the overall progression of the 
exposures, although there were little humps at age group 10-15. However, the 
females' death curve shows fluctuations at most of the ages, and particularly at ages 
15+, as a result of inconsistent increases in the total number of deaths with the 
increase in age. The crude central mortality rates for males and females were then 
calculated for individual ages using central exposures and deaths estimated by the 
iterative method, and are compared with the grouped ones on the log scale as shown 
in Figure 4.4 and Table 3.2 of Appendix 3. 
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Figure 4.4. Individual's ages Central Crude Mortality Rates and the Initial Grouped 
Figure 4.4 shows that individual age crude mortality rates fluctuate more than the 
grouped ones, particularly within the females' rates. This was expected because the 
grouped ones were just representatives of their groups, as explained before. It is also 
because the accuracy of the female data is relatively less than male data, particularly 
for females who live in the rural areas of Egypt. 
These crude rates have to be graduated to reduce the random fluctuations and progress 
smoothly over the whole age range, while still preserving the general shape of the true 
mortality experience of the 1994-96 investigation as far as possible. In the following 
sections, the results of the graduation of the individual crude mortality rates are 
presented. 
4.11. Graduating Individual Ages' Mortality Rates 
The model used is a GAM based on a Poisson family using a natural (default) link 
function for this distribution, that is a log-link, and Rx as prior weights assigned to 
0 
each observation mx 
. 
Therefore, with mx as the response variable and the age as the 
predictor, a GAM is fitted using the function 4.12. 
Some of the earlier mentioned non-parametric models" were applied within the 
context of the GAMs, to the individual age crude central mortality rates for ages 1-74 
of males and females. It was decided to utilise the crude value at age 0 without 
modification and not to include it in the fitting procedure as it places a heavy 
constraint on the fitting procedure as a result of the severe curvature of mortality. 
Graduation tests were applied to the fitted models to select the one which best fits the 
data. It was found that the Whittaker and Cubic Splines give a satisfactory fit as both 
models pass most of the statistical tests. However, a problem was encountered with 
estimating mortality rates at high ages. Cubic Spline produces biased estimates at the 
end of the available age and unreliable estimates are observed, since above the last knot 
the fitted curve becomes a straight line. Therefore, it was decided not to use such model. 
Whittaker graduation produced a good fit for the available age range 1-74 as well as 
satisfactory estimates at high ages. Accordingly, it was decided to employ a variant of 
's It was very hard and beyond the scope of this thesis to find a parametric model to fit the whole 
mortality curve. 
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the Whittaker fitting method to smooth the curve for ages 1-74 for both males and 
females. Whittaker models with parameter d1l 6= 12 for males and df = 13 for females 
provided the best fit according to the graduation tests carried out. 
Plots of the fitted (graduated) and crude central mortality rates are displayed on a log- 
scale against age for males and females shown in Figure 4.5. A visual inspection of 
Figure 4.5 (as well as the statistical tests) shows that the graduation seems to provide 
satisfactory fit to the data, though not perfect. The results of fitting the model and the 
results of the statistical tests applied to the graduated rates are in Tables 3.2 
Appendix 3. 
Figure 4.5. Individual Age's Crude and Graduated Mortality Rates of the Egyptian Male and 
Female Population, 1994-96 
-0.5 .... 
Males' Graduated Rates 
+ Males' Crude Rates 
-0.8 + Females' Crude Rates Females' Graduated Rates 
-1.0 
-1.3 
J 
-2.0 
-2.3 
-2.5 
-2.8 
-3.0 
-3.3 44 CD V) 0M fD Of rr CO NNNMMM".. OV 10 1A 14) 40 (O tp (0 ti 
Age 
It was also important to make a visual inspection of the graduated individual age 
mortality rates against the grouped ones on the log scale for both males and females 
as shown in Figure 4.6. It is clear from figure 4.6 that the grouped crude mortality 
rates lay within the fitted curve, which implies a satisfactory fitting. The graduation is 
satisfactory and hence the model is considered to be adequate as the results prove to 
be quite supportive of the fitted model. The overall conclusion is that the Whittaker 
model provides a satisfactory graduation. 
16 The number of degrees of freedom is a measurement of the smoothness demanded and it is inversely 
proportional to the smoothing parameter, and the number lost in the fit is decided by the parameter df. 
179 
Figure 4.6. Individual Age's Graduated and Grouped Crude of Loglo (ms) of Males and 
Females, 1994-96 experience. 
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4.12. Extrapolating Mortality Rates at ages 75+ 
The available data for exposed to risk and deaths enable the fitting of curves for 
individual ages up to age 74 only, for both sexes. However, it is necessary to complete 
the graduation by obtaining mortality rates at all ages until cä17. In Egypt, there is no 
recorded experience for mortality rates for ages 75+ other than the grouped data for 
ages 75+. Therefore, mortality rates for these ages must be estimated by extrapolating 
the fitted curve beyond the age range. 
However, it was necessary to ensure that for the ages included there is a monotonic 
(upward) progression in the crude rates otherwise the graduated rates of mortality may 
turn downwards. Mohamed (1997) used a method taken from Renshaw and Haberman 
(1997) to test the goodness of the estimated rates of the Whittaker model and he 
concluded that the Whittaker model provides satisfactory estimates of mortality rates at 
high ages18 beyond the age range. Therefore, the Whittaker model was used to 
estimate mortality rates for ages 75+ for both males and females and the model gives 
reasonable estimates beyond the age range. The model extrapolates the values of mx19 
obtained for ages 75 to 103 for males and to 105 for females as shown in Figure 4.720. 
"Meaning last available age in the life table. 
'$ He used data of lives assured of the largest three insurance companies in Egypt over 1986-1991 and 
the A49/52 Table as a standard table. 
"The values estimated are the ms (by default). 
20 The prediction procedure is carried out using the S-Plus. 
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Figure 4.7 shows the whole curves of graduated and predicted central mortality rates 
alongside the grouped crude central mortality rates for both males and females at all 
ages including high ages on the log scale. A visual inspection of this figure shows that 
the Whittaker model provides satisfactory estimates of mortality throughout the 
available age range and provides good estimates for mortality rates at high ages (see 
Table 3.2 of Appendix 3). 
4.13. Construction of the Full Life Table 
4.13.1. Estimating Initial Mortality Rates (qx) 
In order to produce life tables for both males and females, it was necessary to calculate 
the other parameters of the table from the graduated central mortality rates, mx such as 
the values of qx (initial mortality rates). Graduated central mortality rates were 
converted into initial mortality rates, q,, which give the probability of a person aged 
exactly x dying before reaching age (x + 1). The available information is 
(i) Value of qo derived directly from the data at age 0 over 1994-96 
(ii) Graduated central mortality rates mx for x=1,...., 74 
(iii) Projected central mortality rates mr for x= 75,......, CO 21 (for males and females). 
(iv) spo the average age at death for those dying in the first year of life, assumed to be 
0.10 for males and 0.08 for females (CAPMAS, 1995). 
?' qx approaches, but never quite reaches, the value of 1 as age increases. 
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Figure 4.7. Graduated, predicted and grouped crude of Loglo (mx) of males and females, 1994- 
96 experience 
Xj 
The mathematical procedure for determining the initial mortality rates is then: 
mo = 
qo (4.21) 
1-(1-ýpo)90 
1+ t 
-m q° m, Z2 1+2 (7m1 + 5m2) +3 m1m2 
(4.22) 
qx 
- 
mý 
1-2 mx_, (4.23) 
1+ 
12 
(mx 
- 
mx-t) 
-6 mxmx-t 
for x=2,3 
, ....., 
co 
-1 (for both males and females) 
Having made these assumptions, the arrays (mx) and (q,, ) are completely determined 
for x=0,1........... co 
-1 in Table 3.2 of Appendix 3 and Figure 4.8 shows the (qx) of 
males and females on the log scale. 
4.13.2. Life Expectancy 
This national life table has been constructed assuming that 100,000 persons born are 
divided in the ratio22 106: 100 between females and males and that the resulting male 
and female populations develop in line with the respective single sex life tables. The 
ratio has been selected as being the average sex ratio of births over 1980s and 1990s. 
The values of 1,, were found successively from the radix lo and the following 
ZZ This ratio was estimated as the geometric mean over the period 1967-96. This ratio increased from 
1.01 in 1948 to 1.29 in 1966 and since then has been decreasing to 1.05 in 1996. 
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J. Figure 4.8. The qx of males and females Egyptian population on log scale, 1994-96 experience 
relationship: 
Ix+I = lX (1- q, ) (4.24) 
The values for the complete expectation of life at each age, es were calculated as 
follows: 
e w-x-l lx+t ýý ý/ (4.25) 
eX = +12 -l2ýx 
t1 1 x 
The value of T, the number of years that survivors to age x will collectively survive 
thereafter is calculated as 1, ex 
.A comparison between the life expectancy of males and 
females of 1994-96 experience with the UN 1996-97 estimates shows that the later are 
slightly higher (except for age 0) as shown in Figure 4.9 and Table 3.2 of Appendix 3. 
These differences can be attributed to one or all of the following factors: 
1. The difference in the investigation periods, which is roughly 2 years earlier in our 
investigation; 
2. The use of different models in the estimation of future mortality rates; 
3. The accuracy of the data used in both of the investigation. 
Figure 4.9. Life Expectancy for males and females, 1994-96 experience compared with that 
estimated by the UN 1996-97 
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However, this comparison shows that the model produces very reasonable results, 
which indicate that the Whittaker model produced satisfactory results. An important 
183 
indicator in this case is the expectation of life of a man and a woman at the current 1ý J' state pension age of 60 which are14.13 and 16.43 years respectively in our model and 
14.85 and 15.47 in the UN estimates. 
4.13.3. The Force of Mortality 
The value of u., 
, 
the force of mortality at age x, is calculated as 
(l llx 
- 
181., 
+, 
+ 91x+2 
- 
21x+2) / 61x for x =1 or 2, and (4.26) 
(-lx-2 + 81, 
x_1 - 
81x+l + 1z+2) / 121x otherwise (4.27) 
The full results of the construction of the Egyptian life table are in Table 3.2 of 
Appendix 3. 
4.14. Comparison with the ELT No. 11 
A comparison between the Egyptian mortality rates and the English Life Table No. 11 
is carried out in order to indicate the level of the Egyptian mortality compared with a 
standard table such as ELT. Figure 4.10 shows the Egyptian rates of males and 
females versus the ELT No. 11 (1950-52 experience) of males and females on log 
scale (see Table 3.2 of Appendix 4). 
Figure 4.10. The qx of the Egyptian 1994-96 Experience compared with the ELT No. 11 
(1950-52 Exnerience) of Males and Females on Loa scale. 
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This graph shows that male mortality in Egypt is higher than that of ELT No. 11, 
except for ages 0-1,19-26 and 53-58. Egyptian female mortality is lower than that of 
the ELT No. 11 at ages 21-33 and 41-45 only. The largest differences between male 
mortality in Egypt and ELT No. 11 are at ages 1-17 and 60+, and for females at ages 
1-20 and 60+. Therefore, the conclusion from this comparison is that the Egyptian 
mortality experience of 1994-96 is heavier that those of the ELT No. 11 at most of 
ages other than birth (age 0). 
4.15. Mortality Experience of the Members of the ESSPS 
Improving the quality of the valuation and projection of pension schemes requires the 
use of mortality rates that based on the most recent experience of the scheme's 
members to reflect the actual situation and give accurate information about the 
financial position of the scheme. This also requires the adoption of different mortality 
rates for death in service, death after old age retirement, death after invalidity 
retirement and death of survivors. This also requires using different mortality rates for 
different categories of members (or different schemes) of the system. It is clear that 
the homogeneity of members within each scheme will have specific effects on the 
mortality rates of these schemes and we should allow for this mortality differences 
between different schemes with the heaviest is supposed to be the casual workers. 
However, there is no available data to investigate such mortality experiences of the 
members of the ESSPS as a whole or of different schemes. Therefore, prudent 
mortality rates are necessary required in such a case. Although national population 
mortality rates are supposed to be heavier than the mortality of the members of 
pension schemes, they represent the prudent assumption in such a case. Therefor, a 
comparison between the Egyptian Life Table 1994-96 experience, constructed in this 
Chapter, and the mortality tables adopted by the actuaries in the valuation of the 
ESSPS and occupational pension schemes in Egypt is carried out. And the effects of 
different members' schemes on mortality rates will be ignored and the same mortality 
rates are used for the different schemes unless stated otherwise. 
4.15.1. Death in Service 
The mortality tables for the active members that have been used in most of the 
actuarial valuations of the ESSPS over 1963-9223 are the A24-29 and A1949/52 
(Ultimate) Tables with some different modifications. In the 1992 actuarial valuation, 
the actuary of the GSF employed the A1949/52 (Ultimate) Table with an up rating of 
23 These are the only available reports. 
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5 and 1 years for males and females respectively. In the PPSF the actuary continued to 
employee the A24-29 Table rated down 1 years for both males and females. The 
actuaries of the occupational pension schemes are required by law to adopt the 
A1949/52 (Ultimate) Table in dealing with death in service of active members. 
However, there are some evidences from the national population mortality experience 
of lighter mortality at the young ages and heavier at middle and old ages than those 
adopted of A24-29 and A1949-52 (Ultimate) Tables for males and females. 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 compare these English Life Tables with the Egyptian 
population mortality experience24 of 1994-96 to judge the appropriateness of using 
any of them in the valuation of pension in Egypt. The two English Tables imply 
heavier mortality than the actual general population experience of Egypt at the young 
ages (particularly the A24/29) and lighter mortality than the actual experience of the 
middle and old ages for males (18 and over) and females (40 and over). 
Figure 4.11. Male mortality experience of the Egyptian population over 1994-96 in 
comparison with the A1924-29 and A1949-52 (Ultimate) Tables 
-1 
--"+-"" A49-52 
-2 "- -o- "" 1994-96 Egyptian 
Experience 
""-x-"" A24-29 
. 
5-5 
«6 
++ 
-7 
-8 
4 co V- I" NNMMM 
st 'd' W) 
0 f) (N0 co ti 
P. co 
ONO GGo O0f 00) N 
24 It is supposed that lives-based pensioners' tables have a slightly higher life expectancy than of the 
corresponding general population. However, as the ESSPS covers nearly 40% of the Egyptian 
population it should be a good indicator for the most recent mortality trends. 
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Figure 4.12. Female mortality experience of the Egyptian population over 1994-96 in 
comparison with the A1924-29 and A1949-52 Ultimate Tables 
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It was found that the English Life Table A1949/52 (Ultimate) with an up rating of 4 
years for males and non-for females can approximately match the actual experience of 
the Egyptian general population mortality of 1994-96 for death in service25. 
4.15.2. Death after Retirement 
4.15.2.1. Old Age Pensioners 
For mortality experience of old age pensioners over 1963-92, the actuaries of both 
Funds employed the English Life Table A24-29 with some different age ratings. In 
the 1992 actuarial valuation, the English Life Table a55 was employed for males 
(rated up 2 years) and for females (rated up 3 years), with the assumption that the 
probability of surviving after age 100 is zero. However, it was found that the a55 with 
an up rating of 5 years for males and 6 years for females can approximately match the 
actual experience of the general Egyptian population mortality of 1994-96 for ages 
40+ as shown in Figure 4.13 for males with is exactly similar trend for females. 
25 This means that lives are assumed to experience the mortality of a life at a fixed number of years 
older. To estimate the age rating, different attempts were tested using the least squares estimator 
criterion which is min E 
[q, 
- 
qx ]2 where qx and qx are the population and A49-52 mortality 
experiences respectively at age x. It was found that the best age rating is up rating of 4 years for males 
and nothing for females and this was adopted in the valuation of the liabilities of the ESSPS. 
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Figure 4.13. Male mortality experience of the general population of Egypt over 1994-96 in 
comparison with the a55+5 English Table 
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4.15.2.2. Invalidity Pensioners 
The same problem of unavailability of data for estimating the mortality rates of 
invalidity and work injuries' pensioners is exist here as well. However, the actuaries of 
both Funds acknowledged that their experiences show that the mortality of invalidity 
pensioners could be approximated by using mortality rates higher than those of the old 
age retirement pensioners by nearly 2-3% at all ages (AbdElhamid, 1997). Therefore 
proportion increases of 2% and 3% were applied to the a55 with an up rating of 5 years 
for males and 6 years for females at all ages for the GSF and PPSF respectively as an 
estimation for the mortality of invalidity pensioners. 
4.15.2.3. Mortality of Survivors 
For the mortality of survivors and because the system covers nearly 40% of the 
Egyptian population it is a reasonable assumption to use the Egyptian Life Table 
1994-96 to represent the mortality of the survivors; widows and orphans. 
4.15.3. Mortality Improvements of the Members of the ESSPS 
The improvement of death in service mortality rates will result in an increase in the 
cost of retirement benefits. However, although any increase in mortality rates of 
active members will lead to reducing the cost of the retirement benefits, it will lead to 
increase in the cost of survivors' benefits for deceased members. This means that 
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improvement of mortality of the members will have double effects on the system's 
liabilities, and may cancel out the mortality differentials effect. 
Thus it is clear that the differences between the actual and expected mortality rates 
may not have any significant financial effects on the overall cost of the system, unless 
there are other factors which have some effects (e. g. when there is a minimum death 
benefit such as 65% in the ESSPS). As a result of the unavailability of data to 
investigate such improvements, the assumptions adopted in determining the cost of 
survivors' benefits, and the significant number of members of the system (can 
minimise the mortality risks as a result of limiting statistical fluctuations), allowance 
for any future mortality improvement is not adopted in any of the projection or 
valuations of the ESSPS system in this thesis. 
In order to complete the required components for the projection of future population, 
future fertility rates and mortality trends over the projection period need to be estimated. 
In Chapter 5, both fertility and mortality trends are projected and used alongside the 
mortality rates of the life table within the component method to project the future 
population of Egypt over 1997-2025. 
4.16. Conclusion 
The projection of future population, using the age-cohorts of the population, requires a 
life table which reflects the true underlying mortality rates in the base year of projection. 
Egypt has no life table and therefore it was essential to investigate and graduate the 
mortality experience of the Egyptian population of males and females over 1994-96. The 
non-parametric Whittaker model produced satisfactory results, not only for the 
graduation of the individual age crude mortality rates estimated by the alternative 
method over the available age range but also for the estimation of mortality rates at ages 
above the age range. These rates were used to construct a full Egyptian Life Table based 
on 1994-96 experience. A comparison with the ELT No. 11 (1950-52 experience) 
showed that Egyptian population mortality is behind English population mortality by an 
average of half a century for most ages. 
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Chapter 5 
Projections of the Egyptian National Population, 
1997-2025 
5.1. Introduction 
The national population projection is a critical matter when making long-term 
projections for national insurance funds. Future population structure and numbers will 
determine amounts of potential members, and estimates of income and expenditure, 
long-term financial status and the cost of state pensions. Population projections can be 
obtained from national statistics offices', however it is preferable for national 
insurance schemes to produce their own population projections allowing for 
alternative scenarios and to vary factors2 such as fertility, mortality and migration. 
The projection presents a picture of what would happen if these factors were borne 
out in practice. In this chapter, population, mortality and fertility projection 
methodologies are discussed briefly and the methods applied in projecting the 
population of Egypt are considered in detail. 
5.2. Methodologies of Population Projections 
Throughout the history of population projections many methodologies have been 
suggested for projecting the future population of a given country, Pt, at time t years 
from the present. These methodologies can be classified into two approaches: the 
mathematical models and the component method. In the following sections, the first 
methodology is briefly mentioned and the second methodology is explained in detail 
as it is the one employed in projecting the population of Egypt. 
5.2.1. Mathematical Models3 
These models represent a demographic process in the form of a mathematical function 
or set of functions, by relating two or more measurable demographic variables. They 
represent the population at time t+1 as simply a function of the population at time t 
' In Egypt, estimates of the national population are undertaken by several institutions, such as 
CAPMAS, the Cairo Demographic Centre, as well as the United Nations and the World Bank. 
2 This is the case in the US, Finland and the UK social security pension schemes. The Government 
Actuary's Department in the UK (GAD) produces a principal projection accompanied by variants 
assuming higher and lower fertility and mortality improvements. 
3 This is the most practical approach for population projections in countries where demographic 
information is scanty, which is the case in many developing countries (Scoot, 2000). 
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and this depends on the assumptions employed. One possible assumption is of 
linearity, using regression techniques to fit a line and extrapolate it into the future, 
which can be presented by the following formula: 
Pt=ct+ßt (tz0) (5.1) 
Another simple assumption is of a constant rate of increase, so that the population at 
time t, Pt, can be estimated by assuming that it follows the differential equation: 
dP' 
_KxP, (5.2) dt 
where K is the rate of increase4. This equation may easily be solved to give: 
P, 
=P0xeKi for tz0 (5.3) 
This function may be reasonable for a few years into the future, but the assumption of 
an indefinitely continuing constant rate of growth eventually produces misleading 
figures. Formula (5.2) can be modified to take into account the physical limit to the 
numbers capable of occupying a given space by applying a term tending to "drag the 
population down", thus: 
dP' 
=KxP, -f (P, ) (t z 0) dt (5.4) 
The simplest form of f (P1) could be Cx Pt where C is another positive constant5, 
which leads to the logistic curve6 (Renn, 1988): 
p= Po Xe Kt +K (with an upper limit of P, = C) (t z 0) (5.5) 
Scott (2000) suggests that one might postulate equation (5.4) thus (for example): 
dP` 
=KxP, - K[PP ]2 (t >_ 0) (5.6) dt 
this logistic differential equation is of the Bernoulli type which may be solved by 
substitution. 
Other mathematical formulae, which may also be used for estimating populations, for 
example ARIMA time series models, either based simply upon total population 
numbers or upon increasingly sophisticated breakdowns of the components of the 
4 
. 
This indicates that the rate of growth of the population is directly proportional to its size. 
This also gives an exponential form as 
dP 
= 
(K 
- 
C)P. 
6 Such logistic curves were fitted to long periods of past data in Europe and the US, but subsequent 
census results have usually shown figures below those predicted by these curves. 
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population such births, deaths and migration. However, such mathematical models are 
normally used to estimates the total population, Pt particularly when detailed 
demographic statistics are lacking (Scott, 2000). These methods do not usually use 
detailed information on the structure of the population and they cannot easily be used 
to produce breakdowns of the composition of the projected population. They also do 
not normally take into account the expected changes in the population components. 
5.2.2. The Component Methodology of Population Projection 
This is the most commonly used method in national population projections7. It is an 
appropriate method for estimating national population for many practical purposes 
which require estimates of the population broken down by age and sex for each 
successive year from the projection base year. It also covers the components in their 
entirety, although the projections may lose sight of possible "interactions" between 
the components of the projections (Scott, 2000). The method is adopted to project the 
national population of Egypt. 
It requires the calculation of the distribution of births, immigrants, deaths and 
emigrants9. The starting population plus net inward migrants less the number of 
deaths produces the number in the population one year older at the end of the year, 
and the survivors of those born during the year produce the number in their first year 
of life. The time horizon for projections can be anything from a few months to a 
century or more1°. However, these rolled forward estimates are subject to increasing 
error as they move further away from the last census year. 
The basic formula of the component method is: 
PX. t, s 
(1 ± 
M"t 
for x =1,2,3 
, ...... 
and t =1,2,3, 
..... 
2MX"`'` 
x1-*q 2 
(5.7) 
where PX, t,, = Projected number of population of sex s aged x last birthday at mid- 
I The British official population projections employ this methodology and it is also employed in the 
projection of the national population within the social insurance area in the USA. 
In some countries when the fertility is low there might be a tendency for net inward migration to 
increase. Myers (1985) suggests an inverse relationship between fertility and immigration assumptions 
and states that this element serves as a proxy for fertility. 
9 There can be a need for retrospective population estimates, for example working backward from a 
current census to earlier dates to provide a base for the calculation of birth, death and migration rates. 
10 In the UK, projections are produced for a period of 40 years from the base year, however the focus of 
the results is on the first 25 years from the base year. 
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year t years from the present; 
MX, t,, = Projected number of "net migrants" (= immigrants - emigrants) of sex 
s in the period of mid-year t-1 to mid-year t who survived to mid-year 
t when they were aged x last birthday at the date of migration; 
qx_ 2, t_t, s = 
Probability of death within a year of those of sex s and aged x-1 last 
birthday at mid-year t-1. 
At age 0 the formula used is: 
1.06 
P_2.06 
B`'"' x (1 
-2 qo, t-t, f) f Mo, t, f 11 (5.8) O, t, s 1 
2.06 
Bt, f x (1 - ýlo, t-l, m) t MO, t, m 2 
where, Pot 
,= 
Projected number of children (male/female as appropriate) aged 0 to 1 
of sex s in the period mid-year t-1 to mid-year t; 
Bt,, = Projected number of live births of sex s in the period mid-year t-1 to 
mid-year t; 
M0. t,, = Projected number of net migrants of sex s in the same period that was 
0 last birthday at mid-year t; 
1qo, t_,,, = Probability that a live birth of sex s in the same period would die 
2 
before mid-year t; 
The number of births, Bt, is obtained using the following formula 12: 
x-49 
B, EX,, x FR.,, (5.9) 
x-15 
Ex 
,t-2Lx, t-l, f 
+ Px. t, e 
I (5.10) 
where Ex 
,t= 
The woman-years of exposure at age x last birthday; 
PX, t f= Number of women at mid-yearn aged x last birthday, and 
FR., t = Fertility rate at age x last birthday for births in the period of mid-year 
t-1 to mid-year t of women aged x last birthday at childbirth. 
" The ratio was estimated as the geometric mean over the period 1967-1996. This ratio increased from 
1.01 in 1948 to 1.29 in 1966 and since then has been increasing to 1.05 in 1996. 
12 It means the number of live births per woman-year and the assumption here is that the distribution of 
the number of live births is approximately Poisson with mean EXx FRI. 
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Population projections using this method require data and assumptions about the 
following components for every age and sex over the projection period: 
1. Mid-year population for the base year of the projections, which are used as 13 
starting populations for the projection period; 
2. Life tables for the base year reflecting mortality during the base period; 
3. Allowance for mortality improvement (or worsening) 14; 
4. Estimates of annual total period fertility rates (TPFRs); and 
5. Estimates of annual net migration. 
Thus, this method requires projections of the future mortality, fertility and migration" 
trends over the projection period. Assumptions regarding these components have to be 
based on the statistical evidence available from the analysis of the trends at the time 
of projection. In the following sections, investigations of the Egyptian national 
mortality and fertility experience are carried out. Following this investigation, the 
expected future national mortality and fertility trends for 1997-2025 are projected. 
5.3. Variant Projections 
The inherent uncertainty associated with the demographic components' behaviours 
results in projections which will inevitably be proved wrong to a greater or lesser 
extent. This is because the likely future path of the components is not known at the 
time the projection is carried out. This means that the accuracy of the population 
estimates can not be relied upon. Therefore, variant projections have to be carried out 
on plausible alternative assumptions of future demographic events to draw attention to 
the sensitivity of the projections to these assumptions. Theses assumptions do not 
represent upper and lower limits or reflect a particular level of confidence that the 
outcome will lie between the high and low variant projections. 
There are various methods by which variants might be specified, depending on the 
underlying method used for projecting the demographic components, which are 
discussed with the methods of projecting of mortality and fertility. Probability levels 
" It should be taken as the official mid-year population estimates or census, which should be the most 
reliable for that year. 
14 It is usually thought that mortality rates are the most predictable of the three components. 
15 Egypt is a labour exporting country (with some 2.6 million Egyptians working abroad in 1996). Due 
to the unavailability of the migration statistics, and to the unpredictability of international migration, it 
has been assumed that there will be no net migration during the period of projection, as often this 
migration is temporary for work. 
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can be attached to variants using a methodology that is essentially subjective such as 
constructing confidence intervals based on the size of errors in past projections 16. 
However, when parameters and variants are set subjectively, it is not possible to 
derive confidence intervals. Another method is to obtain the views of experts on likely 
ranges of future changes and construct variant assumptions based on them. 
5.4. National Mortality Experience of Egypt, 1948-96 
Incorporating a prudent projection for future mortality improvement (or worsening) is 
considered a significant factor in the population projection process. In Egypt, there is 
no official national mortality experience available'7 and therefore these rates have to 
be derived from other sources such as the United Nations' model life tables or an 
investigation of past data. In this thesis, assumptions about future mortality 
improvements are obtained from investigating trends in past data and selecting a 
methodology to project future trends. The national mortality experience of Egypt is 
investigated over 1948-96 and the main features over the last half-century are 
extracted by analysing the following points: 
1. Basis of analysis of mortality trends, 
2.. Trends in male and female mortality, 
3. Trends in infant, childhood, middle adult life and advanced ages mortality, 
4. Life expectancy trends, 
5. Reviewing the relevant methodologies and methods that can be adopted in 
projecting mortality rates for national population projections, and 
6. Applying the selected methodology to project future mortality improvements of 
the national population of Egypt. 
5.4.1. Basis of Mortality Analysis and Projection 
The nature and features of the data can determine and dictate the appropriate method 
used for analysis. Mortality improvements can be analysed and projected on a period 
basis18 or a cohort basis'9. Analysis on the cohort basis takes into account the inherent 
16 If the distribution of errors is known then confidence intervals can be produced for the projected 
values, which is only possible to make if the distribution of forecast errors remains stable over time. 
17 In the UK, the GAD produces two sets of annual life tables known as Interim Life Tables. The first is 
based on mortality data for a single calendar year and the second is based on mortality data for three 
consecutive calendar years combined (as for ELTs) and these tables are not graduated. 
'S The rates apply at each age in a given year and improvement rates are calendar-year specific. 
19 The rates apply at each age are to people born in a particular year (year of birth) and improvement 
rates are year-of-birth specific. 
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experience within the generations concerned on the assumption that cohort effects 
will persist. If this is the case, a method that incorporates this effect is likely to 
perform better than one that takes no account of it2° However, if there is no significant 
evidence of cohort effects, mortality can be projected on a period basis. 
Mortality rates can be also analysed in aggregate (that is, all-causes) or separately by 
cause of death for age and sex. Pollard (1989) suggestes that total mortality can be 
obtained by separately projecting mortality from certain groups of disease and then 
adding them together to get the total mortality21. However, it is a complex approach to 
apply and there are many potential problems associated with it, such as causes 
showing greatest past improvements becoming relatively less common in the future 
(Willets, 1999). Also, when causes of death are separated they may follow a much 
more irregular pattern than when all causes are taken together, making it difficult to 
establish a trend. It is not a recommended approach in the UK (GAD, 2001). 
Therefore, in the investigation of the national population mortality of Egypt, the 
analysis is carried out on a period basis. 
5.4.2. Data 
This investigation is confined to the available calendar years of national population 
mortality data over 1948-96, which relates to lives from different generations. The 
data comprises of midyear population estimates and the numbers of deaths 22 9 
subdivided by age and sex, provided in the format mentioned in Chapter 4. The data 
considered is for ages 0-74 in quinquennial age groups as there is no available data for 
individual ages, which might reduce irregularities due to errors of age statement, etc. 
as discussed in Chapter 4. For ages 75 and over, data is contained in one group, which 
represents an average improvement for old ages. Trends for ages 75 and over cannot 
be analysed properly and have to be estimated according to a suitable methodology. 
Crude central mortality rates for each age group (mX)23 and each calendar year are 
derived by the method explained in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.1 of Appendix 4 for Male 
and Female Central Mortality Rates). These rates are not graduated; however, as 
20 GAD (2001) indicates that the poor performance of extrapolatory models in reproducing past UK 
mortality rates may be partly related to their inability to deal adequately with some cohorts. 
21 Japan latest projections used a method based on extrapolating standardised cause-specific mortality 
by sex in five-year age groups over 1975-95, for 13 cause-of-death groupings. 
2" Number of deaths are counted in the calendar year in which they are occurred (an occurrence basis). 
23 These mortality rates do not purport to show the likely experience of any particular generation. 
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data are derived from large national population numbers, this should lead to less 
variability in the rates, and these rates should progress fairly smoothly from age to age 
and year to year. This should make trends easier to discern, even without graduation, 
and give a true indication of the underlying mortality rates. However, examination of 
the Egyptian data reveals some irregularities, particularly the old ages as shown in 
Figures 5.1 & 5.2. This might indicate that the quality of the data provided is not 
considered high, especially for the older years. This may be attributed to the 
possibility of some misreported death data, estimated midyear population data or that 
the data were not grouped properly in quinary age groups. 
5.4.3. Mortality Trends 
Mortality rates by age, sex and year provide a valuable time series for monitoring the 
changing patterns in mortality over time and to have a view of likely changes in the 
future. In the following sections, mortality trends over 1948-96 are examined and 
some comments about current conditions are made. Trends over 1948-96, are 
obtained by comparing the crude central mortality rates (m, ') of the age groups for the 
calendar years 1948,1976 and 1996. The rates are plotted on the log scale at 5-year 
age groups (except for ages 0,1-4 and for ages 75 and over) for males and females as 
shown in Figures 5.1 & 5.2 which give a broad picture of the secular trends of 
mortality changes of the Egyptian population. 
The Figures exhibit roughly similar features of mortality changes for males and 
females for most age groups over 1948-96. Trends in observed levels of mortality 
have shown an overall substantial improvement with a gradual fall at most ages for 
both males and females. The overall mortality rate per person in 1996 was 29.6% of 
that in 1948, the fall being greatest at the young and middle age groups with levels of 
improvement declining with increasing age. 
5.4.3.1. Male Experience 
Overall the mortality rate for males in 1996 was 29.1% of that in 1948. The greatest 
improvements24 in male mortality were at the very young age groups (87.8% for age 
0-1 & 94.2% for age group 1-4). The second largest improvement was at the age group 
5-34 (improved by 76.5-74.0%, declining with age) as shown in Figure 5.1. 
24 The percentage change in mortality rates over 1948-96 is calculated by dividing the difference in 
central mortality rates between 1996 and 1948 by the central mortality rate in 1948. 
197 
Figure 5.1. Male mortality of the Egyptian population over 1948-96 
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Middle age groups 34-59, improved by 64.7-41.8% (declining with age) and very 
modest improvements occurred at age 60 and over. Mortality for age 75 and over as 
one group was 60.9% in 1996 of that in 1948. In general, although male mortality 
improvement lessens with age, male mortality rates have reduced by at least 51% up 
to age 49 and by 38 % up to age 59. 
5.4.3.2. Female Experience 
Female mortality trends exhibit similar feature to male mortality over 1948-96 as 
shown in Figure 5.2. The overall mortality rate for females in 1996 was 29.1% of that 
in 1948, similar to that of males. There was improvement through all ages up to 69 
when deterioration or no improvement occurred for some old age groups. Figure 5.2 
shows that the greatest improvements in female mortality were at the very young 
ages, similar to males, (86.1% for age 0-1 and 93.7% for age group 1-4). 
The second largest improvement was 5-44 age group, (improved by 75.6-64.0%). 
Improvement also occurred in the age group 45-59 (improved by 48.0- 23.9%). There 
were very modest improvements at age group 60-69 (15.8% and 23.9% respectively) 
and deterioration of the age group 70-74. Mortality for age 75 and over, as one group, 
was 50% in 1996 of that in 1948. Although female mortality improvement lessens 
with age, mortality rates have reduced by at least 47% up to age 59. 
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Figure 5.2. Female crude central mortality rates over 1948-96 
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5.4.3.3. Differences Between Male and Female Mortality Improvements 
Changes over 1948-97 are examined in more details in Figure 5.3, which shows the 
percentages improvement (or worsening) in mortality rates over 1948-96. 
Figure 5.3. Percentage Improvement in Egyptian Mortality over 1948-96 
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Table 5.1 shows the % reductions and the effective average annual rates of 
improvement in mortality for males and females over 1948-96. Figure 5.3 and Table 
5.1 confirms the earlier findings of similar patterns of mortality changes for males and 
females for most of the age groups over 1948-96. They show that male mortality 
continues to improve at slightly higher average annual rates than that of females up to 
age group 50-54 (except for the age group 40-44). Female mortality improvements 
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were higher than of males for ages 55 and over (except for the age group 70-74, 
which deteriorated by about 0.72 %). The overall rate of improvement over 1977-96 
was better than over 1948-76 for males and females. The overall female mortality fell 
more than for males over 1977-96 compared with 1948-76. Mortality improvement 
has been higher over 1948-76 than over 1976-96 at most age groups above age 15. 
Table 5.1: Mortality reduction and the effective annual average rates of improvement in 
mortality over 1948-96 
Age 
Group 
% Reduction Effective Annual 
Reduction Rate 
Males Females 
1948-76 1977-96 1948-96 1948-76 1977-96 1948-96 Males Females 
0-<1 20.7 83.7 87.8 10.1 84.0 86.2 4.3 4.0 
1- 4 63.9 84.6 94.2 54.7 86.2 93.7 5.8 5.6 
5-9 48.0 57.9 76.9 45.0 61.2 75.8 3.0 2.9 
10 
-14 48.9 57.1 76.9 50.5 54.7 75.6 3.0 2.9 
15 
- 
19 58.2 40.3 73.9 53.0 41.3 72.2 2.8 2.6 
20 
- 
24 50.0 56.0 77.2 54.8 48.8 75.6 3.0 2.9 
25 
- 
29 54.2 58.7 80.1 48.0 50.4 73.2 3.3 2.7 
30 
- 
34 60.0 40.7 75.1 55.9 38.4 73.0 2.9 2.7 
35 
- 
39 49.0 37.1 68.8 44.2 30.4 62.0 2.4 2.0 
40 
- 
44 54.2 18.4 63.6 60.8 7.6 64.0 2.1 2.1 
45 
- 
49 34.4 26.2 50.8 39.1 16.1 48.0 1.5 1.4 
50 
- 
54 25.4 28.3 47.0 31.4 5.4 33.9 1.3 0.9 
55 
- 
59 16.7 26.0 37.8 39.9 11.9 46.7 1.0 1.3 
60 
- 
64 14.6 
-5.1 14.3 34.8 -26.0 15.8 0.3 0.4 
65 
- 
69 
-10.7 18.7 10.9 8.1 16.6 23.9 0.2 0.6 
70 
- 
74 3.5 
-0.5 5.2 12.1 -13.6 -0.7 0.1 0.0 
75+ 30.1 13.8 39.1 25.3 28.2 49.8 1.0 1.4 
Overall 45.0 47.1 70.9 42.3 49.5 71.0 2.5 2.5 
Source: Derived by Author 
In general, male mortality improved better than females for young ages and female 
mortality improved better than males for old ages. Mortality at young ages improved 
better over 1977-96 than over 1948-76, whereas for old ages, most of the 
improvement occurred over 1948-76. This is might be interpreted as a result of the 
wars and diseases Egypt experienced over 1948-7327. The lower improvement in 
mortality of middle and higher age groups is a reflection of the lack of significant 
changes at these ages compared to the improvements at younger ages over 1948-96. 
25 Improvement at this age group over 1977-96 is significantly less than over 1948-76 and different 
from the trend of the previous and the following age groups. This is might be an indication of an 
emerging of an accident hump similar to that one experienced by the UK as a result of increased risk 
due to accidental causes and violence at these ages. 
26 Figures for the age group 75 and over should be treated as just a general indicator. 
27 Egypt fought more than 4 wars and experienced many fatal diseases over 1948-76. The conquest of 
infectious disease, which generally killed early in life, has altered the age pattern of mortality. 
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5.4.4. Mortality Improvement over the Life-Span 
The causes of death in a population are many and tend to vary over the life-span. 
Improvements in health care and treatment of some diseases, safety, changes in life 
style, living standards and behaviour can all improve mortality experience. However, 
the momentum of mortality improvement cannot be sustained continuously by only 
such factors. Many fundamental problems, such as the emergence of new diseases like 
Aids, changes in economic circumstances (e. g. high unemployment), lack of social 
welfare and education remain to affect mortality. Mortality can improve only up to a 
point, as the human body does eventually wear out, so those who do survive to old 
ages are still faced with an undiminished risk of mental or physical deterioration. 
5.4.4.1. Infancy, Childhood and Early Adult Life 
Mortality at young ages has a significant effect on population numbers. Infants (under 
1) and early childhood (1-4) experienced the largest mortality improvement over 
1948-96 as shown in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4. Infant and childhood Mortality Improvement over 1948-96 
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It is clear that a large part of the mortality improvement since 1948 was due to 
reductions in infant and childhood mortality. Infant mortality has reduced to less than 
one-tenth of its level in 1948 with similar improvement for both sexes over 1948-9628 
particularly over 1977-96. Figure 5.5 shows male mortality improvement for the age 
28 Female mortality in Egypt at these ages are higher and achieved less improvement than males as they 
appear to be more susceptible to birth hazards, death by infection, accidental death, suggesting that 
female babies receive less care. 
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groups 5-34 over 1948-96, as female mortality trends for the same age groups exhibit 
exactly similar trends. 
Figure 5.5. Male Mortality Trends for the age groups 5-34 over 1948-96 
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5.4.4.2. Middle Adult Life and Advanced Ages 
The third largest improvement in mortality rates over 1948-96 was for the age groups 
35-44 (improved by 69-64% for males and 64-62% for females) and at ages 45-59 the 
improvement was 51-38% for males and 48-47% for females as shown in Figure 5.6 
for males' aged 35-59. Mortality rates at these ages have a significant potential impact 
on the ESSPS. Mortality improvement for the age group 60-74 has varied between 
very modest improvement and deterioration, as the average annual rates of 
improvement of these ages were the lowest over 1948-96 as shown in Table 5.1. At 
most of these ages, the levels of mortality improvement were significantly lower over 
1977-96 than over 1948-76. For the age group 75 and over, the rate of improvement, 
as a general indicator, was 39.1% for males and 49.8% for females. 
In general, there has been a considerable fall in mortality in infancy, childhood, early 
and middle adult life for both males and females over 1948-96. There has been some 
modest fall in mortality in late middle adult life and advanced ages for both males and 
females over 1948-96, but the percentage improvement was not significant, and even 
some deterioration has occurred at some advanced age groups, particularly for 
females. This means that the possibility for improvement at old ages is much less than 
for younger and middle ages. 
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Figure 5.6. Male Mortality Trends for the age groups 35-59 over 1948-96. 
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5.4.5. Period Expectations of Life 
Another way of illustrating reductions in death rates is to show the increase in 
expectation of life at birth, as it summaries the overall effect of mortality in a single 
value. It can be calculated from the death rates in particular calendar years (period 
expectations of life) which show the overall effects of changes in mortality of people 
of different generations. It can be also calculated by taking the rates over time 
applicable to people born in a particular year (cohort expectations of life)29. This takes 
into account changes in mortality rates in years succeeding the year of birth, whereas 
the period calculation uses mortality rates applicable in the year under consideration. 
Over 1937-96, the period expectation of life at birth3° increased by nearly 29.5 years 
for a boy (from 35.7 in 1937 to 65.4 in 199631) and by nearly 27.5 years for a girl. The 
period expectation of life at birth increased by about 4.9 years for males and 4.6 years 
for females in each decade. Male expectation of life has improved better than females 
at all ages. Reductions in mortality in infancy, childhood and early adult life have 
made the largest contribution to this improvement as shown in Figure 5.7. The 
expectation of life of a woman at the state pension age of 60 had reached 17.3 years 
29 This can be done for generations not yet extinct by making assumptions about future death rates. 
30 This represents the average number of years that a new-born baby could expect to live. These figures 
were available from the UN demographic yearbook for years back from 1937, however figures for the 
whole life table were only available for few years and the first available one was 1947. 
31 The values for 1947 are taken from the UN demographic yearbook and for 1996 they are taken from 
the results of the Egyptian Life tables constructed in Chapter 4. 
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whereas, for a man it had reached 15.5 years in 1996. The increase in the expectation 
of life at age 60 over 1947.96, is less than 2 years for males and 1 year for females. 
Figure 5.7. Expectation of life for the age groups in 1947 & 1996. 
62 
52 
J 
ö 42 
- c 0 
32 
m CL 
w 22 
12 
-*-Males 1996 -4--Males 1947 
2 
--Females 1996 
-e-Females 1947 
015 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 
Age 
After studying the trends in mortality revealed by this investigation, the methodology 
rates has to be selected. In the following sections, different methodologies for 
projecting mortality are briefly explored and the methodology adopted for the 
Egyptian data is then applied. 
5.5. Methodologies of Projecting Mortality Trends32 
There are a variety of methodologies for mortality projection. The scope of the topic 
is very extensive and it has to be restricted to general population measurements. The 
methods can be broadly classified as (GAD, 2001): 
1. Process-based methods: such methods concentrate on factors that determine 
deaths and model mortality rates from a bio-medical perspective. These methods 
are only effective if the processes causing death are understood and can be 
modelled, but such methods are not usually used to make official projections 33 
2. Explanatory-based methods: such methods employ a causal forecasting 
approach, using econometric techniques to project mortality from the impact of 
32 The core part of this literature review depends on the Benjamin et. el. (1993) (Mortality on the 
Move) and the GAD (2001), "National Population Projections: Review of Methodology for Projecting 
Mortality" which included methodologies used in some other developed countries and others sources. 
33 The USA Social Security Administration (SSA) latest population projections calculated death rates 
by age group, sex, and cause of death. Cause-specific death rates were calculated for ten cause-of-death 
groupings over 1968-94 for four age groupings - less than 15,15 to 64,65 to 84 and 85 and over. 
Annual reductions were then determined for 1968-94 by age group, sex and cause-of-death groupings. 
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various risk factors, such as income or socio-economic factors34. The methods 
require the aggregate mortality projections to be built up by analysing mortality 
into component parts, which would be difficult to predict. They also require 
projection of the prevalent risk factors. Such methods are rarely used in official 
projections. 
3. Extrapolative methods: they based on projecting historical trends in mortality 
into the future. These include some element of subjective judgement and are only 
reliable to the extent that the conditions, which led to changing mortality in the 
past, will continue to have a similar impact in the future. Any significant change 
could invalidate the results of an extrapolative projection. In this investigation, 
extrapolative projection methodologies are explored. 
Methods for estimating mortality, improvement rates can be classified into targeting 
methods and trend methods. Targeting methods may involve a set of age-specific 
mortality rates which are assumed to hold at a certain future date, specified rates of 
mortality improvement, or a life table based on the experience of some other 
countries. Methods could also be either deterministic, meaning that one set of 
projected rates based on a predetermined set of parameters is produced, or stochastic, 
meaning that the projected rates contain a random element from an assumed 
probability distribution for the parameters. 
Any methodology should satisfy some criteria to be a suitable one. Some of such 
criteria are: accuracy, simplicity, availability of data, subjectivity, suitability for 
creating variants, fitting into the process of population projections and providing a 
reasonable level of performance in terms of reliability and defensibility. Accurate 
projections may represent the highest priority in selecting a methodology, although 
this cannot be tested at the time of projection. Complex models may result in small 
marginal increases in accuracy, which does not justify using them. The methodology 
should allow some element of judgement in setting assumptions, informed by views 
on what changes are likely to occur in future, based on exogenous information. 
34 In 1992-93, The World Bank projected life expectancy and infant mortality from national data using 
a logistic function for the rate of change in mortality over time, varying across countries and, for a 
given country, across time. The projection included socioeconomic variables in the countries. 
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Benjamin et el. (1993), grouped the methods of projecting mortality into35: the 
logarithmic method, the logit method, the use of mathematical curve over the whole 
range of ages, projection by the cause of death, projection of the parameters of the 
curve of deaths and the Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI) methodology. 
GAD (2001) added: the Lee-Carter method and the methodology adopted by GAD. A 
brief description and commentary on these methods, and their suitability, or 
otherwise, for use in the case of Egypt, are explored very briefly in Appendix 4. In 
the following sections, a description and commentary on GAD methodology, which is 
employed for use in the case of Egypt, is explored. This adopted methodology is 
applied to the national population projection of Egypt and assumptions used for 
deriving variant mortality projections are determined. 
5.5.1. GAD Current Methodology36 
The GAD's current projection methodology focuses, particularly, on projecting and 
targeting rates of mortality improvement rather than mortality rates themselves or 
expectations of life (and a target year). The methodology is summarised as follow: 
1. Estimate levels of mortality from the base year of the projections on the strength 
of past trends and assuming initial levels of improvements in mortality; 
2. Levels of improvements are then projected forward for each future year to meet 
particular target rates of improvement at a particular year (after this point 
assumptions are often held constant or are assumed to change in a regular way); 
3. Projected rates of improvement for each future year are then applied successively 
to theses base-year mortality rates to obtain future mortality rates; 
4. Two mortality variants are produced, one projecting lower expectations of life and 
the other higher expectations of life than the principal projection and the method 
is adapted to allow for the cohort effects. 
The methodology can be based on the use of the same target rates of mortality 
improvement and can change the target year in which the target rates will be 
achieved. Another way is to retain the same target year but altar the rate at which 
future improvements are assumed to converge to the target improvements. The 
" Pollard (1989) grouped the methodologies into: projection by extrapolation of mortality rates at 
selected ages, projection by reference to a "law of mortality", projection by reference to model life 
tables, projection by reference to another "more advanced" population; projection by cause of death; 
and combinations of these methods. 36 It was used for the first time to project mortality for 1992-based national population projections. 
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method uses a combination of trend extrapolation and targeting methods. Trend 
extrapolation is used to project mortality rates and rates of improvement for the base 
year of the projection. The rates of improvement are obtained by interpolating 
between the improvement rates assumed in the first year and the target rates for a later 
year. Interpolates would be linear or geometric between current mortality rates and 
the set of target rates. Targeting overcomes some of the disadvantages of a purely 
extrapolative approach by taking account of any possible future significant changes. 
Some of the weaknesses of this methodology are: 
1. Choice of parameters may be perceived as somewhat arbitrary, for example, the 
ultimate target-improvement rates could be set for any number of years37; 
2. It may constrain the possibilities for choosing variants, in particular for the low 
life-expectancy variant, and does not allow statements of probability or 
confidence intervals to be attached to them; 
3. Requires a large degree of subjectivity 38, which leads to a relative loss of 
transparency in how the parameters are chosen. 
5.6. The Methodology and Assumptions Adopted for 
Projecting Mortality rates in Egypt over 1997- 2025 
It is clear that there is no universally accepted method for projecting mortality rates 
and the methodologies adopted are changed from time to time, as has happened in the 
UK, and differ from country to country. The GAD's current methodology of 
employing target mortality improvements is considered as the most suitable 
methodology and is adopted in this thesis. 
The methodology and the core main assumptions are as follow39: 
1. Rates of annual improvement based on extrapolation of the rates of improvement 
experienced over 1977-96 by age and sex which allow for the fact that the 
37 A shorter target period is preferred because of the high uncertainty over long-term mortality levels. 
The principal projection result in the UK is 25 years. 
38 Most objective extrapolation methods can reproduce historic UK data, but such methods would 
inevitably require a certain amount of subjective amendment to be used in projections. 
39 This is similar to the Canada Pension Plan methodology, which applies mortality improvement rates 
by age and sex successively to the base mortality rates to obtain future mortality rates. The initial 
improvement rates are determined by analysing trends by age and sex in the mortality of Canada over 
the previous ten years. The base-year mortality improvement rates are then graded using linear 
interpolation from their initial level to their ultimate level over a 20-year period varying by age, sex 
and calendar year. The ultimate rates of improvement are assumed to apply for every year thereafter. 
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mortality of young population has been improving more rapidly than of that in the 
middle and old ages; 
2. Male and female mortality rates have been observed to change at roughly the 
same rates in the past and it was decided for simplicity to use the same 
methodology and their experienced mortality improvement rates. 
3. There are limiting minimum mortality improvement rates by the end of the 
projection period; 
4. Setting three variants (I, II, III) by altering targets and speeds by which rates of 
improvements decrease; 
5. Constant exponential reductions in rates of mortality improvement (decreasing 
with age) are assumed in each future year of the projections for variants I and II. 
Thus the improvement rates decrease to their limiting values by exponential decay 
over the projection period. 
Variant I (high mortality projection): It assumes that the future rate of mortality 
improvement fall exponentially towards a rate of 0% p. a. of that experienced over 
1977-96 by the end of the projection period for males and females up to age 6440. A 
pessimistic view of mortality prospects for old ages, with no future improvement 
(mortality rates remain unaltered in future years) assumed for either sex for age 65 
and over (which might be presented as an unlikely prospect). 
Variant II (principle or central projection): It assumes a rapid slowing in the rates 
of annual improvement. It assumes that the future rate of improvement fall 
exponentially towards an annual improvement rate of 50% of that experienced over 
1977-96 by the end of the projection period for males and females up to age 54. An 
assumed rate of mortality improvement of 1.5% p. a. for ages 55 and over, which also 
moves (exponentially) towards an annual improvement rate of 1% p. a. by year 2025. 
Variant III (low mortality variant): This variant adopts more optimistic rates of 
improvement for most of ages. It covers the possibility of recent trends of mortality 
improvement experienced over 1977-96 being unchanged over the projection period 
for males and females up to age 39. It assumes a constant improvement rate of 2.5% 
p. a. for all ages 40 and over. At ages 40 and over it is assumed that there would be a 
ao Most official projections assume that rates of improvement will fall in the future as improvements 
become more difficult to maintain and few, if any, assume a worsening of mortality, even in the most 
pessimistic scenarios. 
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better improvement than warranted by current trends, which is an optimistic view that 
might not presented as a realistic prospect. 
The three variants represent scenarios which produce three sets of projected mortality 
rates varying by age, sex and calendar year. Clearly, the projection assumption is that 
rates for younger people will fall dramatically, whereas there will be limited 
improvements for old ages. 
The following steps are carried out in projecting mortality rates for both sexes. 
1. Standard mortality tables reflecting the observed mortality experience of the base 
period referred to as the "Base" tables (i. e. "current" mortality) to which future 
projected improvements were applied are generally taken as the average rates 
experienced over a recent three-year period. The standard mortality rates are taken 
as that of the 1994-96 experience which were constructed in Chapter 4. 
2. Projections of expected future mortality rates allow for future improvements in 
mortality from the base tables. Projected future mortality rates are derived for 
each year by sex and age last birthday, at the middle of each future calendar year, 
for the projection period; 
5.6.1. Results of the Projection 
Based on mortality rates assumed in the principal projections (Variant II), life 
expectancies at birth are 72.1 and 75.4 years for males and females, respectively, in 
2025 rising from 65.3 and 69.1 years for males and females respectively in 1996. This 
indicates a gradual narrowing of the gender disparity in life expectancy 
-from a 
difference of 3.8 years in 1996 to less than 3.3 years in 2025. The resulting projected 
mortality rates and life expectations under the three variants seem plausible and 
reasonable as shown in Figure 5.8 and Table 4.2 of Appendix 4. 
Variant I led to projected life expectancies at birth of 69 and 72.1 years for males and 
females respectively in year 2025. Variant III led to projected life expectancies at 
birth of 76.0 and 79.3 in year 2025. The differences in life expectancy at birth 
between variants I and III are 7.0 and 7.3 years for males and females respectively by 
the end of the projection period. 
The UN projects the life expectancy at birth in Egypt to be 72.2 and 76.0 years for 
males and females respectively and 74.1 for both sexes combined over the period 
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2020-2030 according to the medium-variant projection. The UN (1999) low mortality 
variant estimates that by year 2025 the life expectancy at birth in Egypt would 
increase to 75.5 years for males and to 80.5 years for females. The World Bank 
estimates that over the period of 2020-2030 the life expectancy at birth in the Middle 
East & North Africa for both sexes combined would be 72.7 and 74.3 years for males 
and females respectively compared with 80.7 to 81.2 years of the high income 
(OECD) countries. 
Figure 5.8. Projected Life Expectancy at Birth of the Egyptian Population over 1997-2025 
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All these indicators indicate that the results driven from this methodology are 
reasonable and adequate to be used in the national population projection of Egypt 
over 1997-2025. Table 4.2 of Appendix 4 gives details of projected expectations of 
life under the three variants and the actual and projected life expectancy at birth under 
variant II for males and females as shown in Figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9. Actual and projected expectation of life over 1937-2025 
In the projections' output, mortality rates are provided in the form of probabilities of 
dying between one mid-calendar year to the next, by age last birthday at the beginning 
of that 12-month period (q,, +[t)). 
5.7. Fertility Rates41 
Analysis and monitoring of fertility levels are essential steps toward projecting the 
national population. In the medium and long-term, fertility is likely to be the largest 
source of uncertainty in projecting the size of the population (consequently the labour 
force and the beneficiary population), which is quite sensitive to this factor. Fertility 
is sensitive to social and economic changes affecting attitudes to family size, as the 
decision to have a child depends on many factors such as: 
1- Influence of leading writers, religious, social and tradition factors; 
2- General ethos (fashion or culture) and loss of leisure or gainful employment; 
3- Economic and political outlook at the time of conception; 
4- The prohibition of the employment of young children, causing them to become 
economic liabilities rather than assets and the rise in the costs of raising a child; 
5- The decline in infant mortality leading to a major increase in the proportion of 
children who survive to adulthood, the general improvement of the health of 
mothers, babies and social conditions; 
6- More widespread knowledge of contraceptive methods and the introduction of 
more efficient methods. 
These factors have brought about a profound change of attitude towards, a smaller 
family size, which has been witnessed in many countries. This decline can be also 
explained in part by economic uncertainty created by business cycles which have led 
to periods of high unemployment and increased poverty. This decline is not likely to 
be reversed without positive motivation. 
In countries where most births occur within marriage, the pattern of fertility could be 
analysed according to the mother's year and duration of marriage. A temporary 
slowing of the marriage rate would produce temporary decreases in age fertility rates. 
For this reason reproduction rates are sometimes marriage-standardised, although this 
raises the problem of projecting marriage rates. Marriage experience of a single year 
See for example, G. H. Andrews et. eI. (1987); Pressat, 1978; Colin Newell, Newell, 1988; Benjamin 
and JH Pollard, (1989); Orszag et. el., 2000). 
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may be a misleading guide: for example, economic conditions may later produce 
some temporary postponement of marriage or a general reduction in marriage 
prospects. In general, fertility rates decline with the advancing age of mothers and 
with the lengthening duration of marriage and these are very important in assessing 
fertility prospects for particular population. 
Fertility can be analysed on a period basis, parity (birth order or number of children) 
and a cohort approach, examining family building both by age and duration of 
marriage. Births patterns according to the year of the mother's birth, for women now 
past childbearing, can be used to extrapolate the incomplete pattern of those still at a 
fertile age (15-49). It is preferable to analyse data according to year of birth, i. e. to 
calculate a replacement rate applicable to a single generation (those born in a 
particular calendar year). It is desired to use both ex-nuptial and nuptial fertility, so a 
general approach can be modified to produce the expected number of births. This 
follows a generation through childhood, marriage and productive life, subject to 
mortality, nuptiality and fertility recorded for that generation if it has reached the end 
of reproductive life, or projected if it has not. 
Fertility and nuptiality are inherently more variable than mortality, this means that 
their models will, on average, fit the data less closely than mortality models. These 
models are more complex, less numerous and less widely used. In this thesis we 
restrict ourselves to TPFRs (calendar-year central rates) analysis, as the data was 
collected in this way in Egypt over 1946-96, and estimates of TPFRs over 1997-2025. 
5.7.1. Total Period Fertility Rate (TPFR42) in Egypt over 1946-96 
Fertility rates are usually related to females by age, both because there are fewer ages 
involved and also because data is commonly collected in this way. They can be 
represented as the total births produced by a woman during her reproductive lifetime 
if she experiences, throughout that period, the age-fertility rates of the particular year. 
It is a mixture of fertility rates of many generations (a secular rate) and for this reason 
it is called the period total fertility rate (TPFR). 
4Z It is the average number of children in a year who would be born to a woman in her lifetime if she 
were to survive her entire childbearing years and were to experience those age-specific birth rates 
throughout her childbearing years. It represents the expected number of children to whom a woman 
would give birth if she followed the natality experience of that year throughout her childbearing years. 
It is a simple sum of the age-specific fertility rates experience for a single year. 
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Examining trends in fertility is the first step in projecting fertility. Although fertility 
rates in Egypt have been traditionally high, Egypt has experienced many of the 
changes witnessed in many other countries during the past 20 years, which have 
contributed to reducing the number of children being born. These factors are an 
upward shift in the average age of first marriage, an increase in female participation in 
the labour force, continuing urbanisation, modernisation of education and health, 
changes in social attitudes, and changes in economic and political conditions. In 
Egypt, births must be within marriage to be recognised officially and therefore the 
extent to which people marry exercises a powerful influence on the subsequent flow 
of births. These changes have affected both marriage and fertility. 
Analysis of the TPFR patterns over 1946-96 shows a considerable secular decline, 
ranging from a high of more than 6.38 in 1952 to a low of 3.76 in 1995 as shown in 
Figure 5.10. It has been declining since 1979 and has tended toward the lower end of 
the current range of around 3.8 in 1996. As Figure 5.10 shows, a significant shift has 
occurred from higher to lower fertility over 1946-96. This trend indicates that as time 
passes there is a substantial fall in TPFR. 
Figure 5.10. TPFR over 1946-96 
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The crude birth rate also declined from 46.8 per 1000 in 1946 to around 27 per 1000 
in 1996. The average number of children born per woman, which has been falling is 
reflected in reduction in the average family size from 4.9 persons in 1986 census to 
4.6 in 1996 census. This family size is still high and above the natural replacement 
level, however, the three-child family has now become the popular family size in 
Egypt and this is likely to continue. 
Current trend of TPFR declining 
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5.7.2. Age-Specific Fertility Rate (ASFR)43 
Age specific fertility rates (ASFRs) of mothers are generally used in population 
projections. Differential fertility at different ages within the child-bearing group gives 
a clearer picture of possible variations, such as any arise from unusual features of the 
age structure of the population. The pattern of ASFRs fertility rates for women at ages 
14-49 over 1946-96 in Egypt, for four selected calendar years is shown in Figure 5.11. 
Figure 5.11. ASFRs over 1946-96 
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The curves have their peaks between ages 20-30 and a decrease in the TPFR over 
1946-96, is largely due to the very significant decrease in birth rates among women in 
their middle 20s, 30s and 40s who put off having children when they are in the early 
20s. Fertility rates for women aged 20 years and over were decreasing significantly 
over 1946-96, particularly over 1986-96 and it is expected to decrease further. A 
slight decline for women under 20 year is also noticed. The period of high fertility in 
the 1980s was followed by a period of a substantial decline in fertility rates in the 
1990s. However, as a result of the current economic situation and high unemployment 
in Egypt, discussed in the next chapter, misleading indications of fertility can result in 
age specific fertility rates as a result of marriages postponed. This is opposed to what 
happened in the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s when 
marriages were accelerated. 
43 It is defined as the total births during the year to mothers at the specific age divided by the midyear 
female population at that age. 
214 
5.7.3. Experience of other Countries 
Selecting ultimate TPFRs for different projections can be assessed by examining the 
evolution of recent TPFRs in other nations, as fertility rates have been converging 
across countries (Orszag, et. el., 2000). Orszag, et. el. (2000) found that the percentage 
of the countries with a TPFR below 4 had increased from only 37% in 1987 to 61% of 
countries by 1998 and the mean fertility rate fell from 4.7 in 1978 to 3.5 in 1998. 
In 1995, the average TPFR of the high income OECD, Eastern Europe and Russia, 
Latin American & Caribbean, Asia, Middle East & North Africa and Sub-Saharan 
Africa were 1.6,1.6,2.9,3.2,4.0 and 5.5 respectively. A comparison of TPFRs in 
199644, for the U. S., Canada, and nineteen industrialised countries revealed a range 
from 2.1 in New Zealand to 1.3 in Italy. Many other European countries had a TPFR 
under 1.6. Therefore, it is possible that the TPFR could be as low as 1.6 children per 
woman on average over a long period of time. Orszag et. el. (2000) show that there is 
a substantial evidence that countries with high fertility rates experience larger and 
faster declines in fertility than countries with lower fertility rates, providing evidence 
that fertility rates are converging across countries, although fertility has not declined 
in Africa as rapidly as the rest of the world. In general, in the long run, TPFRs have 
fallen. 
5.7.4. Variant Future TPFRs Assumptions in Egypt over 1997-2025 
For the reasons already cited, it is not believed that the TPFR in Egypt will return to a 
level as high as that experienced over 1946-79 or even to remain close to recent 
levels, as no significant reversal of these changes is anticipated for any sustained 
period. Therefore, the TPFR can be assumed to remain constant at about current 
levels or to follow some trend (e. g. to continue decrease) in the future. 
Various assumptions about the ultimate TPFR over the projection period are selected 
according to the assessment of the past data and future prospects. An ultimate TPFR 
of 2.5 children per woman in 2025 was selected as the intermediate variant 
assumption for the principal projection45 after a gradual decline46 from the 
preliminary value of 3.82 children per woman in 1996. 
44 For the most recent calendar year published in the 1996 United Nations Demographic Yearbook. 
°S Total cost paid by the Treasury is significantly affected by the number of members covered by the 
ESSPS and a higher fertility rate means a larger cost, which is opposite to the PAYG systems. 
46 The annual decline rate was estimated using a geometric mean over 1961-96. 
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An ultimate TPFR in 2025 of 2.1 children per woman47 was selected as the low 
variant assumption (low cost variant for the ESSPS) as it represents the replacement 
level of the population (UN, 1999). Although low by historical standards in Egypt, it 
seems consistent with international organisations in their principal projections. The 
low variant assumes that the average family size of successive cohorts will continue 
to fall and that fertility rates will be lower at all ages as compared with the principal 
projection. This means a larger decline in rates at younger ages than in the principal 
projection and a levelling off in the upward trend in rates at ages over 30. 
An ultimate TPFR of 2.9 children in 2025 per woman was selected as the high variant 
assumption (high cost variant). The higher variant would imply a slow decline of the 
recent downward trend in average family size. Figure 5.12 gives past and projected 
TPFRs for the three alternatives and shows that each of the overall levels assumed in 
the variants are consistent with the recent decline in the TPFRs. The methodologies 
for projecting ASFRs are described in the following sections. 
Figure 5.12: Historical and Projected TPFR according different Variants 
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5.7.5. Models for Projecting Future ASFRs 
ASFRs can be assumed to remain constant in the future or to follow some trend. How 
do we estimate the age-specific fertility rates in year t? Colin (1988) mentioned three 
models of projecting fertility. The first is the Coale 
-Trussell fertility model (Coale 
and Trussel, 1974), which is a combination of the Coale-McNeil nuptiality model and 
47 The Egyptian Government target is to achieve this TPFR by year 2017, which seems very difficult. 
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a model of marital fertility. The second is the Gompertz relational fertility model of 
Brass (1981), which is similar in principle to the logit relational model life-table 
system. The third is the Brass Fertility Polynomial model. In the following section the 
first is mentioned briefly and the second is explained in detail as it is applied in 
projecting ASFRs. The third is ignored because it is not nearly as good as the two 
other models (Newell, 1988). 
5.7.5.1. Coale 
-Trussell Fertility Model 
This model can be expressed algebraically as: 
f(x) = G(x). n(x). em*''(") (5.11) 
where f(x) is the age specific fertility rate at age x, m gives the extent of fertility 
control and G(x) is the proportion ever married at age x as determined from the ao (the 
age of onset of marriage) and k (the rate of marriage). n(x) and v(x) are fixed values 
expressing natural marital fertility and the typical departure from natural fertility 
respectively. 
A model which can fit a set of observed ASFRs is needed. The nuptiality model, 
which the model incorporates, can only model well-behaved cohorts where nuptiality 
has not been changing rapidly. Also it is a three-parameter system, and these normally 
have to be found from six or seven ASFRs. The model is quite sensitive to small 
differences or errors in the data and such sensitivity is a disadvantage when working 
with data from developing countries, which are likely to contain errors and biases 
(Newell, 1988). These problems are to some extent overcome in the Gompertz 
relational model system. 
5.7.5.2. Gompertz Relational Fertility Model 
This system bears many similarities to the logit relational system of model life tables. 
The Gompertz model uses ASFRs expressed as proportions (i. e. divided by the TFR) 
and cumulated. A Gompertz transformation is used to linearise the data and is called 
`Gompit'. The transformation is then: 
Gompit (p) =- Ln (-Ln p) 
And its inverse (anti-Gompit) is: 
P= Exp(-Exp(Gompit)) 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
where p is transforming proportions. The key to the model is that plotting the Gompits 
of one set of cumulative proportional ASFRs against another, such as a predefined 
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standard, produces an approximately straight line. Expressing this algebraically, if the 
Gompit of the cumulative relative fertility at age x is called Y(x), and that of a 
standard fertility function is denoted by the subscript s, then: 
Y(x) =a+ (3 Ys(x) (5.14) 
A standard fertility function can be used, such as the one generated by Booth (1984), 
and was designed to represent the typical pattern of fertility in high-fertility 
populations. The parameter a denotes the change of the age-location of the model and 
the parameters ß may be interpreted as determining the spread, or degree of 
concentration, of the fertility function. It should be remembered that a and ß only 
have meaning relative to the standard. If a different standard is used, then the values 
of a and ß will change. 
The advantages of the Gompertz fertility model over the Coale-Trussell fertility 
model are first that it uses two rather than three parameters which makes the model 
less sensitive to errors and biases in data. Second, the model is useful in the 
evaluation of data quality and its application is easy. Because it is based upon a 
relational principle it might well fit cross-sectional data rather better, especially where 
nuptiality is changing rapidly. 
5.7.6. Projecting ASFRs in Egypt over 1997-2025 
The Gompertz model is adopted for projecting future ASFRs with the following 
modifications: 
1- For a given calendar year, the total ASFRs is restricted to TPFRs assumed under 
the three variants; 
2- The standard schedule (the base year) is taken as 1947; 
3- The linear trends in a and ß are used to project future ASFRs. 
This assumes that TPFR for a year is distributed over the assumed childbearing ages 
(14 through 49) in a pattern consistent with the ASFR trends experienced over 1948- 
96, a pattern which is assumed to persist throughout the projection process. Over 
1997-2025, the ASFRs are projected to follow the same pattern (trend) experienced 
over 1946-96, which is reflected in the Gompertz model such that the completed 
fertility rate would gradually approach the assumed ultimate total fertility rate. The 
assumptions are based on the relative distribution of ASFR for the average historical 
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age distribution. This methodological change serves to make the relative ASFRs 
distribution moves in trends similar to recent data. Figure 5.13 shows that the 
Gompertz model produces projected future ASFRs over the projected period 1997- 
2025, which takes into account the trends over 1947-96. The Figure indicates that 
future ASFR curves are moving towards a deep decline at ages 30 and over and more 
concentration at the age group 20-30. The projected fertility rates over 1997-2025 are 
shown in Table 4.3 of Appendix 4. 
Figure 5.13. Historical and Projected ASFRs according Medium TPFR Variants 
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5.8. Results of the Egyptian Population Projections 
48 A population projection over the period 1995-2025, using the component model, 
was prepared according to the following: 
1. The population's census at the middle of the 1996 as the base year, 
2. The Egyptian Life Table, which was constructed in Chapter 4, as the standard 
mortality table in the base year, 
3. Allowance for mortality improvement over the projection period according to the 
three variants and the assumptions stated, 
4. Assumptions about the future TPFRs and ASFRs according to the three variants 
modelled and assumed over the projection. 
48 Projections become increasingly uncertain the further into the future they are carried. The period of 
time between the base year of the projection and the target year is an indication of the relative 
uncertainty of that component. Over the longer term, errors in population numbers can arise from the 
cumulative effects of a series of smaller errors at some ages being projected forward through the 
projection period. This type of error would be particularly significant to long-term projections. 
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The projected population figures and the results are presented in such a way that the 
inherent uncertainties and interactions involved in alternative mortality and fertility 
assumptions on the development of the Egyptian population and its structural 
composition are explored. Nine population projections for Egypt under different sets 
of assumptions were carried out, however, three main scenarios from the point of 
view of the ESSPS are considered. 
Scenario I (low cost variant): this represents low fertility and high mortality 
variants; 
Scenario II (medium cost variant): this represents the medium variants of mortality 
and fertility assumptions; 
Scenario III (high cost variant): represents high fertility and low mortality variants. 
Tnhlr" 5.2! F vntinn nnnulatinn nrniectinn by sex_ and age structure over 1997-2025 
Year 1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
Total VI 61.89 65.90 72.91 80.24 87.41 93.98 99.65 
Population VII 61.90 66.03 73.51 81.72 90.14 98.38 106.20 
At mid-year VIII 61.92 66.14 74.07 83.09 92.75 102.60 112.29 
Male VI 31.48 33.50 37.06 40.79 44.44 47.78 50.65 
Population VII 31.49 33.57 37.37 41.54 45.83 50.02 53.99 
VIII 31.49 33.63 37.65 42.24 47.17 52.19 57.13 
Female VI 30.41 32.39 35.85 39.45 42.97 46.20 49.00 
Population VII 30.42 32.46 36.15 40.18 44.32 48.36 52.21 
VIII 30.42 32.51 36.42 40.85 45.58 50.41 55.16 
Age Structure 
0-14 VI 38.3 36.7 34.3 33.0 31.5 29.8 27.5 
VII 38.3 36.8 34.8 33.9 33.0 31.7 29.7 
VIII 38.3 36.8 35.4 34.6 34.2 33.2 31.4 
15-59 VI 55.8 57.2 59.1 60.0 61.0 62.1 63.6 
VII 55.8 57.1 58.5 59.0 59.3 59.9 61.0 
VIII 55.8 57.0 57.9 58.1 57.9 58.1 58.9 
60+ VI 5.9 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.5 8.1 8.9 
VII 6.0 6.2 6.7 7.2 7.7 8.4 9.3 
VIII 6.0 6.2 6.7 7.3 8.0 8.8 9.7 
Dependency VI 10.7 10.7 11.1 11.6 12.3 13.1 14.0 
Ratio VII 10.7 10.8 11.4 12.1 13.1 14.1 15.2 
VIII 10.7 10.8 11.6 12.5 13.8 15.1 16.5 
Source: Derived by Author 
Egypt's demographic transition which began in the second half of the 1980s when 
the population growth rate declined from about 2.8% p. a. over 1976-86 to around 
2.1% over 1986-96, is expected to continue over the projection period. According to 
the three scenarios, the population growth rate is expected to decrease to 1.08% p. a., 
1.47% p. a., and 1.74% p. a. respectively by year 2025. 
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The main features of the projection results are shown in Table 5.2 and the main 
results are summarised in Table 4.4 of Appendix 4. Table 5.2 shows that there is a 
shift in population structure in terms of classical demographic ratios. The overall 
Egyptian population is projected to increase gradually from 60.6 million in 1996 to 
reach 99.65,106.2 or 112.29 million by 2025, according to the three scenario 
projections49 as shown in Figure 5.14. By the end of the projection period in year 
2025, the population under scenario I would be about 12.94 million smaller than 
under scenario III. 
Figure 5.14. Projected total Egyptian population under the three scenarios over 1997-2025 
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Matters of particular interest include a projected gradual rise in the population and a 
marked increase in the population of pensionable age. The proportion of the 
population of pensionable age (60+) over 1948-97 was relatively stable, increasing 
from 5.85% in 1986 to 5.95% in 199650. This proportion is projected to increase to 
8.9-9.7% in 2025 according to the three scenarios. The main changes of the 
population structures over 1948-97 were in the age groups 0-14 and 15-59. The 
proportion of the population aged 0-14 decreased from 43.0% in 1960 to 39.0% in 
1997, with annual decreases varying between 0.20-0.33%, which still reflects a young 
population structured. This proportion is projected to fall to 27.5-31.4% by year 2025. 
49 The Egyptian government official estimate of the population on 30/6/1999 is 64.33 million compared 
with the model projection of 64.62 million according to the principle projection (scenario II). 
S0 UN (1997) projects that this age group will steadily increase annually by 0.1% which seems a 
reasonable estimate. 
s' High fertility rates in the 1970s and 1980s have resulted in a young population structure, which has 
resulted in high concentration of young persons in the labour force. 
221 
The proportion of people working age (ages 15-60 for men and women) has increased 
from 51.0% in 1949 to 55.3% in 1997 with annual increases varying between 0.19- 
0.26%52. This proportion is projected to rise to 58.9-63.6% by 2025. The average age 
of the population continues to increase, with the mean age projected to rise from 24.3 
years in 1996 to 30.6-28.7 years by the end of the projection period according to the 
three scenarios. The median age is estimated to rise from 19 years in 1996 to about 
27-25 years in 2025. Factors causing this include the fall in the expected number of 
children under 15, however, it still indicates a young population structure. 
The demographic old-age dependency ratio53 declined from 11.9% in 1948 to 11.6% 
in 1993, and has since increased to 10.7% in 1996. It is estimated to increase slowly 
to 17.0-13.5% in 2025 according to the three scenarios. The demographic youth 
dependency ratio54 has fallen from 79.5% in 1948 to 67.3% in 1996 as a result of the 
increase in the proportion aged 15-60 and as the number of births continues to fall. 
The total demographic dependency ratio55 has fallen from 86% in 1948 to 73.8% in 
1996. These ratios indicate a gradual shift in the population structure of Egypt, which 
will affect not only its future labour force but also its future social protection system 
as a whole. 
5.9. Conclusion 
There is strong evidence that population mortality experience is improving faster at 
young ages and early adulthood than at late adulthood and old ages for males and 
females. Fertility is also declining significantly, particularly, from the second half of 
the 1980s, and it is expected to continue declining over the projection period. The 
overall population of Egypt is gradually increasing but at a declining rate of growth 
under the three scenarios. For Egypt, the key assumptions for the future according to 
the principle projection are: Life expectancy at birth, based on the mortality rates for 
that year, to rise from 64.6 years in 1996 to 72.1 years in 2025 for men, and from 69.1 
years in 1996 to 75.4 years in 2025 for women; TPFRs to decline from 3.82 children 
52 UN (1997) projects that the population aged 15-59 will increase annually by 0.4% and that the 
population aged 0-14 will decrease annually by 0.5% in the future. Both estimates seem to be high, 
compared with the past experience over 1948-97, and particularly when taking into account the social 
and religious factors affecting fertility in Egypt. 
s' The ratio of the population aged 60+ to the total population aged 15-60. 
54 The ratio of the population aged under 15 to the total population aged 15-60. 
55 This is the sum of the youth and old age demographic dependency ratios. 
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per woman in 1996 to 2.5 in 2025. The assumed declining fertility rates and extended 
life expectancy result in the changing profile of the population. The analysis reveals 
that the dominant impact arises from the fertility assumptions rather that the mortality 
assumptions. 
The impact of fertility can be expected to be increasingly important impact over a 
longer projection period, beyond 2025. But the parameters used to determine forecast 
of fertility over a very long time horizon are likely to be subject to greater uncertainty 
than those used to predict mortality, because they are based on social and cultural 
attitudes. 
The population as a whole is ageing, with particularly large increases in the very old. 
However, this ageing is moderate and significant effects will not materialise until well 
into the next century. These changes have to be taken into account when providing 
public resources for the ESSPS. In this context, a direct link was found between the 
projected population, the projected age structure of the contributors and the State 
liabilities towards the system. However, the analysis must focus not only on the 
number of persons contributing, and potentially receiving benefits, but also on the 
total liabilities that will be borne by the state towards them. The insured labour force 
is determined by the level and structure of the total population, and more precisely by 
the maximum number of potentially active persons. 
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